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THE “AVE MARIA” EFFECT
FREDERICK B. JONASSEN*
“[N]othing in the First Amendment converts our public schools into religionfree zones or requires all religious expression to be left at the schoolhouse
door.”1
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I. INTRODUCTION
Most everyone is familiar with the concept of “zero-tolerance” as it has been
applied in public schools by administrators and teachers determined to render their
schools free of illicit drugs, weapons, or harassing behavior. The 1980s and 1990s
cultural stew of the Columbine massacre, the war on drugs, the “broken window”
theory of law enforcement, the Gun Free Schools Act of 1994, and other influences
conspired to one extent or another to generate the policy. 2 A zero-tolerance policy
is an assignment of “explicit, predetermined punishments to specific violations of
school rules, regardless of the situation or context of the behavior.” 3 Punishments
for minor infractions include suspension or expulsion from school. 4 The policy has
the benefit of bright lines and certain punishment to discourage violations of any
kind—at least theoretically. But, worthy as this purpose may be, too often the general public becomes aware of zero-tolerance through news articles exposing harshly
inflexible punishments for trivial violations in which the definitions of weapons and
drugs have been extended beyond all reason.
There is the story of the nine-year-old who was suspended from school for
drug possession and distribution because he shared Certs Breath Mints with classmates.5 Another child was suspended for weapons possession when he “formed his
2. On the influence of Columbine, see Celeste Headlee, 15 Years after Columbine, Are Schools
Any Safer?, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Apr. 18, 2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/04/18/304526475/15-years-aftercolumbine-are-schools-any-safer; on the war on drugs, see Stephanie Francis Ward, Schools Start to Rethink
Zero-Tolerance
Policies,
A.B.A.
(Aug.
2014),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/schools_start_to_rethink_zero_tolerance_policies/; on the “broken windows” theory of law enforcement, see generally Brian N. Moore, Tolerating Zero Tolerance?, SCH. BUS. AFF. 8 (Oct. 2010),
http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/EJ914665.pdf; and on the Gun Free Schools Act of 1994, 20 U.S.C. §§ 8921–
23 (repealed 2002), see Russell J. Skiba, The Failure of Zero Tolerance, 22 RECLAIMING CHILD. & YOUTH 27, 28
(2014), and Kathleen M. Cerrone, Comment, The Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994: Zero Tolerance Takes Aim
at Procedural Due Process, 20 PACE L. REV. 131 (1999).
3. Christopher Boccanfuso & Megan Kuhfeld, Multiple Responses, Promising Results: EvidenceBased, Nonpunitive Alternatives to Zero Tolerance, CHILD TRENDS 1 (Mar. 2011), http://www.nea.org/assets/docs/alternatives-to-zero-tolerance.pdf.
4. Id.
5. Dan Eggen, Boy Brought up on a Candy Rap, WASH. POST (Sept. 23, 1997), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1997/09/23/boy-brought-up-on-a-candy-rap/9f9054fb-afe1-4547-af8ec0fbbb8fac92/?utm_term=.394445ae1cd3 (discussing incident in which a nine-year-old student was suspended after bringing Certs to school and allegedly telling another student the candy would make him
“jump higher”).
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hand into the shape of a gun and pointed his finger ‘execution-style’ at a classmate[.]”6 Yet another incident concerned a seven-year-old who was suspended for
chewing a pop-tart into the shape of a pistol.7 And the game of tag was banned
from a school because it involved too much touching.8 As early as 1999, USA Today
reported that students were removed from school for possessing
Midol, Tylenol, Alka Seltzer, cough drops and Scope mouthwash—contraband that violates zero-tolerance, anti-drug policies. Students have been
expelled for Halloween costumes that included paper swords and fake
spiked knuckles, as well as for possessing rubber bands, slingshots and toy
guns—all violations of anti-weapons policies.9
These examples could easily be multiplied. There is no evidence that the policy
has decreased violence and drug use in schools, 10 but there is evidence that it has
damaged trust between students and teachers,11 has been applied disproportionately to minorities,12 and has created a school to prison pipeline. 13 Of course, the
unreasonable implementation of this policy has also led to withering criticism and
much re-evaluation.14
6. Patrick Jonsson, Ohio Boy Suspended for Pointing Finger Like a Gun. ‘Zero-Tolerance’ Run
Amok?,
CHRISTIAN
SCI.
MONITOR
(Mar.
4,
2014),
https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Education/2014/0304/Ohio-boy-suspended-for-pointing-finger-like-a-gun.-Zero-tolerancerun-amok.
7. Melissa Locker, WATCH: Boy Suspended from School for Making “Gun” out of a Pop-Tart,
TIME (Mar. 4, 2013), http://newsfeed.time.com/2013/03/04/watch-boy-suspended-from-school-for-making-gun-out-of-a-pop-tart/.
8. Scott Timberg, Zero-Tolerance Madness: A “No Touching” Rule Means Even Tag Is Out-ofBounds for Seattle-Area School Kids, SALON (Sept. 25, 2015), http://www.salon.com/2015/09/25/zero_tolerance_madness_a_no_touching_rule_means_even_tag_is_out_of_bounds_for_seattle_area_school_kids/.
9. Dennis Cauchon, Zero-Tolerance Policies Lack Flexibility, U.S.A. TODAY (Apr. 13, 1999),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/educate/ednews3.htm.
10. Skiba, supra note 2, at 30 (“No data exist to show that out-of-school suspensions and expulsions reduce disruption or improve school climate. If anything, disciplinary removal appears to have negative effects on student outcomes and the learning climate. . . . It is difficult to argue that zero tolerance
approaches are necessary in order to safeguard an orderly and effective learning climate when schools that
use school exclusion more have poorer academic outcomes.”).
11. Boccanfuso & Kuhfeld, supra note 3, at 2 (“Students who trust their teachers, and feel that
their teachers are respectful, fair, and attentive, are more likely to form bonds with and perform well in
school. By restricting the ability of school staff to put student actions into context in some cases, zero tolerance policies can inhibit the formation of school bonds.” (footnotes omitted)).
12. Stephen Hoffman, Zero Benefit: Estimating the Effect of Zero Tolerance Discipline Policies on
Racial Disparities in School Discipline, 28 EDUC. POL’Y 69, 90 (2014) (“[Z]ero tolerance policies have an especially harsh impact on Black students, exacerbating already severe disparities in school discipline between
Black students and White students.”).
13. AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOC. ZERO TOLERANCE TASK FORCE, Are Zero Tolerance Policies Effective in
the Schools?: An Evidentiary Review and Recommendations, 63 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 852, 856 (2008) (“The increased reliance on more severe consequences in response to student disruption has . . . resulted in an
increase of referrals to the juvenile justice system for infractions that were once handled in school. The
term school-to-prison pipeline has emerged from the study of this phenomenon.” (citations omitted) (original emphasis)).
14. See, e.g., John Cloud, The Columbine Effect, TIME (Nov. 28, 1999), http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,35098,00.html; Ward, supra note 2; AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOC.
ZERO TOLERANCE TASK FORCE, supra note 13.
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If school administrators are able to crack down on Certs Breath Mints and paper firearms, it should surprise no one that they may implement a zero-tolerance
policy toward religious expression, one that unreasonably and intolerantly prohibits
any speech that touches on religion. One could certainly devote a law review article
to an examination of the many cases in which students have been denied religious
expression in public schools: the first grader whose poster expressing thanks for
Jesus was the only one his school would not display because of its religious content;15 the school district that discontinued recitation of a Mohawk Thanksgiving
address over the public address system because some believed it could be a Native
American prayer;16 the Montana valedictorian who was not permitted a brief mention of her religious belief in God and Christ at a graduation ceremony;17 the cheerleaders who were not permitted to carry banners and run-throughs containing Bible
verses at football games;18 and a football coach (concededly not an instance of student speech) who was fired for praying by himself after football games.19
Then there is the case of “Ave Maria,” which will serve as the exclusive focus
of this Article. In this case, Nurre v. Whitehead, the Everett School District in Washington State prohibited the seniors of the Jackson High School Wind Ensemble from

15. C.H. ex rel. Z.H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2000). The student made the poster in response
to an assignment asking the students “to make posters depicting what they were ‘thankful for.’” Id. at 201.
The poster was at first displayed with the others, but then removed, and finally placed in a less prominent
spot. Id. The Third Circuit remanded the case with instructions to dismiss on what the dissent characterized
as “a spurious procedural ground never raised by the defendants—viz., that the complaint does not adequately allege facts providing a basis for holding any of the defendants responsible for the treatment of the
poster.” Id. at 203 (Alito, J., dissenting).
16. Jock v. Ransom, No. 7:05-cv-1108, 2007 WL 1879717 (N.D.N.Y. June 28, 2007), aff’d, No. 073162-CV, 2009 WL 742193 (2d Cir. Mar. 20, 2009). Originally, the school district allowed the OHEN:TON
KARIHWATEHKWEN or Mohawk Thanksgiving Address to be played over the public address system “for the
pedagogical purpose of exposing District students to Mohawk language and culture.” Id. at *6. A non-Mohawk student’s parents complained that the recitation of the Address was a prayer. Id. at *1. Following the
advice of counsel, the school district removed the Address from the public-address system. Id. The parents
of Mohawk students filed a complaint that the action violated their equal protection rights. Id. at *2. Confronted with conflicting evidence as to the nature of the Address, the court concluded that the actions of
the school district were at least reasonable. Id. at *12.
17. Griffith v. Butte Sch. Dist. No. 1, 244 P.3d 321, 333 (Mont. 2010) (finding that school district
violated student’s free speech rights by prohibiting her from mentioning her religious beliefs: “We find it
unreasonable for the School District to conclude that Griffith’s cursory references to her personal religious
beliefs could be viewed by those in attendance at the BHS graduation ceremony as a religious endorsement
by the School District.”).
18. Matthews v. Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 53526, 2013 WL 1914796 (356th Judicial Dist. Tex.
May 8, 2013) (“Neither the Establishment Clause nor any other law prohibits the cheerleaders from using
religious-themed banners at school sporting events. Neither the Establishment Clause nor any other law
requires Kountze I.S.D. to prohibit the inclusion of religious-themed banners at school sporting events.”),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part 482 S.W.3d 120 (Tex. App. 2014) (holding that the case had been rendered moot
by the school district’s change of policy permitting the banners and run-throughs), rev’d 484 S.W.3d 416
(Tex. 2016) (holding case is not moot and remanding for further proceedings).
19. Brief of Appellant at 4, Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., No. 16-35801, 2016 WL 6611220
(9th Cir. Oct. 31, 2016) (“Specifically, after the game is over, and after the players and coaches from both
teams have met to shake hands at midfield, Coach Kennedy feels called to pause on the playing field to
engage in private religious expression. He takes a knee at the 50-yard line and offers a silent or quiet prayer
of thanksgiving for player safety, sportsmanship, and spirited competition. That prayer lasts no more than
30 seconds.”(citations omitted)).

2018

THE “AVE MARIA” EFFECT

733

performing an instrumental piece of music they had chosen to play for their graduation ceremony.20 The reason for the prohibition was the sectarian title of the chosen work, “Ave Maria.”21 The district and appellate courts produced opinions ruling
in favor of the school, prompting a concurrence by Judge Milan D. Smith disagreeing
with the constitutional reasoning of the majority,22 and a dissent by Justice Samuel
A. Alito to the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari.23 Even after finding that instrumental music is constitutionally protected speech, and after ostensibly assuming
that the performance of the Wind Ensemble was a limited public forum, the lower
courts found it reasonable to ban the work from commencement because of the
possibility that the appearance of its title in the graduation program could either
create an Establishment Clause violation or engender controversy. 24
The case is almost ten years old now. It has provoked some, but not a great
deal, of critical commentary.25 Nevertheless, there are some things about it that
stand out. Nurre is not like the cases of religious expression mentioned above. In
those cases—with the possible exception of the Mohawk case—the messages or
prayers were intentionally religious. The Nurre case is different in that the students
who wished to perform “Ave Maria” quite credibly intended no religious message
at all and would not likely have been understood by their audience to be expressing
one. Their interest in the music was artistic, not religious. On the other hand, that
very aspect of Nurre makes the case comparable to the instances of zero-tolerance
regarding drugs and weapons cited above.26 In those cases of zero-tolerance, school
authorities punished students for behavior that obviously had nothing to do with
the reasons for which the policy was implemented: the students in those cases had
no intention of taking illicit drugs or carrying dangerous weapons, and were not in
possession of anything illicit or dangerous. In the “Ave Maria” case, the authorities
prohibited student expression which similarly possessed no intention of conveying
a religious message, and which was simply not religious. Just as zero-tolerance
sweeps up harmless behavior, irrelevant to the purposes of the policy, and imposes
harsh punishment, the school administrators of Jackson High, in their zeal to avoid
offending the Establishment Clause, unreasonably banned a beautiful work of musical art, which the Jackson High seniors wanted to play at their graduation. But
unlike zero-tolerance for the performance of “Ave Maria,” zero tolerance for student consumption of Alka Selzer does not implicate the constitutional right of Free
Speech.
20. Nurre v. Whitehead, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1225 (W.D. Wash. 2007), aff’d 580 F.3d 1087,
1091 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. denied 559 U.S. 1025 (2010).
21. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1225; Nurre, 580 F.3d at 1091.
22. Nurre, 580 F.3d at 1099 (Smith, J., dissenting in part, but concurring in the judgment).
23. Nurre, 559 U.S. at 1025 (Alito, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
24. Nurre, 580 F.3d at 1095; Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1238.
25. See, e.g., CATHERINE J. ROSS, LESSONS IN CENSORSHIP: HOW SCHOOLS AND COURTS SUBVERT STUDENTS’
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS 265–67 (2015); William M. Perrine, Religious Music and Free Speech: Philosophical
Issues in Nurre v. Whitehead, 21 PHIL. MUSIC EDUC. REV. 178 passim (2013); Matthew J. Shechtman, Piercing
Pearson: Is Qualified Immunity Curbing Students’ Free Speech Rights?, 43 STETSON L. REV. 17 passim (2013);
Charles J. Russo, Tone Deaf? The Courts Turn a Deaf Ear to Religious Music in Schools, 257 EDUC. L. REP. 1
passim (2010); Frederick B. Jonassen, Free Speech and Establishment Clause Rights at Public School Graduations Ceremonies: A Disclaimer: The Preceding Speech Was Government Censored and Does Not Represent
the Views of the Valedictorian, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 683, 766–76 (2009).
26. See supra notes 3–14.
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The title of this Article, “The ‘Ave Maria’ Effect,” is not intended to suggest a
discussion of religious expression per se. Rather, it is meant to signify a narrowing
of permissible student expression due to unreasonable fear of Establishment Clause
litigation created by the courts. By allowing the prohibition of an instrumental piece
of music at graduation because of its name, without deciding whether this could
have been a genuine Establishment Clause violation, the courts have, in effect, decided that school administrators may implement a zero-tolerance policy at school
events towards any expression having a scintilla of religion about it. Moreover, the
precedent has left school administrators with the incentive to do just that in order
to avoid any imaginable violation of the Establishment Clause or any criticism from
members of the community no matter how extreme and hostile to religion that
criticism may be. Finally, the Ninth Circuit opinion permits this prohibition to be
extended not only to anything suggestive of religious speech, but also to any speech
that, in the view of school officials, may be controversial,27 a proposition that could
potentially suppress far more than religious expression.
Following this introduction, Section II of this Article will present the facts of
Nurre. Section III will outline the reasoning of the opinions of the district court, the
appeals court, and the opinions of Judge Smith and Justice Alito. This part of the
Article is by far the most lengthy in tracing the tortuous and dubious reasoning of
the district and appellate courts in reaching conclusions that deferred so completely
to school authorities. Section IV will concern the Oral Argument before the Ninth
Circuit. And Section V will discuss the Amici Curiae Briefs. A pessimistic Conclusion
will follow.
II. THE FACTS OF NURRE V. WHITEHEAD
In the spring of 2006, the plaintiff, Kathryn Nurre, was a senior member of the
Wind Ensemble of Jackson High School, located in Everett, Washington. 28 As in previous years, the Wind Ensemble was to perform a musical piece at the school’s graduation ceremony.29 In 2002, when Leslie Moffat replaced Jim Rice as the Faculty
Director of the Wind Ensemble, the senior members told Moffat that Rice had allowed the seniors to select the music they would perform at graduation.30 Rice,
however, “testified that he ‘always selected the piece the band played [and] [t]he
graduating seniors had no input in that selection.’”31

27. Nurre, 580 F.3d at 1094–95 (citing precedent that ostensibly found “that a [School] District's
concern regarding disruption and controversy were legitimate reasons for restricting content . . . . [and]
recognized that a school acts reasonably when it takes steps to avoid controversy or maintain an appearance of neutrality[,]” and concluding, “Here, the District was acting to avoid a repeat of the 2005 controversy
by prohibiting any reference to religion at its graduation ceremonies.”).
28. Nurre v. Whitehead, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1225 (W.D. Wash. 2007).
29. Id.
30. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Nurre v. Whitehead, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1222 (W.D.
Wash. 2007) (No. C06-0901RSL), 2007 WL 4868967 (“Lesley Moffat replaced Rice during the Summer of
2002, which was Nurre’s freshman year. Moffat was told by the students that seniors had a ‘tradition’ of
selecting the final piece to play at commencement.” (citations omitted)).
31. Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, Nurre, 520 F.
Supp. 2d 1222 (No. C06-0901RSL) (citing Dkt. 13 ¶2).
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Moffat relied on what the seniors told her and allowed them to choose the
piece they would perform at graduation for three years (200305).32 For each of
these years, the seniors chose to perform “On a Hymnsong of Phillip Bliss,” by David
R. Holsinger, a piece that Rice had earlier selected for the Wind Ensemble to perform at graduation during his tenure as Director.33 In 2006, however, the seniors
“wanted to start [their] own tradition by playing a different song.”34 They unanimously chose to play Franz Biebl’s “Ave Maria,” a piece that they had performed at
the school winter concert earlier in the school year, the title appearing without controversy in the concert program.35 Nurre testified, “Religion didn’t even come into
our minds at all[.]”36 “The other seniors and I did not choose the ‘Ave Maria’ piece
because of any religious message it might convey. Rather, the seniors chose it because of its beauty, we liked how it sounded and the performance would have made
our graduation a memorable one.”37
Moffat sent a copy of the music to the Principal of Jackson High, Terry Cheshire, and to the Everett School District’s Associate Superintendent, Karst Brandsma,
with a note indicating that the words were not to be sung. 38 Cheshire recognized
that the selection might be a problem because of complaints regarding the Jackson
High School Choir’s performance of a choral piece, “Up Above My Head,” at the
2005 graduation.39 That was Cheshire’s first year as principal.40 At that time, he was
unaware that in approving music for graduation, he had the responsibility of reviewing not only the titles of the musical pieces, but also their content.41 Because
32. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 30. (“Having no knowledge of Mr.
Rice’s practice of personally selecting the graduation piece without student input, Moffat permitted students to select the music to be performed.” (citations omitted)).
33. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1225.
34. Plaintiff Nurre’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1222 (No. C06901RSL).
35. Nurre, 1222 F. Supp. 2d at 1225.
36. Supplemental Declaration of Michael A. Patterson Re: Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment, Exh. 2, Deposition Upon Oral Examination of Kathryn Nurre at 67, Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1222
(No. C06-0901RSL) [hereinafter Deposition Upon Oral Examination of Kathryn Nurre]; Plaintiff Nurre’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 34 (“Plaintiff and the other seniors did not choose the piece because of any religious message it might convey.”).
37. Declaration of Kathryn Nurre in Support of Her Motion for Summary Judgment ¶¶ 17–18,
Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1222 (No. C06-901RSL), 2007 WL 4868957; Plaintiff Nurre’s Motion for Summary
Judgment, supra note 34, at 3 (citing Nurre Dep. at 85); Declaration Of Michael A. Patterson Re: Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment, Exh. 3, Deposition Upon Oral Examination of Lesley Moffat at 36, Nurre,
520 F. Supp. 2d 1222 (No. C06-0901RSL) [hereinafter Deposition Upon Oral Examination of Lesley Moffat]
(“[The students] really liked the piece, and it’s beautiful, and they said they wanted to play it because of
that.”).
38. Brief of Appellant at 5, Nurre, 580 F.3d 1087 (No. 07-35867) (“Moffat sent copies of the music
that was to be performed to Terry Cheshire, Principal of JHS, and Karst Brandsma, the District’s Associate
Superintendent for Instruction. A note accompanying Moffat’s submission stated that the senior members
chose ‘Ave Maria’ for their piece to play during the ceremony. She also sent the musical score for the piece;
at the top, Moffat wrote in bold ‘Not sung,’ indicating there would be no vocal parts or lyrics.” (citations
omitted)).
39. Nurre, 580 F.3d at 1091.
40. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 30.
41. Id. (“Jackson’s principal, Terry Cheshire, had just begun his tenure at Jackson and was unaware that it was his responsibility to review not only the titles of the music, but also the content to ensure
compliance with District policy.” (citations omitted)).
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Cheshire did not perceive any religious content from the title of “Up Above My
Head,” he approved it without examining its lyrics, so that Everett School District
officials were not aware of the religious content of this piece. 42 The Superintendent
of the Everett School District, Carol Whitehead, testified that members of the audience complained to her about “Christian” lyrics in the song, such as, “over our
heads, Jesus reigns.”43 Brandsma testified that complaints were sent to the editor
of The Herald, the largest newspaper in Snohomish County.44 However, the only
complaint that was documented in the litigation was a single letter appearing in The
Herald.45
Religious song had no place at event
This letter is regarding Henry M. Jackson High School’s graduation at the
Everett Events Center, which is, as I understand it, a public venue.
I would like to express my puzzlement over how the Everett School District
– including a school board member, superintendent, south area executive
director, principal and choir director – can justify classroom civics instruction on the importance of our national and state constitutions specifically
relating to policy regarding religious activity, while willfully disregarding
the same by sponsorship of nonsecular entertainment during a public
graduation ceremony. (The program’s song title of “Up Above My Head”
gave no indication the words sung would be of a religious nature.)
Is that the final lesson of our students’ education? If in fact the lesson was
to demonstrate the meaning of hypocrisy, an “A” grade should be
awarded. Finally, does putting the violation to music somehow mitigate

42. Id. (“Because the title to the song ‘Up Above My Head’ appeared secular, Cheshire approved
it.” (citations omitted)).
43. Declaration of Michael A. Patterson Re: Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Exh. 2,
Deposition Upon Oral Examination of Dr. Carol Whitehead at 60–61, Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1222 (No. C060901RSL) [hereinafter Deposition Upon Oral Examination of Dr. Carol Whitehead].
Q.

What about the songs [were] Christian?

A.

At the 2005 on the program the principal had reviewed the titles with the teachers and
the title was something like – I would have to see it exactly to make sure I’m quoting
this correctly – but something like up over my head or up over our head, and so he took
the recommendation from the teacher that reviewed the title. But when the song was
sung, the lyrics were something like up over my head Jesus reigns, and so it was clearly
a song of a Christian nature.

44. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 30 (“[S]ome [people in the audience] sent complaints to the editor of the Snohomish County’s largest newspaper.” (citations omitted)).
(The district court opinion refers to Associate Superintendent Brandsma as “Ms.” However, the deposition
makes clear that Karst Brandsma is a “Mr.” See Declaration of Michael A. Patterson Re: Defendant’s Motion
for Summary Judgment, supra note 37, at 20, 31, 42).
45. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 6–7, Nurre, 559 U.S. 1025 (No. 09-671) (“School officials
stated during deposition that they received complaints about the religious nature of ‘Up Above My Head,’
but the only specifically documented complaint about the earlier 2005 graduation that Respondent admitted to the record was a single letter to the editor of the local paper mocking the educational competence
of the Superintendent and her subordinates[.]” (emphasis in original)).
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the offense? Under no circumstance should this letter be construed as a
criticism of the very talented performing students! 46
Although Whitehead described the song’s lyrics as Christian, claiming they referred specifically to Jesus Christ, the source Ms. Whitehead cited, the Kirk Franklin
lyrics, does not have any specifically Christian references, though it does mention
“God” repeatedly.47
Up above my head I hear music in the air
Up above my head there's a melody so bright
And fair
I can hear when I'm all alone
Even in those times when I feel all hope is gone
Up above my head I hear joybells ringing
Up above my head I hear angels singing
There must be a God somewhere
There must be a God somewhere

I hear music in the air
I hear music everywhere

There must be a God somewhere
There must be a God somewhere
There must be a God somewhere
There must be a God somewhere48
After the 2005 controversy, Mr. Cheshire was instructed to review all musical
selections for content as well as title, especially in the context of commencement
exercises.49 But as Moffat indicated, no words were to be sung in the wind ensemble’s performance of “Ave Maria,”50 so, unlike “Up Above My Head,” the instrumental music to be performed had no explicit religious content, except for its title.
46. Declaration of Michael A. Patterson re: Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Exh. 4,
Letter to the Editor of the Everett Herald published June 26, 2005, Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1222 (No. C060901RSL).
47. The Defendant references these lyrics in Appellee’s Answering Brief, at 5, Nurre, 580 F.3d
1087 (No. 07-35967) (citing KIRK FRANKLIN Lyrics–UP ABOVE MY HEAD, that may be found at
http://www.azlyrics.com/lyrics/kirkfranklin/upabovemyhead.html).
48. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 45, at 6, n.3.
49. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 30.
50. Brief of Appellant, supra note 38.
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Cheshire informed the School District’s Executive Director of Instruction and
Curriculum, Lynn Evans, about his concerns that “Ave Maria” might not be consistent with the District’s policy in the light of the controversy of the previous year.51
Evans brought the matter to Brandsma, who agreed with Evans and Cheshire that
“Ave Maria” should not be played at the graduation.52 When Whitehead learned of
the matter, she called a meeting with Brandsma and Evans to discuss the Wind Ensemble’s selection of “Ave Maria.”53 At the meeting, it was decided that the performance would not be permitted at the graduation ceremony.54 As Whitehead testified, “[W]e made the decision that because the title of the piece would be on that
program and it’s Ave Maria and that many people would see that as religious in
nature, that we would ask the band to select something different.” 55 It appears that
no one at the meeting clearly understood the meaning of the words, “Ave Maria.”56
Whitehead testified that she did not understand their meaning.57 In her deposition,
Nurre demonstrated she did not understand the meaning of the words either. 58 The
decision was made without any input or attempt to receive input from the students.59
After the meeting, Brandsma sent an email to the high school principals of the
District in which he requested that the principals provide a copy of the musical selections that would be performed including any lyrics that would be sung.60
Brandsma noted that School Policy 2340 and Procedure 2340P allowed musical
presentations with religious themes as long as the selections were based on their
artistic and educational value and are accompanied by comparable non-religious
works.61 However, Brandsma mandated that

51. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 30.
52. Id.
53. Nurre v. Whitehead, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1225 (W.D. Wash. 2007).
54. Deposition Upon Oral Examination of Dr. Carol Whitehead, supra note 43, at 77.
55. Id. at 76–77.
56. “[Whitehead’s] sole concern and that of the persons attending the meeting was the listing
of the two-word title of the piece, although no one at the meeting knew what the words ‘Ave Maria’ meant,
other than that they thought it had a religious connotation.” Plaintiff Nurre’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 34, at 4 (citations omitted).
57. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 45, at 18 (citing Excerpts from the Record on Appeal
(hereinafter ER 229) (“Superintendent Whitehead disclaimed knowing what the words Ave Maria even
meant, though she viewed it as having a ‘religious connotation.’”).
58. Deposition Upon Oral Examination of Kathryn Nurre, supra note 36, at 35–36.
Q.

Do you know what [“Ave Maria”] stands for?
***

A.

I’m not sure. I know it’s – I think it’s Latin and it has to do with Mary, and it
means like Holy Mary or something. I’m not sure.

59. Plaintiff Nurre’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 34, at 5 (“During their deliberations and discussions, neither the Defendant nor any of the school administrators ever allowed the students
to give them input or additional information. They engaged in absolutely no dialogue with the students and
conducted no genuine investigation into their selection of ‘Ave Maria’ or its origins.”).
60. Id. at 4.
61. Id.

2018

THE “AVE MARIA” EFFECT

739

music selections for graduation be entirely secular in nature. My rationale
is based on the nature of the event. It is a commencement program in celebration of senior students earning their high school diploma. It is not a
music concert. Musical selections should add to the celebration and should
not be a separate event. Invited guests of graduates are a captive audience. I understand that attendance is voluntary, but I believe that few students (and their invited guests) would want to miss the culminating event
of their academic career. And lastly there is insufficient time at graduation
to balance comparable artistic works.62
Whitehead made a similar distinction between commencement ceremonies
and other school programs in her deposition.
It’s my understanding that the commencement is a once in a lifetime opportunity for students and their families, that it should be a neutral experience so that every student and every family can feel comfortable coming
there. Because based on what I understand about a Federal Supreme Court
decision, it is not really an opportunity that would be voluntary in that
should the student or their parents or other family members opt not to
attend, they would never have another opportunity to get that back, which
is very different than attending another assembly or attending another
concert.63
The Everett School District had a policy, Board Policy 2430P, in force at the
time of this controversy, which provided rules for the performance of music with
religious associations.64 School Board Policy 2430P did not reflect the distinction
which Mr. Brandsma and Ms. Whitehead drew between a high school graduation
and other school programs.65 The Policy read as follows:
Religious services, programs or assemblies shall not be conducted in school
facilities during school hours or in connection with any school sponsored
or school related activity. Speakers and/or programs that convey a religious or devotional message are prohibited. This restriction does not preclude the presentation of choral or musical assemblies, which may use religious music or literature as a part of the program or assembly.
Musical, artistic and dramatic presentations, which have a religious theme
may be included in course work and programs on the basis of their particular artistic and educational value or traditional secular usage. They shall
62. Id. at 4–5 (emphasis in original).
63. Deposition Upon Oral Examination of Dr. Carol Whitehead, supra note 43, at 33–34.
64. Plaintiff Nurre’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 34, at 10 (“This policy reflects
the settled rule that it is not improper for public school music groups to perform music with religious
themes.”).
65. Id. at 11 (“Defendant Whitehead has sought to justify the exclusion of ‘Ave Maria’ in this case
on the grounds that commencement exercises are different and require that all musical performances be
secular. However, the only school board policy governing music performances and religion is Policy 2340P,
. . . and there is no separate school board policy that covers performances at commencement ceremonies.
Therefore, school district policies do not treat music performances at commencement differently from
other music performances.” (citations omitted)).
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be presented in a neutral, non-devotional manner, be related to the objective of the instructional program, and be accompanied by comparable
artistic works of a non-religious nature.66
In his deposition testimony, Brandsma explained the School District’s role in
overseeing graduation.
Everett School District holds graduation ceremonies for all of its high
schools at the Everett Events Center. Though the Everett School District
does not own the Everett Events Center, it rents the facility and does sponsor and fund the graduation ceremony of each of its three comprehensive
high schools . . . The Everett School District is responsible for the conduct
and content of all speeches and performances that occur at these graduation ceremonies. . . . [A]nd the District maintains supervisory control over
each aspect of the ceremony. Speeches are reviewed in advance to ensure
they are compliant with District policies. Music is also reviewed. If any
speech were inappropriate, such as containing language that was lewd, offensive, profane, or proselytizing (which is not meant to be an exhaustive
list), the District would not allow it.67
Consistent with this statement, the defendant claimed that the school administration sponsored the graduation in its entirety, used its funds to rent the facility
where the graduation took place, planned the details of the ceremony, was fully
responsible for all content and conduct that occurred, maintained supervisory control over all aspects of the event, and reviewed speeches and music in advance to
be sure that they complied with school district policies. 68
As indicated above, the concern of the school officials was that the title of
“Ave Maria” would appear in the graduation program and be recognized as religious.69 After receiving Brandsma’s email, Moffat spoke with Cheshire for clarification, and suggested that the program simply list the piece at issue as “A Selection
by France [sic] Biebl,” thus suppressing the sectarian title of the music.70 But Cheshire told her, without other explanation, “[I]t would be unethical to inaccurately or
untruthfully list the titles to pieces.” 71 Moffat then informed the Wind Ensemble
66. Complaint para. 15, Nurre v. Whitehead, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1222 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (No. C06–
901RSL), 2006 WL 2302614.
67. Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 31.
68. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 30.
69. See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text.
70. Regarding this conversation between Mr. Cheshire and Ms. Moffat, Ms. Moffat testified.
A.

I did ask for clarification as to why.

Q.

And what did Mr. Cheshire say?

A.

That–well, in the conversation, I said, “Could we change and just write ‘A selection by France [sic] Biebl’?”

Deposition Upon Oral Examination of Lesley Moffat, supra note 37, at 40. In subsequent quotations of this
conversation, the composer’s first name, Franz, will be spelled correctly.
71. Nurre v. Whitehead, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1226 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (citing Dkt. # 12 (Cheshire
Decl.) at ¶ 4). Ms. Moffat continued her testimony:
A.

And then I was–that was where he said that that would not be, I believe the
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that they needed to select a different piece of music to play at the graduation. 72
Nurre and the other members of the Ensemble were upset by the decision.73 Rather
than boycott the commencement, they reluctantly decided to play the fourth movement of the “Holst Second Suite in F” which was performed at the graduation on
June 17, 2006.74 It was listed as Gustav Holst’s “Second Suite for Military Band.”75
At the ceremony, Nurre and the other senior members of the Wind Ensemble received their diplomas.76
Whitehead later testified that it would not have been “appropriate” to play
“Ave Maria” without listing its title in the program.77 However, several pieces played
by the High School Jazz Combo at the beginning of the ceremony when attendees
were taking their seats were not listed.78 These pieces, however, were not “featured” as was the performance of the Wind Ensemble.79 In any event, Whitehead
indicated that she would have objected to “Ave Maria” even if it were not listed on
the graduation program, “[b]ecause it is a religious piece.”80
The commencement ceremony included a variety of instrumental and vocal
music, both student–performed and recorded.81 Aside from the Wind Ensemble’s
performance, the Jazz Combo played six separate instrumental works, “Freedom
Jazz Dance,” “Day by Day,” “Let’s Fall in Love,” “Unforgettable,” “Un Poco Loco,”
and “Travelling Light.”82 Then the processional followed, an instrumental-only recording of “Pomp and Circumstance,” which was also used for the recessional. 83
Once assembled, the “graduates stood to the ‘National Anthem,’ sung by Aubrey
Logan of the Class of 2006.”84 After remarks by a class speaker, the school Choir
performed “Mother Africa.”85

word “ethical.” I’m not 100 percent sure, but on that line, would not be okay to
do that.
***
Q.

Did he state why it was unethical or wrong or whatever to have an alternate
title?

A.

No, I don’t believe so.

Deposition Upon Oral Examination of Lesley Moffat, supra note 37, at 40-41.
72. Plaintiff Nurre’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 34, at 5.
73. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 45, at 10.
74. Plaintiff Nurre’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 34, at 6; Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d
at 1226.
75. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1226.
76. Plaintiff Nurre’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 34, at 2.
77. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 45, at 8 (citing ER 22526).
78. Plaintiff Nurre’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 34, at 4.
79. Brief in Opposition [to Petition for Certiorari], at *10–11, Nurre v. Whitehead, 559 U.S. 1025
(2010) (No. 09-671), 2010 WL 128006 (“Because the song [“Ave Maria”] was a featured piece as opposed
to a prelude to the ceremony, the District concluded that it would be more appropriate to choose another
song, rather than simply list the name of the piece in the program under a different title.”).
80. Brief of Appellant, supra note 38, at 32 (citing ER 227).
81. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 45, at *10.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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On June 26, 2006, Nurre filed her complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging
violations of the Free Speech Clause, the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 86
III. THE OPINIONS
The title of Biebl’s work is certainly religious. “Ave Maria” is Latin for “Hail
Mary,” the Roman Catholic prayer to the Virgin Mary, the Mother of Jesus Christ. 87
Among the many musical settings for this prayer, perhaps the two best known are
the version by Johann Sebastian Bach and Charles Gounod, and the version by Franz
Schubert; but there are many others.88 Comparatively speaking, the setting by Franz
Biebl is obscure, composed as it was in 1964 for a German fire brigade choir engaged in a choral competition.89 Today, it has some currency both performed with
words and performed as an instrumental piece by various ensembles.90
The question of whether the sectarian title of the piece could legally appear
in a public school graduation program will be assessed later in this Article. However,
that issue is something of a red herring. Moffat’s suggestion that the piece be identified in the program as, “A Selection by Franz Biebl,” not only indicated the lack of
religious motive in presenting this work, but would also have avoided the problem
school administrators had with the piece by excluding its title from the graduation
program altogether.91 Whatever the validity of Cheshire’s reason for rejecting the
offer, another topic reserved for later treatment, the students clearly only wished
to perform “Ave Maria” for artistic reasons. In fact, Nurre v. Whitehead is not a case
about religious expression at all, but rather a case about artistic expression suppressed by an unreasonable fear of violating the Establishment Clause.

86. Complaint, supra note 66, ¶¶ 17–34.
87. The district court took judicial notice that “Ave Maria” means “Hail Mary.” Nurre v. Whitehead, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1225, n.3 (W. D. Wash 2007) (citing WEBSTER’S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY
DICTIONARY 141 (1984) (defining “Ave Maria” as “The Hail Mary”); WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 150 (1981) (unabridged) (defining “Ave Maria” as “1. a salutation to the Virgin Mary combined
as now used in the Roman Catholic Church with a prayer to her as mother of God”)).
88. Justice Alito makes this point. “Many composers including Schubert, Gounod, Verdi, Mozart,
Elgar, Saint-Saéns, Rossini, Brahms, Stravinsky, Bruckner, and Rachmaninoff, composed music for the Ave
Maria.” Nurre v. Whitehead, 559 U.S. 1025, 1026, n.1 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
89. Wilbur Skeels, Program Note, Franz Biebl’s Ave Maria (Angelus Domini), https://web.archive.org/web/20110719132345/http://cantusquercus.com/ave.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2018). In program notes to Biebl’s Ave Maria, the choral conductor, Wilbur Skeels, relates that Franz X. Biebl, the choirmaster of a parish near Munich, Germany, composed the work for a local fire brigade chorus to perform at
festivals and competitions. Id. The work gained popularity when the Cornell University Glee Club, after a
visit to Germany, brought it to the United States. Id.
90. Chanticleer, Ave Maria-Franz Biebl- Chanticleer, YOUTUBE (Dec. 26, 2008),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XVyCJlPiHFg (a performance of the spoken words by Chanticleer);
Robert C. Cameron, Franz Biebl: Ave Maria (arr. Robert C. Cameron), YOUTUBE (Aug. 14, 2010),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ymtVCizCVi4 (an instrumental version).
91. See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text.
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A. The Decision to Assess Nurre’s Constitutional Claims
On September 20, 2007, Judge Robert S. Lasnik of the Western District of
Washington issued the district court opinion.92 Before the court were cross motions
for summary judgment.93 As an initial matter, the court had to decide (1) whether
Nurre’s case was moot because she had agreed to perform an alternative piece at
her commencement and received her degree; and (2) whether the court could
simply grant Whitehead qualified immunity and dispense with any further analysis
of Nurre’s constitutional claims.94
The court agreed with Whitehead that Nurre’s graduation mooted her claims
for declaratory and injunctive relief.95 She had already suffered any alleged damage
from the school’s prohibition of “Ave Maria” so that those forms of relief no longer
served any purpose and were not available.96 However, Nurre’s graduation did not
moot her claim for monetary damages. 97
On the defendants’ qualified immunity defense, the court applied the then
controlling Supreme Court test from Saucier v. Katz, which required that in deciding
whether to grant a defendant qualified immunity the court must first determine
whether a constitutional right had been violated on the facts alleged and then, assuming such a violation had occurred, the court would determine whether the right
in question had been clearly established. 98 In 2009 the Supreme Court issued Pearson v. Callahan, giving the lower courts discretion to decide which of the two prongs
to address first and encouraging dismissal of a case without discussion of the constitutional claim when the court has found the pertinent law was not clearly established.99 Had the Nurre case been decided after Pearson, the discussion of Nurre’s
constitutional claims probably would not have occurred since the district court not
only found there was no constitutional violation, but also found that pertinent law

92. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1222 (W.D. Wash. 2007).
93. Id. at 1224.
94. Id. at 1226–27.
95. Id. (citing Cole v. Oroville Union High Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1092, 1099 (9th Cir. 2000) and Doe
v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 177 F.3d 789, 798 (9th Cir. 1999)).
96. Id. at 1226 (“[D]efendant requests dismissal of plaintiff’s claim for declaratory relief as moot
because plaintiff has graduated and will never again participate in an Everett School District graduation ceremony. The Court agrees. Now that plaintiff has graduated, her claims for declaratory relief are dismissed
as MOOT.”) (citation omitted).
97. Id. at 1227.
98. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1227; Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), receded from by
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (“A court required to rule upon the qualified immunity issue must
consider, then, this threshold question: Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury,
do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right? This must be the initial inquiry
. . . . [I]f a violation could be made out on a favorable view of the parties’ submissions, the next, sequential
step is to ask whether the right was clearly established.” (citations omitted)).
99. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236 (“On reconsidering the procedure required in Saucier, we conclude
that, while the sequence set forth there is often appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as mandatory.
The judges of the district courts and the courts of appeals should be permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in
light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.”).
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was not clearly established.100 But because the then current law required the district court to assess the constitutional claims first, it addressed Nurre’s alleged violations of three distinct constitutional rights: (1) the Free Speech Clause; (2) the Establishment Clause; and (3) the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause.101 The following discussion will focus mostly on the Free Speech issue,
though it will include the court’s treatment of the Establishment and Equal Protection allegations as well as that of the qualified immunity defense where these are
relevant to the court’s Free Speech analysis.
B. The Performance of the Instrumental Music from Biebl’s “Ave Maria” as
Constitutionally Protected Speech
i. The District Court
Turning to the free speech issue, the court began its analysis by asking
whether an instrumental piece of music such as Biebl’s “Ave Maria” is protected
speech under the First Amendment.102 Whitehead had argued that such instrumental music is not protected speech because Nurre had not shown an intent to communicate a particularized message nor that any such message would have been
communicated to anyone.103 Under Spence v. Washington, both are required if nonverbal conduct is to constitute protected speech. 104 Judge Lasnik, however, found
ample authority supporting the constitutional protection of instrumental music as
free speech. In Ward v. Rock Against Racism, the Supreme Court declared, “Music,
as a form of expression and communication, is protected under the First Amendment.”105 Noting that neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit had specifi-

100. The oral argument before the Ninth Circuit in Nurre took place on January 22, 2009, one day
after the Supreme Court issued the Pearson decision, and the first question that arose was whether the
court any longer needed to resolve the constitutional issue to decide the qualified immunity claim, when it
could simply dispose of the case by deciding the issue of whether the law would have been clear to a reasonable school official. However, as the panel’s opinion indicates, the Ninth Circuit decided to address the
constitutional issue as well. Transcript of Oral Argument, Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2009)
(No. 07-35867), 2009 WL 482112.
101. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1227–28.
102. Id. at 1228 (“The threshold issue in determining whether plaintiff’s free speech rights were
violated by defendant’s prohibition of the performance of Franz Biebl’s ‘Ave Maria’ is whether this piece of
music is protected ‘speech’ under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment made applicable to the
states by the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
103. Id.
104. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 30 (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974))) (“For nonverbal conduct
to qualify as speech, and thus implicate First Amendment ‘free speech’ protections, the Court asks ‘whether
“[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was present, and [whether] the likelihood was great that
the message would be understood by those who viewed it.’”). Whitehead quoted a district court case which
took the view that instrumental music might not be protected speech. Id. n.7 (quoting Fla. Cannabis Action
Network, Inc. v. City of Jacksonville, 130 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1366 n.7 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (“[O]nly some forms of
music may be protected expression while others, such as an instrumental orchestra performance, are
not.”)).
105. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1228 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989)).
The Ward court went on to say, “In the case before us the performances apparently consisted of remarks
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cally held instrumental music to be protected, the court cited other circuits and Supreme Court dicta to this effect. 106 In commenting on the passage quoted above
from Ward, Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit had found it implausible
that the Supreme Court “thought it was speaking only of vocal music; . . . ”107 Posner
also noted that the Seventh Circuit had held that “wordless music is speech within
the meaning of the First Amendment”108 in Reed v. Village of Shorewood, a case
stating that in forbidding the playing of rock and roll, a municipality, “would be infringing a First Amendment right, even if the music had no political message—even
if it had no words—and the defendants would have to produce a strong justification
for thus repressing a form of ‘speech.’” 109 In Steadman v. Texas Rangers, the Fifth
Circuit stated,
“Speech,” as we have come to understand that word when used in our First
Amendment jurisprudence, extends to many activities that are by their
very nature non-verbal: an artist’s canvas, a musician’s instrumental composition, and a protester’s silent picket of an offending entity are all examples of protected, non-verbal “speech.”110
In Bernstein v. United States Department of State, a court in the Northern District
of California declared, “Music . . . is speech protected under the First Amendment.”111 Judge Lasnik also quoted Supreme Court dicta from Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, stating, “[A] narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of constitutional protection, which if confined
to expressions conveying a ‘particularized message,’ would never reach the unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schöenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll.”112 Based on this authority, the court concluded
that the instrumental version of “Ave Maria” was protected speech.113

by speakers, as well as rock music, but the case has been presented as one in which the constitutional challenge is to the city’s regulation of the musical aspects of the concert; and, based on the principle we have
stated, the city’s guideline must meet the demands of the First Amendment.” Ward, 491 U.S. at 790.
106. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1228–29.
107. Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1096 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., concurring)
(rev’d on other grounds, Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991)) (quoted by Nurre, 520 F. Supp.
2d at 1228–29). Posner based this view on the Supreme Court’s reference to “music’s appeal to the emotions, and its citation to an article about Soviet ambivalence toward Stravinsky—a composer primarily of
nonvocal music . . . .” Id. (citing Ward, 491 U.S. at 790 (citing Soviet Schitzophrenia toward Stravinsky, N.Y.
TIMES, June 26, 1982, section 1, p. 25, col. 2)).
108. Id. at 1096 (quoted by Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1229).
109. Reed v. Village of Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943, 950 (7th Cir. 1983), overruled on other grounds
by Brunson v. Murray 843 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoted by Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1229) (emphasis
added by Nurre).
110. Steadman v. Texas Rangers, 179 F.3d 360, 367 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoted by Nurre, 520 F. Supp.
2d at 1229).
111. Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1435 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (quoted by Nurre,
520 F. Supp. 2d at 1229).
112. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1229 (quoting Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group
of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995) (citations omitted)).
113. Id. (“Based on this persuasive authority, the Court concludes that the Wind Ensemble’s instrumental performance of Franz Biebl’s ‘Ave Maria,’ constitutes ‘speech’ under the First Amendment.”).
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ii. The Appellate Court
In addressing the free speech issue, the Ninth Circuit opinion, written by Judge
Richard C. Tallman, began by quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District, that students “do not shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.” 114 But the appellate court also noted
that Supreme Court precedent taught that “‘the constitutional rights of students in
public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other
settings’ . . . and ‘must be applied in light of the special characteristics of the school
environment.’”115 On the question of whether instrumental music can constitute
speech, the appellate court followed the district court in finding that musical expression is speech that is protected under the free speech clause, citing the same
authorities for this proposition.116 “[W]e hold . . . [the instrumental arrangement of
Franz Biebl’s ‘Ave Maria’] . . . is . . . [free] . . . speech as contemplated by the First
Amendment.”117
Despite these rulings, both courts were to have difficulty with the concept of
wordless music as protected speech. Though judicial precedent indicated that instrumental music need not convey a particularized message to be entitled to constitutional free speech protection, the issue was to arise again under the guise of
whether such music had a “viewpoint” under public forum analysis. This was a crucial issue.
iii. Music as Protected Speech
Clearly, courts have stated that instrumental music is protected under the
First Amendment. But as Alan K. Chen has pointed out, “[N]o court has ever explained in any meaningful way why the musical, as opposed to lyrical, component
of such [musical] expression is independently covered by the Constitution.”118 Sim-

114. Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1092–93 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Morse v. Frederick, 551
U.S. 393, 406 (2007) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969))).
115. Id. at 1093 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)).
116. Id. at 1093–95.
117. Id. at 1093 (“Nurre and her classmates sought to perform an entirely instrumental arrangement of Franz Biebl’s ‘Ave Maria,’ which we hold is speech as contemplated by the First Amendment.” (footnote omitted)).
118. Alan K. Chen, Instrumental Music and the First Amendment, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 381, 384 (2015).
Chen acknowledges that “[t]he most thoughtful lower court discussion of music” took place in Miller v. Civil
City of South Bend, which invalidated a city ordinance prohibiting public nudity as applied to non-obscene
nude dancing for entertainment. Id. at 393. Several judges commented on whether music was protected
speech. Id. Judge Posner argued that if nude dancing is not speech, then non-vocal music is not speech
either. Id. at 394. “If the striptease dancing at the Kitty Kat Lounge is not expression, Mozart’s piano concertos and Balanchine’s most famous ballets are not expression.” Miller, 904 F.2d at 1093 (Posner, J., concurring). Judge Easterbrook agreed that music is protected speech but argued that it is distinguishable from
nude dancing: “That a dance in Salome expresses something does not imply that a dance in JR’s Kitty Kat
Lounge expresses something, . . . [A]ll that we call music is the product of rational human thought and
appeals at least in part to the same faculties in others. It has the ‘capacity to appeal to the intellect’, . . . is
not ‘conduct’, and is closer to speech (even an emotional harangue is speech) than to smashing a Ming vase
or kicking a cat, two other ways to express emotion.” Id. at 1125 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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ilarly, “[t]he scholarly literature is also surprisingly bereft of comprehensive discussions of the theoretical or doctrinal foundations for treating purely instrumental
music as expression under the Constitution.” 119 Chen, however, demonstrates that
instrumental musical expression has possessed sufficient meaning to incur suppression by totalitarian, fascist, and theocratic states:
Hitler’s regime banned the publication, sale, performance, and broadcast
of “Entartete Musik” (degenerate music) . . . [by] Stravinsky, Mahler, and
Gershwin. Jewish composers, such as Mendelssohn, were specifically targeted for censorship . . . as was jazz music, quite probably because of its
association with African Americans . . . . [A] long history of music censorship marks several periods of the Soviet regime . . . including . . . the regulation of the work of Shostakovich . . . . [T]he previously Taliban-controlled
Afghanistan and the current Iranian government banned instrumental music . . . . [A]n Islamist rebel group in northern Mali . . . . targeted what they
viewed as “Satan’s music” . . . offensive to the standards of Sharia.120
In Rock Against Racism, the Supreme Court similarly observed:
“From Plato’s discourse in the Republic to the totalitarian state in our own
times, rulers have known [music’s] capacity to appeal to the intellect and
to the emotions, and have censored musical compositions to serve the
needs of the state . . . . The Constitution prohibits any like attempts in our
own legal order.”121
This history of censorship suggests that, with or without words, music has expressive qualities that threaten oppressive regimes. Expression that tyrants believe is
worth suppressing may well be worth protecting in free societies.
Instrumental music, however, does not immediately suggest a form of expression protected by the First Amendment because music without words is generally
not a vehicle for expressing cognitive ideas. Unlike novels and plays, instrumental
music has no words. Nor do musical sounds consist of images that may evoke or
symbolize such ideas, as do visually representational arts like painting and sculpture. Instrumental music is highly nonrepresentational.122 Some musical works may
evoke or intensify specific ideas by association. A John Philip Sousa march can
arouse thoughts of patriotic parades, or the music of Wagner’s Bridal Chorus can
evoke thoughts of weddings. But this is largely due to cultural experience. Though
the character of the music may be receptive to these ideas, the specific associations
are largely extrinsic to the sounds of the music itself. A central challenge to treating
instrumental music as speech “is that music inherently lacks a particularized message or idea. In fact, one of the reasons music can be so uniquely expressive is in
this very absence of [any particular] message.”123

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Chen, supra note 118, at 384.
Id. at 400–01 (footnotes omitted).
Ward, 491 U.S. at 790.
Chen, supra note 118, at 436.
Id.

748

IDAHO LAW REVIEW

VOL. 54

As with other associations, the sounds of music do not in and of themselves
present a message, religious or sectarian, except by association.124 Take for example, the melody to which the lyrics of “Greensleeves” and “What Child Is This?” are
set.125 Originally, the traditional folk melody was accompanied by lyrics suggestive
of a romantic encounter.126 Later, religious lyrics were applied to the melody making it a religious Christmas carol.127 The melody itself is not inherently romantic or
religious, but only takes on these qualities by its association with the words that it
has attracted to itself. Likewise, the melody for one of the well-known versions of
“Ave Maria,” that of Bach-Gounod, originated as Bach’s instrumental Prelude No. 1
in C Major.128 This appears in Book One of the Well-Tempered Clavier, which was
not a religious work at all, but rather an exercise of composing keyboard works in
each of the major and minor keys to show the advantages of a particular method of
tuning.129 Charles Gounod later set the religious lyrics to Bach’s melody, and this is

124. Perrine, supra note 25, at 184, argues that the legal distinction between religious and secular
does not neatly apply to musical genres:
[C]ategorical distinctions between . . . the sacred and secular are not quite so clear cut. In
music, the Western classical tradition grew out of a complex interplay between the musical
requirements for worship . . . and state requirements for musical performance . . . . Ostensibly
sacred genres such as the mass were written for performance in secular venues. . . . Important
instrumental genres such as the sonata originally developed through the patronage of and for
performance within the church. Franz Biebl’s Ave Maria . . . was written for a German fire
department choir to sing at an amateur choral festival.
Id.
125. There is a recording of “Greensleeves” from the television series, “The Tudors” (2007-10), at
hiserature,
The
Tudors:
Greensleeves,
YOUTUBE
(Dec.
23,
2007),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mmh9__mI51g. A recording of “What Child Is This” by Josh Grobin
(2010) may be found at MyJesusGod1, Josh Grobin, What Child Is This, YOUTUBE (Dec. 22, 2010),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=brmRUlKbF7g.
126. A song by this title appears as a broadside ballad by Richard Jones, entitled, “A Newe Northern Dittye of ye Ladye Greene Sleves.” See John M. Ward, And Who But Ladie Greensleeues?, in THE WELL
ENCHANTING SKILL: MUSIC, POETRY, AND DRAMA IN THE CULTURE OF THE RENAISSANCE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF F.W.
STERNFELD 181 (John Caldwell, Edward Olleson, & Susan Wollenberg, eds., 1990).
127. The melody became associated with Christmas and New Year’s texts as early as 1686. Id. at
193. In 1865, William Chatterton Dix wrote a poem entitled, “The Manger Throne.” WILLIAM D. CRUMP, THE
CHRISTMAS ENCYCLOPEDIA 437–38 (McFarland, 3d ed. 2012) (2001). In 1871, three stanzas from this poem were
set to the melody of “Greensleeves” under the title of “What Child Is This?” Id. See CHRISTMAS CAROLS OLD
AND NEW, Hymn XIV, 32-33 (Henry Ramsden Bramley & John Stainer, eds. 1871).
128. BAKER’S BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF MUSICIANS 1339 (Nicolas Slonimsky ed., 7th ed. 1984)
(1900) (“One of [Gounod’s] most popular settings to religious words is Ave Maria, adapted to the 1st prelude
of Bach’s Well-Tempered Clavier, but its original version was Meditation sur le premier Prelude de Piano de
J.S. Bach for Violin and Piano (1853); the words were later added (1859).”). See Jonassen, supra note 25, at
758 n.482.
129. The Well-Tempered Clavier was a highly practical musical exercise demonstrating how musical pieces may be written in every key for a keyboard instrument, the clavier, when it is evenly tuned or
“tempered.” BAKER’S BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF MUSICIANS 1:161 (Nicolas Slonimsky ed., 7th ed. 1984) (1900).
(“Bach’s system of ‘equal temperament’ (which is the meaning of ‘well-tempered’ in the title Well-Tempered Clavier) postulated the division of the octave into 12 equal semitones, making it possible to transpose
and to effect a modulation into any key, a process unworkable in the chaotic tuning of keyboard instruments
before Bach’s time.”).
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what associates the particular melody with a religious theme. 130 It is perhaps true
that certain melodies have qualities that are receptive to certain words or thoughts.
Nevertheless, instrumental religious music does not, in and of itself, project any
particularized religious message, though it certainly can receive one through association. Separated from any association, religious or secular, all that can be said is
that music projects the aesthetic qualities of its own sound and rhythm performed
and received for its beauty as an artistic expression, regardless of the name given
to the music.131
Some scholars have taken a narrow view of what speech the First Amendment
protects.132 Robert Bork, for example, asserted, “Constitutional protection should
be accorded only to speech that is explicitly political. There is no basis for judicial
intervention to protect any other form of expression, be it scientific, literary or that
variety of expression we call obscene or pornographic.” 133 Under this theory, the
Constitution protects only cognitive ideas that advance the democratic values of
debate and discussion in the marketplace of ideas.134 This cognitive theory of First
Amendment protection also appears in case law requiring a particularized message
such as Spence v. State of Washington.135 However, in Texas v. Johnson, the Supreme Court extended free speech protections beyond “particularized meaning” in
recognizing the burning of an American flag as speech not because the act was a
specific, particularized message, but rather because it was expressive conduct that
was intentional and overtly political.136 The context made the flag burning “sufficiently imbued with elements of communication.” 137 In National Endowment for the
130. Id. at 2.1339. Gounod’s application of Bach’s Prelude from the Well-Tempered Clavier to a
prayer demonstrates that music really consists of an aesthetic arrangement of sounds with scant correspondence to lexical meaning.
131. For that matter, names in general, and religious names in particular, do not necessarily denote the character of the objects they signify. Objecting to the name, “Ave Maria,” which happens to signify
a piece of music, logically leads to intolerance for the names of many American cities which might appear
in graduation programs, such as Sacramento, Corpus Christi, Las Cruces, San Diego, Los Angeles, or St. Louis.
See Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009) (Smith, J., dissenting in part, but concurring in
judgment) (“As amicus for Nurre notes, many common proper nouns to secular entities have religious origins. For example, the cities Los Angeles (originally ‘our lady of the city of angels’), San Diego (‘Saint
Didacus’), and Las Cruces (‘the crosses’) each contain overt religious references.”). Id. at 1102 n.3.
132. Chen, supra note 118, at 404.
133. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20
(1971) (quoted by Chen, supra note 118, at 404).
134. But, “[I]f the purpose and scope of the First Amendment’s speech and press clauses are exhausted in the protection of political speech, because freedom of political speech is all that is necessary to
preserve our democratic political system, this implies the exclusion from the amendment’s protections not
only of all art (other than the political) but also of science. For one can have democracy without science,
just as one can have democracy without art.” Miller v. Civil City of S. Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1096 (7th Cir.
1990) (Posner, J., concurring).
135. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974). The Supreme Court held that nonverbal
conduct is protected speech only when there is present “[a]n intent to convey a particularized message . . .
and in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood [is] great that the message would be understood by
those who viewed it.” Id.
136. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 405–06 (1989). See Chen, supra note 118, at 389–90 (“[I]n .
. . Texas v. Johnson, the Court recognized the burning of an American flag as speech, even though neither
the flag burner’s intent nor the audience’s understanding of his message could be said to be particularized.”).
137. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406 (quoting Spence, 418 U.S. at 409).
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Arts v. Finley, the Court extended protections for nonverbal speech by assuming the
works of a variety of artists to be speech without discussing whether their art would
convey a specific or particularized message to those who viewed it. 138 And, as noted
above, the Supreme Court has stated, “[A] narrow succinctly articulable message is
not a condition of constitutional protection, which if confined to expressions conveying a ‘particularized message,’ would never reach the unquestionably shielded
painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schöenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of
Lewis Carroll.”139 Thus, Bork and Spence notwithstanding, the courts should not require nonverbal expression to convey a particularized message from speaker to listener in order to bestow Free Speech protection upon instrumental music.140
After examining several theories of why instrumental music should enjoy the
protection of the First Amendment, Chen concludes that two aspects of pure instrumental music justify constitutional protection: (1) “[I]t advances expression of important forms of cultural, religious, nationalist, and other social values . . . .” 141 Thus,
music unites people who share in their familiarity and appreciation of the music in
question and also provides respect for diversity of taste given the distinct music that
various cultures generate and admire. (2) “[It] serves a completely individualizing
function, . . . to the extent that it promotes highly personal expressions and experiences of emotion.”142 In this respect, music develops self-realization, self-fulfillment, and individual autonomy.
Chen’s second justification is particularly relevant to Nurre because, in promoting personal expression, musical sounds do not have to be associated with any
extrinsic ideas. Nurre testified that the students did not choose Ave Maria to communicate a “religious message,” but rather because of its “beauty,” and nowhere in
the record of the case does any evidence contradict this statement, nor did the
courts question it.143 Accordingly, the students only intended to convey the beauty
138.

Nat’l Endowment of Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 571 (1998). See Chen, supra note 118, at

390.
139. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995) (citation omitted).
140. Chen, supra note 118, at 390. The standard should be applicable to instrumental music,
which is also expressive conduct, but which usually cannot be said to have a particularized meaning intended by the performer and recognized by the audience. Id.
141. Id. at 437 (“In its expression of culture, music serves important social functions by connecting
people within and between different communities, and its recognition as a form of speech ensures that
government efforts to establish a cultural orthodoxy, like attempts to create a political or religious orthodoxy, are thwarted.”).
142. Id. at 438 (“Instrumental music allows people to express (through composition, performance, and feeling) and experience (through listening, interpreting, and feeling), as no other medium of
communication can. Thus, while music serves a community building function in terms of cultural expression,
it simultaneously advances an autonomy-promoting function in its facilitation of individualized emotional
expression and experience. As developed in more detail above, music’s role in expressing, evoking, and
experiencing the emotional could easily be argued to promote self-realization.”).
143. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. Nurre herself was not Catholic. See Declaration
of Kathryn Nurre, supra note 37, ¶ 34 (“While I am not a Catholic and oppose praising any ‘Mary’ to the
point of deification, I had no and have no objection or taken offense to the title of the song we chose, ‘Ave
Maria,’ the listing of such title in my school printed program or the playing of such song at any graduation
ceremony.”). In “Ave Maria,” or the “Hail Mary,” there is no deification of the Virgin Mary, which is contrary
to Catholic theology. Rather the prayer is a request for intercession with God, as its words indicate, “Holy
Mary, Mother of God, pray for us sinners, now and at the hour of our death. Amen.”
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of the piece of music they had selected. The desire to perform “Ave Maria” was
nothing more nor less than an attempt to share with the audience the notes, melody, harmony, and orchestration of the work, all as interpreted by the students in
their performance. It was an artistic message which the school authorities suppressed, and not any particularized message or viewpoint about religion or anything
else.
As this Article will show, in Nurre, the idea that a mode of expression which
does not project any particularized message is due constitutional protection as
speech created a distinct problem for the courts in their application of public forum
analysis. In a limited public forum, the government is not permitted to discriminate
against viewpoint.144 Does this mean that the mode of expression must have a particularized message, such as a religious statement, in order to have a viewpoint and
thereby merit protection? What is the viewpoint of artistic expression that is generated only for its beauty and not for any particularized message? If wordless music
lacks such a specific point of view, does that mean this form of expression has no
protection under public forum analysis? And if such music has no viewpoint or protection, then what is the point of all that precedent stating that instrumental music
is protected speech?
The courts in Nurre were rather inattentive, if not clueless, as to how the nonrepresentational nature of the music affected their treatment of viewpoint and the
students’ rights of free speech. While the district court treated “Ave Maria” as if it
could mean anything, sometimes having a message, or viewpoint, and sometimes
not, the appellate court treated the music as if it meant nothing at all and was therefore devoid of viewpoint, or constitutional protection. What was common to both
approaches was an unfavorable result for the speech rights of the students.145
C. The Wind Ensemble’s Performance as a Limited Public Forum
i. The District Court
In the cross motions for summary judgment that were before the district
court, both parties had argued that public forum analysis should be applied to determine the extent of First Amendment protection that ought to be afforded to the
students’ performance of “Ave Maria.”146 The court noted that forum analysis is “a
means of determining when the Government’s interest in limiting the use of its
property to its intended purpose outweighs the interest of those wishing to use the
property for other purposes.”147 Though the graduation ceremony did not take
144. “The State may not exclude speech where its distinction is not ‘reasonable in light of the
purpose served by the forum,’ nor may it discriminate against speech on the basis of its viewpoint.” Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
145. Cf. Perrine, supra note 25, at 193 (“Franz Biebl’s Ave Maria falls within a cultural tradition in
which musical works can function aesthetically within both a secular and religious context. This cultural
precedent should be respected by the courts. . . . Teachers and schools which allow a forum for student
expression should respect students’ artistic choices.”).
146. Nurre v. Whitehead, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1229 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (“Both parties assert that
in determining the First Amendment’s reach in this case, the Court should look to the forum where the
speech is presented.”).
147. Id. (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985)).
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place on school property, forum analysis was applicable because the Everett School
District rented the facility and sponsored the event.148
The district court ably presented Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court precedent
on forum analysis. Government property is divided into three basic categories: The
“public forum, [the] designated public forum, and [the] nonpublic forum.”149 The
public forum is a place such as a street or park that has been traditionally open for
public use, such as speech and communication.150 A designated government forum
is a government property which the state has intentionally opened for public expression.151 A nonpublic forum is a government property which neither tradition
nor government designation has made a forum for public discourse.152 The Supreme
Court has indicated that the state may also create a “limited public forum,” that is,
a nonpublic forum in which the state may limit speech for the use of certain groups
or the discussion of certain subjects.153
The ability of the government to limit a person’s speech is contingent upon
the type of forum in which the speech occurs. A court applies strict scrutiny to government speech limitations in traditional or designated public forums. 154 In a traditional or designated public forum, the state may enforce a content-based restriction
on speech only if it can show that the restriction is necessary to serve a compelling
state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that purpose. 155 The state may also
apply time, place, and manner limitations on speech as long as these limitations are
narrowly tailored to achieve a government interest and allow for alternative channels of communication.156 In a nonpublic forum, a regulation on speech need only
be reasonable and not an effort to suppress the speaker’s viewpoint. 157 The government may limit speech in a limited public forum as long as the restriction is reasonable in the light of the forum’s purpose and does not discriminate against a point of
view.158
Whitehead argued that the Jackson High School graduation was simply a nonpublic forum because the school district exercised supervisory control of all conduct
and speech at the graduation ceremony, setting parameters on the music that the
Wind Ensemble could play.159 Nurre contended that the Wind Ensemble performance, as opposed to the rest of the graduation ceremony, was a limited public
148. Id. at 1229–30 (citing Summum v. Duchesne City, 482 F.3d 1263, 1270 (10th Cir. 2007), vacated by Duchesne City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 1210 (2009)).
149. Id. at 1230.
150. Id. (citing DiLoreto v. Downey Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. Of Educ., 196 F.3d 958, 964 (9th Cir.
1999)); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
151. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1230 (citing DiLoreto, 196 F.3d at 964); Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802.
152. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1230; Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
153. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1230 (citing Faith Ctr. Church Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover, 480
F.3d 891, 908 (9th Cir. 2007), abrogated by Winter v. Nat. Res. Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008).
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (citing Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806.).
154. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1230; Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
155. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1230; Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
156. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1230; Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
157. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1230 (citing Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S.
672, 679 (1992)).
158. Id. (citing Glover 480 F.3d at 908); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (citing Cornelius, 473 U.S. at
806.)
159. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1230; Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 30.
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forum.160 Nurre argued that the designation depended on whether Jackson High
School had a tradition in which the school had opened a portion of the graduation
ceremony to a group, the seniors of the Wind Ensemble, for them to choose their
form of musical expression, thereby creating the limited public forum. 161 Both
Moffat and Nurre testified that Jackson High School had a tradition for the previous
three years of allowing the graduating senior members of the Wind Ensemble to
choose an instrumental piece to perform at graduation.162 Nurre claimed this tradition existed even before the three years Moffat had given the Wind Ensemble seniors this choice.163 Whitehead presented the testimony of the previous director,
Rice, that he had never allowed the students to choose the music they would play
at graduation.164 The district court noted that under the Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, the court was “required to view all facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.”165 The court, therefore, concluded, “for purposes of summary judgment there are sufficient facts showing that
the School District created a limited public forum when it allowed the Wind Ensemble’s seniors to choose the piece for performance at the JHS 2006 graduation.” 166
ii. The Appellate Court
After following the district court in finding that the performance of “Ave Maria” was free speech protected by the First Amendment, the Ninth Circuit also
turned to the public forum question. Judge Tallman agreed that since the performance was to take place within a government property, the next step was to determine the type of forum that was created and assess whether the school district’s
restriction was constitutionally permitted under that forum. 167 Tallman observed
that a school is typically a non-public forum, but it may become a public forum “if
school authorities have ‘by policy or by practice’ opened those facilities ‘for indiscriminate use by the general public,’ or some segment of the public, such as student
organizations.”168 The appellate court noted that Nurre did not claim the graduation
ceremony was a public forum, but rather that school administrators created a “limited public forum” by permitting the students to select the musical piece to perform

160. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1230–31; Plaintiff Nurre’s Response in Opposition to Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment, Nurre v. Whitehead, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1222 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (No. C06901RSL), 2007 WL 4868958.
161. Plaintiff Nurre’s Response in Opposition, supra note 160.
162. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1231 (citing Deposition Upon Oral Examination of Lesley Moffat,
supra note 37, at 17:4-7 (“Q. Does the Jackson High School wind ensemble have a tradition of having the
seniors choose a final piece for the graduation. A. Yes.”); Declaration of Kathryn Nurre, supra note 37, ¶ 11
(“Part of this traditional [graduation] performance by the Wind Ensemble included having the graduating
seniors choose an instrumental piece to be performed at their graduation ceremonies.”)).
163. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 30.
164. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1231 (citation omitted).
165. Id. (citation omitted).
166. Id.
167. Nurre, 580 F.3d at 1093 (“[W]e must determine the type of forum created by the government
when Nurre sought to perform ‘Ave Maria’—that is, the relevant forum—and then assess whether the District’s restriction was constitutionally permissible in light of that forum.”).
168. Id. (quoting Perry, 460 U.S. at 47).
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during graduation.169 However, the Ninth Circuit had “never definitively determined
what forum is created when a school district holds graduation, or, as in this case,
when part of the graduation ceremony presents student-selected work.”170 The appellate court believed that it did not have to decide the question in this case because “the [School] District d[id] not challenge Nurre’s contention that a limited
public forum existed here. Instead, it simply argue[d] that the restriction placed on
Nurre was reasonable in light of the purpose served by the graduation ceremonies.”171 The court concluded, “[t]herefore, we assume, without deciding, that a
limited public forum was created.”172
iii. The Assumption of a Limited Public Forum
Both district and appellate courts assumed Jackson High School had established a limited public forum in regard to the part of its graduation ceremony in
which the Wind Ensemble seniors would perform the music of their choice. Neither
actually found that Jackson High School did in fact do so. The district court assumed
there existed a limited public forum since the plaintiff had alleged facts which, if
proven, would be sufficient to show the school had established such a forum. 173
This was a question of fact which, on Whitehead’s summary judgment motion, the
court had to resolve in favor of the non-moving party, Nurre. The appeals court
explicitly said it was not deciding whether part of a public school graduation ceremony becomes a limited public forum when students select their own music to perform, but only assumed a limited public forum was created because the school district did not contest the issue at the appellate level.174
Once these courts assumed the existence of a limited public forum, they
should not have granted summary judgment to the defendant school district unless
there was no genuine dispute of material fact that the school district had not violated the students’ rights within the limited public forum.175 This conclusion could
not be reached by any reasoning that would contradict or vitiate the assumption
that a limited public forum existed. The courts’ analysis should not have been influenced or affected by any underlying doubt that the court would eventually hold
that no part of a public school graduation ceremony could possibly be a limited
public forum, by any belief that Nurre’s factual allegations would be disproven at
trial, or by any undue deference to the school officials’ authority. Having declined
to rule on the matter given the alleged facts before the court, and having explicitly
169. Id. at 109394.
170. Id. at 1094.
171. Id. Although Whitehead argued at the district court that the Wind Ensemble performance
was a nonpublic forum, it is correct, as the Circuit Court has it, that Whitehead did not contest this issue in
its Appellee’s Answering Brief, Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2009) (No. 07-35867).
172. Nurre, 580 F.3d at 1094.
173. See id. at 1093.
174. See id. at 1094.
175. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“Motion for Summary Judgment or Partial Summary Judgment. A party
may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense—or the part of each claim or defense—
on which summary judgment is sought. The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. The court should state on the record the reasons for granting or denying the motion.”).
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accepted the assumption, the courts should have produced a rigorous analysis as if
they indeed had decided that the Wind Ensemble’s performance was a limited public forum. And given their assumption that the Wind Ensemble performance was a
limited public forum, the courts could not countenance the school’s unreasonable
termination of that forum. “Once it has opened a limited forum . . . the State must
respect the lawful boundaries it has itself set. The State may not exclude speech
where its distinction is not reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum.”176
D. The Application of Forum Analysis to the Wind Ensemble’s Performance of the
Instrumental Music from Biebl’s “Ave Maria”
After stating its assumption that the Wind Ensemble portion of the graduation
ceremony was a limited public forum, the district court turned to the task of applying the test for permissible government limitations on speech in a limited public
forum. Under this test, the government would be able to restrict speech if the restriction was (1) viewpoint neutral, and (2) reasonable in the light of the purpose of
the forum.177 Both conditions of viewpoint neutrality and reasonableness must be
met for the restriction to be constitutional.178 The government may choose the
group that is entitled to speak and the subjects that may be discussed in a limited
public forum so that the government may restrict the speakers and content of
speech accordingly.179
i. Viewpoint Neutrality
a. The District Court
In regard to viewpoint, the government may not discriminate against a particular viewpoint or deny access to a speaker with a particular perspective that is
within the forum’s limitations of content.180 The district court recognized that the
distinction between content and viewpoint regulation is not a precise one. 181 Nevertheless, the court found the “exclusion of ‘Ave Maria’ was based on permissible
content restriction, not impermissible viewpoint discrimination,” because the exclusion resulted from “a decision to keep religion out of graduation as a whole, not
176.

Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (citations omit-

ted).
177. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d. at 1231 (“[D]efendant’s prohibition on the performance of ‘Ave Maria’ is not a violation of plaintiff’s free speech rights if the restriction is viewpoint neutral and reasonable in
light of the purpose of the forum.” (citing Glover, 480 F.3d at 908)); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829.
178. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1230.
179. Id. at 1231.
180. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 n.7 (1983) (“A public forum
may be created for a limited purpose such as use by certain groups (student groups), or for the discussion
of certain subjects (school board business.”) (citations omitted)).
181. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1231 (citing Glover, 480 F.3d at 911 (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S.
at 829)). (“In determining whether the restriction is viewpoint neutral, the Court must identify whether
exclusion of ‘Ave Maria’ is ‘content discrimination, which may be permissible if it preserves the purpose of
[the] limited forum [or] viewpoint discrimination, which is presumed impermissible when directed against
speech otherwise within the forum’s limitations.”).
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to discriminate against a specific religious sect or creed.” 182 The court quoted
Brandsma’s e-mail instructing principals that music for graduation ceremonies be
“entirely secular” in nature, and also Whitehead’s testimony to the same effect. 183
The court then made the following statement:
The case would be different if the exclusion had been based on excluding
a particular religious sect or creed. However, the Court finds the blanket
restriction on the exclusion of religious music that occurred in this case is
one based on content, not viewpoint.184
The district court’s argument relies heavily on Faith Center Church Evangelistic
Ministries v. Glover, a Ninth Circuit opinion.185 In that case, the Ninth Circuit found
that a public library created a limited public forum by allowing community organizations to use its conference room facilities. 186 The Circuit held that the Contra
Costa County Library did not discriminate against the religious viewpoint of Faith
Center Church Evangelistic Ministries in prohibiting the use of the library’s meeting
rooms for “religious services or activities”187 because the prohibition was applicable
to all religious groups rather than to this particular religious group. 188 The district
court quoted the Glover opinion’s pertinent statement:
If the County had, for example, excluded from its forum religious worship
services by Mennonites, then we would conclude that the County had engaged in unlawful viewpoint discrimination against the Mennonite religion. But a blanket exclusion of religious worship services from the forum
is one based on the content of speech. 189
This very quotation should have indicated to the district court that Glover is obviously distinguishable from Nurre. The Glover case concerned “religious worship services”; Nurre did not.190 The Jackson High seniors did not intend to lead the audience
in any semblance of prayer or worship. It was for aesthetic reasons that they
wanted to perform a musical work whose title happened to be “Ave Maria.”191 The

182. Id. at 1231–32.
183. Supra notes 6263 and accompanying text.
184. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1232.
185. Id. (citing Glover, 480 F.3d at 915).
186. Glover, 480 F.3d at 910 (“We therefore hold that the Antioch Library meeting room is a limited public forum whose restrictions to access may be based on subject matter . . . so long as the distinctions
drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral.” (citations and
quotations omitted)).
187. Id. at 903.
188. Id. at 915 (“Religious worship, . . . is not a viewpoint but a category of discussion within which
many different religious perspectives abound.”). “We therefore conclude that prohibiting Faith Center’s religious worship services from the Antioch meeting room is a permissible exclusion of a category of speech
that is meant to preserve the purpose behind the limited public forum.” Id. at 918
189. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1232 (quoting Glover, 480 F.3d at 915).
190. Glover, 480 F.3d at 910; Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1222.
191. See supra notes 3637 and accompanying text; Jonassen, supra note 25, at 756–57 (“The
performance of religious music in a secular setting such as a graduation or a concert is distinguishable from
worship, since in such a setting the audience primarily appreciates the music for its artistic merits, and not
as a vehicle to communicate with God.”).

2018

THE “AVE MARIA” EFFECT

757

music was instrumental only, purged of any religious reference except for its title.192
With or without the title, it was unrealistic to think the audience would have perceived the performance to be a religious service or worship. The graduation performance of “Ave Maria,” therefore, could not reasonably be construed as religious
worship.
Further examination of Glover only deepens its dissimilarity from Nurre.
Glover held that there is a difference between speech that is dedicated to worship
or praise of God and speech that is about religion or that simply possesses religious
content. The Glover court based this view on a fragment of dicta from Good News
Club, which, the Glover court argued, distinguished between “mere religious worship, divorced from any teaching of moral values” and therefore possessing no
viewpoint, and other religious activities which provide opinions about moral values,
and which therefore possess viewpoints. 193 Because religious worship is devoid of
viewpoint, the argument proceeds, worship does not constitute protected speech
for the purposes of public forum analysis, whereas speech about religion contains
viewpoints which are protected under public forum analysis. 194 In the Glover passage discussing the impermissibility of excluding one religion and not another, the
Ninth Circuit was talking about the exclusion of “religious worship services,” not
religious commentary.195 Based on this distinction, the Glover court held that the
County Library could maintain a blanket exclusion of religious worship ceremonies.196
However, the Glover majority made it quite clear that the County Library’s
policy would not have been constitutional if it had prohibited the Faith Center
192. See Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1225.
193. Glover, 480 F.3d at 913 (quoting Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 96, 112
n.4 (2001)). See contra, id. at 899–901 (Bybee, J., with whom O’Scannlain, Kleinfeld, Tallman, Callahan, Bea,
and Smith, Jr., join, dissenting from denial of hearing en banc) (“The [Supreme] Court was pointing out only
that the Club’s activities were reasonably related to the purposes of the limited forum: in that sense, the
Club’s activities were not ‘mere religious worship’ lacking any connection to the purpose of the forum. If
the Club had attempted to conduct worship that contained no references to moral and character development in children, the school could have denied permission for such use, just as it could have denied permission for a ‘mere political discussion’ or a ‘mere Tupperware party’ also devoid of such content. The relevant
distinction was between ‘mere religious worship’ and worship that bore a relationship to the narrow purposes of the dedicated forum, not between a category of fully protected religious speech with a secular
component or counterpart and speech that is less protected because it is exclusively religious.”).
194. The Glover court went on to argue that the government may not be competent to distinguish
between the two, but the Faith Center Church itself made that distinction by separating its worship services
from discussions about religion. Id. at 918 (“The distinction to be drawn here is thus much more challenging—one between religious worship and virtually all other forms of religious speech—and one that the government and the courts are not competent to make. That distinction, however, was already made by Faith
Center itself when it separated its afternoon religious worship service from its morning activities. Faith Center admits that it occupied the Antioch forum in the afternoon of May 29, 2004 expressly for ‘praise and
worship.’ The County may not be able to identify whether Faith Center has engaged in pure religious worship, but Faith Center can and did.”).
195. Id. at 915.
196. Id. (“Pure religious worship, however, is not a secular activity that conveys a religious viewpoint on otherwise permissible subject matter. For every other topic of discussion that Faith Center engages
in—the Bible, communication, social and political issues, life experiences—religious and non-religious perspectives exist. The same can be said for moral and character development in Good News Club, child rearing
in Lamb’s Chapel, and the topic of religion itself in Rosenberger.”). See Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union
Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
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Church from using the library’s facilities to discuss religious topics, “such as how to
communicate effectively with one’s God.”197 Such commentaries would present a
religious viewpoint, so that banning them in a limited public forum would be illicit
viewpoint discrimination. “It would . . . be viewpoint discrimination for the County
to exclude Faith Center’s perspective on the subject of communication because of
the religious content of Faith Center’s speech.” 198
The proposed performance of “Ave Maria” at the Jackson High School graduation was certainly not worship. Although it was not intended to be religious commentary either, it could conceivably be construed as musical commentary on a religious idea. But even if it were, Glover would stand for protecting this speech in a
limited public forum precisely because of the distinction the Ninth Circuit made between religious worship and religious commentary. Banning “Ave Maria” then,
would be viewpoint discrimination under Glover. Thus, Glover did not approve of a
blanket policy prohibiting any and all expression related to religion in a limited public forum, as was implemented by the school officials in Nurre: it did the opposite.
b. The Appellate Court
Like the district court, the Ninth Circuit adopted the limited public forum test:
“In a nonpublic forum opened for a limited purpose, restrictions on access ‘can be
based on subject matter . . . so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light
of the purpose served by the forum’ and all the surrounding circumstances.” 199
Judge Tallman, however, did not follow the district court’s argument that relied so
heavily on Glover. This is, perhaps, because he had penned a rather robust dissent
in that very case.200 Tallman disagreed that there was a constitutional distinction
between the speech of religious worship and the speech of religious discussion. He
had rather good grounds for his dissent, for he quoted the Supreme Court in its
refusal to recognize such a distinction in Widmar v. Vincent, which said “religious
worship and discussion . . . are forms of speech and association protected by the
First Amendment.”201 Given his previous dissent, Tallman could not depend on
Glover for the proposition that the performance of “Ave Maria” had no viewpoint
and therefore no protection because it would be religious worship. 202 Nor could he

197. Glover, 480 F.3d at 914 (“[T]he morning workshop was devoted to the topic of communication and how to communicate effectively with one’s God. Although Faith Center’s activities may have included ‘quintessentially religious’ speech such as a call to prayer, Good News Club makes clear that such
speech in furtherance of communicating an idea from a religious point of view cannot be grounds for exclusion.”).
198. Id.
199. Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1095 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting DiLoreto v. Downey Unified
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 196 F.3d 958, 967 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ.
Fund, Inc,, 473 U.S. 788, 806, 808 (1985))).
200. Glover, 480 F.3d at 921 (Tallman, J., dissenting).
201. Id. (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 (1981)).
202. Glover, 480 F.3d at 91415.
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square the prohibition of “Ave Maria” as religious commentary given Glover’s holding that the banning of such speech would be viewpoint discrimination. 203 Therefore, Tallman used a different approach, one that was, perhaps, suggested by the
district court.
In a footnote, Judge Lasnik mentioned an alternative means of disposing of
the viewpoint issue. “Plaintiff’s case is further weakened . . . by the fact that she
appears to have no religious viewpoint on the performance of ‘Ave Maria.’”204 The
idea appears to be that because Nurre had disclaimed any religious intent or message, she had no viewpoint which warranted constitutional protection.
Judge Tallman did not discuss viewpoint discrimination in the text of the appellate opinion.205 Instead, he summarily disposed of the entire issue in a footnote,
declaring, “[T]his is not a case involving viewpoint discrimination which would be
impermissible no matter the forum. Nurre concedes that she was not attempting
to express any specific religious viewpoint, but that she sought only to ‘play a pretty
piece.’”206 The appellate court then quoted Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of
the University of Virginia: “When the government targets not subject matter, but
particular views taken by the speakers on a subject, the violation of the First Amendment is [viewpoint discrimination]….The government must abstain from regulating
speech when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the
speaker is the rationale for the restriction.” 207 The point of the quotation seems to
be that viewpoint discrimination is only concerned with regulating the “motivating
ideology, or the opinion or perspective of the speaker,” and because Nurre had declared she intended to convey no religious message (no religious ideology, opinion,
or perspective), the government could not have been guilty of viewpoint discrimination. There simply was nothing to discriminate against, except the desire to “play
a pretty piece.” By assuming that the only possible viewpoint Nurre could have had
in her desire to perform “Ave Maria” had to be religious, the court enabled itself to
conclude that no viewpoint at all was involved and therefore no viewpoint discrimination.
c. The Courts’ Discussions of Viewpoint
Both the district and appellate courts had ruled that instrumental music was
protected speech, and both had assumed the existence of a limited public forum.
In order to rule in favor of the school district, the courts had to find there was no
viewpoint discrimination. To do this the courts chose distinct paths to argue there
was no such discrimination because the students simply had no point of view. The
district court treated the performance of “Ave Maria” as a species of religious worship when, in fact, it was no such thing, and wrongly interpreted Glover to justify a
blanket prohibition of all religious expression when in fact Glover explicitly stands

203. Id.
204. Nurre v. Whitehead, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1232 n.15 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (citation omitted).
205. See Nurre, 580 F.3d at 1087.
206. Id. at 1095 n.6.
207. Id. (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)
(emphasis added by the Ninth Circuit)).
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for the permissible blanket exclusion of religious worship, but not religious commentary, in a limited public forum.208
On the issue of the constitutional distinction between religious worship and
religious commentary, Judge Tallman was probably right, and Glover wrong. The
Supreme Court has never adopted this distinction. It was Justice Stevens who, in a
dissent from Good News Club, attached constitutional significance to the categories
of religious discussion, religious worship, and proselytizing. 209 But even Justice Stevens noted that “a public school that permitted its facilities to be used for the discussion of family issues and child rearing could not deny access to speakers presenting a religious point of view on those issues,” 210 and probably would have protected
the musical performance of “Ave Maria” if he had construed the music as religious
commentary.
The appellate court therefore rejected the district court’s reliance on Glover,
choosing instead to assume that the only possible viewpoint involved in performing
a work with a title such as “Ave Maria” was a religious one, and since the students
disclaimed any intent to communicate a message about religion, there was no viewpoint that could have suffered discrimination. These positions, however, render nugatory the findings of both courts that instrumental music is protected expression
under the First Amendment. 211 It makes no sense to find that instrumental music is
protected speech, and then deny any protection for such expression by finding that
instrumental music has no viewpoint to protect. It would have been more logical to
have found that instrumental music was not protected speech. But that, of course,
would have contradicted the dicta of the Supreme Court and several circuits. The
“no viewpoint” positions also rendered null the assumption both courts made that
the school had established a limited public forum for the musical performance of
the wind ensemble. If the music Nurre wished to perform had no viewpoint, what
was the sense of finding there was any limited public forum for the performance of
this music to begin with? It would have been more logical for the court to have
found there was no limited public forum because the performance of music without
a message has no viewpoint. But the courts did not take that line. The evidence and
basic civil procedure indicated to the district court there was a genuine question of
material fact as to whether the school had established a limited public forum. And
the appeals court noted that the defendant did not contest the existence of a limited public forum. Finally, the contrived requirement that the music express a viewpoint such as an ideology, opinion, or perspective in order to deserve free speech
208. The district court’s interpretation of Nurre’s interest in performing “Ave Maria” as religious
worship which has no First Amendment protection based on Glover, and, in the alternative, as expression
lacking any religious message or viewpoint to be protected based on Nurre’s disclaimer, indicates that the
district court had no consistent understanding of the musical performance. See supra notes 186–97 and
accompanying text.
209. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 96, 130 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (“Speech for ‘religious purposes’ may reasonably be understood to encompass three different categories. First, there is religious speech that is simply speech about a particular topic from a religious
point of view . . . . Second, there is religious speech that amounts to worship, or its equivalent . . . . Third,
there is an intermediate category that is aimed principally at proselytizing or inculcating belief in a particular
religious faith.”).
210. Id. (citing Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 393–94 (1993)).
211. See supra III(B)(i)(ii).
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protection was really a camouflage for the “particularized meaning” requirement,
a proposition which Supreme Court precedent in Johnson and Finley and dicta in
Hurley had long ago rejected.212
The courts obviously did not think about any of this. They were not attentive
to the nonrepresentational nature of music, which does not, per se, project a cognitive ideology or perspective, but rather presents an artistic expression to which
the listener might or might not attach such cognitive ideas.213 The courts failed to
recognize that the students’ expression possessed an artistic point of view to which
judicial precedent had accorded full constitutional protection. By prohibiting the
musical performance, the school was practicing viewpoint discrimination, not
against a religious point of view, but rather against an artistic point of view. Referring to the music as merely “a pretty piece” doesn’t change this.
ii. Reasonableness
The second requirement for the legality of government speech restrictions in
a limited public forum is reasonableness. To be permissible, the school district’s
censorship of “Ave Maria” had to be reasonable in its exclusion of content that did
not serve the purpose for which the limited public forum was established.214 At the
end of its discussion of the viewpoint element of the limited public forum analysis,
the district court declared that the school district’s decision to prohibit the performance of “Ave Maria” was not only viewpoint neutral but also reasonable on the
basis of the “Establishment Clause Defense,” so that there had been no constitutional violation of free speech.215 However, the district court had not yet examined
the reasonableness prong of the limited public forum test, but rather only announced it would do so in a subsequent section of the opinion.
The Court also finds, as discussed below in the context of an “Establishment Clause defense,” that the prohibition on the performance of “Ave
Maria” was reasonable in light of the purposes of the 2006 JHS graduation
ceremony. See Section II.B.2.b, infra. As a result, under the forum analysis,
the Court concludes that defendant's restriction was viewpoint neutral
and reasonable. Accordingly, defendant did not violate plaintiff's rights under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment by prohibiting the performance of “Ave Maria” at the 2006 JHS graduation ceremony. 216
Section II.B.2.b deals with the defendants’ qualified immunity defense. 217 Thus, rather than discuss the issue of the reasonableness of the speech restriction under its
limited public forum analysis, the court elected to postpone its treatment of that
issue to its discussion of the defendants’ qualified immunity defense. But before
212. See supra notes 133–140 and accompanying text.
213. Jonassen, supra, note 25, at 757 (“The court’s comments miss a crucial aspect of the case.
Plaintiff’s statement was evidence that she did not intend to express anything religious. But just because
she did not have a religious viewpoint does not mean that she did not have a musical viewpoint.”).
214. See supra notes 176 and 199 and accompanying text.
215. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1231–33.
216. Id. at 1232–33.
217. Id. at 1236–40.
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discussing Whitehead’s qualified immunity defense, the court also discussed reasonableness in regard to Nurre’s Establishment Clause and Equal Protection Clause
claims as well.218
This Article focuses on the Free Speech issues in Nurre. However, the district
court’s analyses of Nurre’s Establishment and Equal Protection claims and Whitehead’s qualified immunity defense are all relevant to that issue because rather than
discuss reasonableness under the reasonableness prong for government restrictions on speech in a limited public forum, the court dealt with the reasonableness of the school officials under these other issues, concluding, it appears, that if
the school officials were reasonable for the purposes of these other issues, they
were reasonable for the purposes of the limited public forum. In its discussion of
these other issues of the Establishment Clause and Equal Protection claims and the
Qualified Immunity defense, the district court supported its contention that the Everett School District officials acted reasonably on the basis of the Establishment
Clause Defense.
a. Reasonableness: Establishment Clause and Equal Protection
1. The District Court
Nurre’s Establishment Clause claim is unusual in that she was not arguing the
school district was endorsing a religious belief with which she disagreed, or was
preventing her from worshipping as she wished. 219 Rather, Nurre was arguing that
by unreasonably excluding “Ave Maria” only because of its religious title, the school
district was demonstrating a hostility to religion.220 The claim may have been illadvised because it drew attention to religious expression, when the case was really
about artistic expression.
In any event, the district court applied the Lemon test, the first prong of which
requires the government action under review to have a secular purpose. 221 The
court quoted Vasquez v. Los Angeles County, an opinion in which the Ninth Circuit
218. The court justified this shift in a footnote stating that an examination of “the graduation ceremony as a whole is relevant in evaluating the reasonableness of defendant’s action in denying the performance of ‘Ave Maria.’” Id. at 1232 n.16. The court relied upon Glover, 480 F.3d at 910, for this proposition.
Id. The shift, however, obscures the distinction between the musical performance, which both courts assumed was a limited public forum, from the rest of the graduation ceremony, which did not enjoy that
assumption. In another footnote, the court states that the school district’s policies and procedures are not
controlling because they refer to choral and musical assemblies, and not specifically to graduation ceremonies. Id. at 1233 n.17. The footnote does point out, “The only policy or procedure expressly addressing
graduation states: ‘Neither the District nor individual schools shall conduct or sanction invocations, benedictions or prayer at any school activities including graduation.’” Id. at 1233 n.17 (citing to Dkt. No. 10, Ex.
2 at 3). But, of course, an instrumental musical performance is not an invocation, benediction, and, though
the music was composed to accompany the prayer, “Ave Maria,” the performance of the music for its artistry alone, without the words of the prayer, is not a prayer.
219. Id. at 1234 (quoting Vasquez v. Los Angeles Cty., 487 F.3d 1246, 1256 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting
American Family Ass’n, Inc. v. City and Cty. of San Francisco, 277 F.3d 1114, 1122 (9th Cir. 2002))) (“The
Ninth Circuit has ‘noted that “because it is far more typical for an Establishment Clause case to challenge
instances in which the government has done something that favors religion or a religious group, [there is]
little guidance concerning what constitutes a primary effect of inhibiting religion.”’”).
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1233 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 61213 (1971)).
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found Los Angeles County’s removal of a cross from the county seal was not a violation of the Establishment Clause. “[T]o hold that the removal of . . . objects to cure
an Establishment Clause violation would itself violate the Establishment Clause
would . . . result in an inability to cure an Establishment Clause violation and thus
totally eviscerate the [E]stablishment Clause.” 222 The court then pointed to Whitehead’s deposition testimony that in not allowing the performance of “Ave Maria”
at graduation, she was relying on Lee v. Weisman, where the Supreme Court prohibited school officials from arranging for clergy to lead prayers at public high school
graduations because that would be a coercive imposition of religion by the government on those attending the graduation, an Establishment Clause violation.223
Therefore, the court found that the purpose of prohibiting the performance of “Ave
Maria” was to avoid this potential Establishment Clause violation, which is a secular
purpose, so that the first prong of Lemon was satisfied.224
The court went on to argue that the prohibition did not violate the other two
prongs of the Lemon test. The second prong prohibits “government action that has
the ‘principal or primary effect’ of advancing or disapproving religion.” 225 Again relying on Vasquez, the court found that a “reasonable observer” familiar with the
history and controversy surrounding religious speech at graduation exercises would
not perceive the primary effect of the defendant’s action as one of hostility toward
religion. “Rather, it would be viewed as an effort by Defendant to comply with the
Establishment Clause and to avoid unwanted future litigation.” 226
The third prong of Lemon provides that the government action must not foster
an “excessive government entanglement with religion.”227 The district court argued
that “given plaintiff’s stance on the lack of religious content of ‘Ave Maria’ . . . plaintiff cannot show that excessive entanglement occurred.” 228
The claim might be stronger if plaintiff believed that the performance of
Biebl’s “Ave Maria” conveyed a religious message. But she does not . . .
Based on this, the plaintiff cannot take the position that defendant acted
with hostility toward religion or the School District’s action fostered ‘excessive entanglement with religion’ when plaintiff does not assert that the
speech that was excluded conveyed a religious message. 229
Thus, the district court thought that because Nurre had no religious message to
convey, the government could not have been demonstrating any hostility against
religion or fostering excessive entanglement with religion.

222. Id. at 123334 (quoting Vasquez, 487 F.3d at 1256 n.8).
223. “Q. Where did you obtain your information that the commencement was required to be a
neutral setting? A. From the Supreme Court decision about commencement.” [Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S.
577 (1992)]. Id. at 1234 (citing Deposition upon Oral Examination of Carol Whitehead, supra note 43, at
34).
224. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1234. (“The Court finds that defendant’s action was motivated by
an effort to avoid a potential Establishment Clause violation.”).
225. Id. (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612).
226. Id. (quoting Vasquez, 487 F.3d at 1257).
227. Id. (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613).
228. Id. at 1234.
229. Id.
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Again, there are defects in this argument. For one thing, the district court’s
finding of no religious intent in its discussion of the Establishment Clause overlooks
the court’s earlier treatment of the performance as if it were religious worship.230
Under its viewpoint analysis, the court treated the students’ expression as religious
worship in spite of their disclaimer of any religious intent, an approach which, in the
court’s view, undercut their free speech claim. For purposes of the Establishment
Clause claim, the court took the disclaimer seriously as an indication that the students had no religious intent in their expression, which now undercut their Establishment Clause claim. For the court to earlier treat the performance as if it were a
species of religious worship, and now find there was no government entanglement
because the performance was not intended to be religious after all, appears inconsistent to say the least.
Another problem with this argument is its lack of attention to what a reasonable observer would understand about the performance. As the court itself indicated, the determination of whether the school district was expressing hostility towards religion depended on what a reasonable observer would understand from
the prohibition of the performance, and not on what Nurre intended. 231 Indeed, the
school officials banned the musical performance not on the basis of what was intended, but on the basis of what might be perceived due to the religious title of the
music. But it was questionable whether a reasonable observer would have perceived the musical performance as government support of religion merely because
of the music’s name or origin. Banning the music because of its religious name, even
though the music had no religious intent or message, could be unreasonable hostility to religion, one which excludes expression out of all reasonable proportion to its
religious significance, regardless of what was intended and what could have been
perceived.
In attempting to demonstrate the reasonableness of the school district’s action of prohibiting the performance of Ave Maria, the district court relied on
Vasquez in much the same way as it relied on Glover, and just as inappropriately.
Once again, the district court chose a case that was clearly distinguishable from
Nurre. Vasquez concerned an objection to the removal of a cross from the official
Los Angeles County seal.232 Such a seal is a representation of the authority of the
county government.233 An official county seal could not be considered a limited public forum in which private speakers are allowed to contribute symbols of their
choice. A county seal is more appropriately identified as no public forum at all, in
which the government speaks by selecting the symbols with which the government

230. Supra notes 18494 and accompanying text.
231. See supra, note 226 and accompanying text.
232. Vasquez, 487 F.3d at 1247–48.
233. Consider, for example, the significance of the county seal in Robinson v. City of Edmund, 68
F.3d 1226, 1228 (10th Cir. 1995): “Since 1965 the seal has been used extensively by the City, and appears
on City limits signs, on City flags, on the uniforms of City police officers and firefighters, on official City vehicles, on stickers identifying City property, and in the City Council chambers. Additionally, the seal appears
on each utility bill sent out by the City, as well as on official City stationery and the Utility and Sanitation
Department’s newsletter. The seal has been registered as a trademark under Oklahoma law.”
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represents its authority.234 The government may include or exclude any symbol it
chooses.235 It is especially important in this type of forum that the government
avoid expression supportive of a specific religion or religion in general in order not
to violate the Establishment Clause.236 In Vasquez, a potential Establishment Clause
violation hinged on the appearance of the cross, the most fundamental symbol of
the Christian religion, on a county seal.237 Certainly in a nonpublic forum such as
this where the government is speaking, there is a realistic danger that the community would think the municipality was endorsing a particular religion by including a
cross; so the Ninth Circuit was justified in finding that a reasonable observer would
not construe the removal of the cross to be an act of hostility towards religion, but
rather conclude “[d]efendants' removal of the cross is more reasonably viewed as
an effort to restore their neutrality and to ensure their continued compliance with
the Establishment Clause,” 238 especially because such crosses on municipal seals
had recently been found unconstitutional.239 What may be a reasonable government prohibition in the forum which Vasquez addressed may not be a reasonable
prohibition at all in the limited public forum assumed by the court in Nurre, in which
students were allowed to choose the work of instrumental music they wished to
perform. Vasquez, therefore, was not persuasive in demonstrating the reasonableness of the school district’s prohibition.
While failing to distinguish Vasquez, the district court distinguished three
cases involving religious music at a public school. In Stratechuk v. Board of Education of South Orange-Maplewood School District, the Third Circuit found that a complaint alleging a categorical school ban on exclusively religious music having the express purpose of sending a message of disapproval of religion states a claim and
should not be dismissed.240 The district court, however, found the denial of a mo-

234. Cf. Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 472 (2009) (citation omitted), which
found that the monuments which the city government had selected for a public park were government
speech: “In this case, it is clear that the monuments in Pleasant Grove’s Pioneer Park represent government
speech. Although many of the monuments were not designed or built by the City and were donated in
completed form by private entities, the City decided to accept those donations and to display them in the
Park. Respondent does not claim that the City ever opened up the Park for the placement of whatever
permanent monuments might be offered by private donors. Rather, the City has ‘effectively controlled’ the
messages sent by the monuments in the Park by exercising ‘final approval authority’ over their selection.”
235. Id. at 467–68 (citations omitted) (“The Free Speech Clause restricts government regulation
of private speech; it does not regulate government speech.”).
236. Id. at 468 (“This does not mean that there are no restraints on government speech. For example, government speech must comport with the Establishment Clause.”).
237. Vasquez v. Los Angeles Cty., 487 F.3d 1246 (9th Cir. 2007); Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700,
725 (2010) (“The cross is of course the preeminent symbol of Christianity[.]“).
238. Vasquez, 487 F.3d at 1257.
239. Id. (citing Robinson, 68 F.3d 1226, 1232 (10th Cir. 1995); Harris v. City of Zion, 927 F.2d 1401,
1413 (7th Cir. 1991); Friedman v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 781 F.2d 777, 778 (10th Cir. 1985); and Murray v. City
of Austin, 947 F.2d 147, 163 (5th Cir.1991) (Goldberg, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1219, 112 S. Ct.
3028, 120 L.Ed.2d 899 (1992) (noting “constant . . . judicial disapproval of government use of Christian
crosses . . . on municipal seals” and pointing out that “[t]he Supreme Court itself has repeatedly disapproved
in dicta the governmental display of crosses”).
240. 200 Fed. Appx. 91, 94 (3d Cir. 2006). In Stratechuk v. Bd. of Educ., S. Orange-Maplewood Sch.
Dist., 587 F.3d 597 (3d Cir. ), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 828 (2009), the Third Circuit ruled that the school board’s
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tion to dismiss insufficient to apply to Nurre which concerned summary judgment.241 In Doe v. Duncanville Independent School District, the Fifth Circuit found
no Establishment Clause violation in the performance of a religious choral piece,
“The Lord Bless You and Keep You,” as the Choir Theme Song.242 Rather, the Circuit
stated that prohibiting or limiting the song’s performance would “require hostility,
not neutrality, toward religion. Such animosity towards religion is not required or
condoned by the Constitution.”243 Despite this dicta, the district court found this
case irrelevant because it did not concern a “hostility to religion” claim as did Nurre,
nor did Duncanville concern the graduation context.244 In Bauchman for Bauchman
v. West High School, the Tenth Circuit found that the school choir’s practice and
performance of religious choral music even at religious sites did not offend the Establishment Clause.245 The district court distinguished this case because it also did
not deal with the “hostility to religion” issue and the Tenth Circuit had granted an
injunction against the performance of such music at the school’s graduation pending appeal.246 However, the district court neglected to consider the Tenth Circuit’s
eventual finding, that the singing of the Choir Theme Song at graduation would not
have been the kind of religious activity found in Weisman, so that it would not have
entailed a state endorsement of religion in the context of a school graduation.247

policy of eliminating religious songs to celebrate the holiday season at school sponsored activities was constitutional. However, the policy did permit the performance of religious music that had an educational purpose, did not refer to the holidays, and tended to be in foreign languages such as Latin or Italian. Thus, songs
such as “Joy to the World,” “O Come All Ye Faithful,” “Hark, the Herald Angels Sing,” and “Silent Night”
would not be permitted, but music such as Antonio Vivaldi’s “Gloria in Excelsio” (sic for “Gloria in Excelsis
Deo,” that is, “Glory to God in the Highest”), Arcangelo Corelli’s “Concerto VIII, fatto per note di natali”
(“Concerto No. 8 composed for Christmas Eve”), a “Jubilate” (unidentified composition with the title of “Rejoice” that could refer to the birth of Christ), and “Agnus Dei/cum sanctis” (“Lamb of God/with the Saints”
the “Lamb of God” is a prayer recited at the Catholic Mass) would be allowed. Id. at 602. Apparently, choral
music that refers to the event Christmas celebrates, the birth of Christ, would be acceptable as long as the
references occur in classical works in a foreign language and not in popular Christmas carols.
241. Nurre v. Whitehead, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1240 (9th Cir. 2009).
242. 70 F.3d 403 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 953 (1998).
243. Id. at 407–08. “The argument that students likely identify their choir by its theme song is well
taken but misses the crucial point that particularly in the world of choral music, singing about religion is not
the same as endorsing or exercising religion. Students who identify DISD’s choir with The Lord Bless and
Keep You will certainly feel unity with past choirs from the same school but we are hard pressed to find that
this unity necessarily stems from a common belief in Christianity or Judaism rather than the fact that the
earlier students also attended the same high school.” Id. at 408 n.8.
244. Id. at 1240.
245. 132 F.3d 542, 556 (10th Cir. 1997).
246. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1240 (quoting Bauchman, 132 F.3d at 547 n.4 (“Ms. Bauchman also
requested an injunction pending appeal, which we granted, thereby enjoining the singing of the two songs,
‘The Lord Bless You and Keep You’ and ‘Friends’ by the Choir at West High School’s 1995 graduation ceremonies.” (emphasis added by district court))).
247. Bauchman, 132 F.3d at 552, n.8 (stating in reference to the graduation exercise, “[W]e do
not believe the singing of religious songs alone constitutes prayer . . . . The facts as alleged by Ms. Bauchman
simply do not identify a religious activity analogous to that addressed in Lee or other school prayer cases.
Accordingly, we conclude a coercion analysis is inapplicable to the facts at hand.”). The Tenth Circuit thereby
affirmed the district court’s opinion distinguishing Weisman which was concerned with prayer at graduation
and not music. Bauchman by and through Bauchman v. West High School, 900 F. Supp. 254, 268 (D. Utah
1995) (“Singing of songs is not an ‘explicit religious exercise,’ like the graduation prayer was deemed to be
by the Supreme Court in Lee v. Weisman, or like other prayers and singing in cases cited by plaintiff. Music
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These cases, though distinguishable on grounds far more tenuous than cases such
as Glover and Vasquez, could nevertheless have been read as an indication that,
generally speaking, religious music studied and performed for artistic or historical
reasons is acceptable at events sponsored by a public school, including graduation.
Consistent with those opinions, the Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that
the study of religion itself in public schools, to say nothing of the performance of
religious music, passes constitutional muster.248 However, these cases did not persuade the district court that the performance of “Ave Maria” at the Jackson High
School graduation might not have offended the Constitution, and were quickly dispatched.
In regard to the Equal Protection claim, the district court noted that Nurre was
not claiming that the prohibition deprived her of a fundamental right or discriminated against her on the basis of a suspect classification. Rather, Nurre claimed that
she “and her Wind Ensemble classmates were singled out for different treatment
because, unlike previous senior classes, their choice of a performance piece at graduation was not allowed. This different treatment was not reasonable or rational.”249
In support of her theory, Nurre relied on the Supreme Court’s “class of one” equal
protection jurisprudence.250 However, this theory only required rational scrutiny to
justify the government’s action. The court readily found a rational basis for the government’s action in the school officials’ concern that the performance of “Ave Maria” at graduation would be an Establishment Clause violation.
Perhaps the court was a bit hasty in concluding the school’s action passed rational scrutiny. For several years, the Wind Ensemble of Jackson High School had
presented graduation performances of “On a Hymnsong of Philip Bliss,” an instrumental work by David R. Holsinger with many religious connections. 251 The term,
“hymn” is plain English (as opposed to Latin) for “1(a): a song of praise to God; (b)
a metrical composition adapted for singing in a religious service.” 252 The particular
has a purpose in education beyond the mere words or notes in conveying a feeling or mood, teaching culture and history, and broadening understanding of art.”). This is a clear distinction the courts in Nurre failed
to recognize.
248. See, e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42 (1980) (“[T]he Bible may constitutionally be used
in an appropriate study of history, civilization, ethics, comparative religion, or the like.”); Edwards v.
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578. 606–08 (1987) (Powell, J., concurring) (“As a matter of history, schoolchildren can
and should properly be informed of all aspects of this Nation’s religious heritage . . . . In fact, since religion
permeates our history, a familiarity with the nature of religious beliefs is necessary to understand many
historical as well as contemporary events. In addition, it is worth noting that the Establishment Clause does
not prohibit per se the educational use of religious documents in public school education. . . . The [Bible] is,
in fact, ‘the world’s all-time best seller’ with undoubted literary and historic value apart from its religious
content.”); Sch. Dist. of Abington Township, Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) (“[O]ne’s education is
not complete without a study of comparative religion or the history of religion and its relationship to the
advancement of civilization. It certainly may be said that the Bible is worthy of study for its literary and
historic qualities. Nothing we have said here indicates that such study of the Bible or of religion, when presented objectively as part of a secular program of education, may not be effected consistently with the First
Amendment.”).
249. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1235 (citation omitted).
250. Id.
251. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
252. Hymn, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/hymn (last visited Mar. 1, 2015). See Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1100 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (Smith,
J., dissenting in part, concurring in judgment) (“In marked contrast to what was done in this case, in previous
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term, “hymnsong,” was coined by the composer—Holsinger—for his compositions
which make use of melodies derived from hymns. 253 Philip Bliss was a nineteenthcentury composer of hymns well-known in Christian musical circles.254 And David
Holsinger is a contemporary composer who has written many musical works with
Christian themes and is currently Composer and Director of the Wind Ensemble at
Lee University, which describes itself as a Christ-Centered Liberal Arts University,
located in Cleveland, Tennessee. 255 Members of the audience would have been
more likely to recognize the religious significance of “Hymsong” than of the Latin
title, “Ave Maria,” and those who were more knowledgeable would have known the
many Christian aspects of this work.256 And if, in fact, the “Hymnsong” was chosen
by the previous Director of the Wind Ensemble—Jim Rice—as he testified,257 the
performance of this religious work at a public school graduation would have made
a much better case for government endorsement of religion and an Establishment
Clause violation than the performance of “Ave Maria,” since the former was chosen
by a school official, which implies government approval of the religious expression,
and the latter was chosen by students, which supports the existence of a limited
public forum in which members of the public speak and not the government. The
school district approved and allowed the “Hymnsong” for several years with no concern about an Establishment Clause violation, and then disapproved the “Ave Maria” for that very reason.258 This does not appear particularly rational.
2. The Appellate Court
The appellate court treated Nurre’s Establishment Clause and Equal Protection claims in much the same manner as the district court. Like Judge Lasnik, Judge

years the School District had condoned the ensemble’s playing a piece titled On a Hymnsong by Phillip Bliss
at the school’s graduation ceremony.”).
253. E-mail to Frederick Jonassen from David R. Holsinger Conductor, Wind Ensemble, Lee University (August 29, 2008, 17:33 EDT) (on file with author) (“[‘Hymnsong’ is] just a term I made up to refer to
my compositions based on hymn melodies.”).
254. Philip Bliss (1838 to 1876) “is the second most famous Christian song writer in history.” Ed
Reese, The Life and Ministry of Philip Bliss, CHRISTIAN BIOGRAPHY, http://www.wholesomewords.org/biography/biobliss.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2018). His hymns include titles such as, Dare to Be a Daniel; Hallelujah, ‘Tis Done!; Hallelujah, What a Savior!; Jesus Loves Even Me; and many others. Id.
255. David R. Holsinger (b. 1945) is a composer who has written many musical works with Christian themes. See Dr. David R. Holsinger, Biography, http://www.davidrholsinger.com (last visited Mar. 1,
2018). His titles include Liturgical Dances and The Easter Symphony. Id. About Lee University, LEE UNIVERSITY,
http://www.leeuniversity.edu (last visited Mar. 1, 2018).
256. Justice Alito points out that “On a Hymnsong by Phillip Bliss,” which the District had approved
for several years, “not only includes the term ‘hymn’ in its title, [but] is an arrangement of Philip Bliss’ hymn
‘It is Well with My Soul’ that has fervently religious lyrics, including the following:
‘Though Satan should buffet, though trials should come,
Let this blest assurance control,
That Christ hath regarded my helpless estate,
And hath shed His own blood for my soul.’”
Nurre, 559 U.S. at 1027 n.2 (Alito, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (quoting SPAFFORD & BLISS, It is Well
with My Soul, in GOSPEL HYMNS No. 2, p. 78 (P. Bliss & I. Sankey 1876)).
257. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
258. Jonassen, supra note 25, at 761.
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Tallman applied the Lemon test.259 He found the first prong satisfied as “an effort to
avoid conflict with the Establishment Clause.”260 Relying heavily on Vasquez, the
appellate court, like the district court, found Lemon’s second prong satisfied because “a reasonable person . . . would understand that the action had the secular
effect of maintaining neutrality and ensuring the District’s continued compliance
with the Establishment Clause.”261 On the third prong, the appellate court distinguished between two types of state entanglement in religious matters: administrative entanglement and political entanglement. 262 There was no administrative entanglement because the ban on religious music “occurred only once that year and
was done merely by reviewing song titles for overtly religious references.” 263 There
was no political entanglement because the record did not provide “any evidence
that this policy caused political divisiveness,” despite Nurre’s objection and that of
the other students.264 Regarding Nurre’s equal protection claim, the appellate court
found that the school district’s action passed rational-basis review because the “requirement that all musical selections be secular was a reasonable action taken to
avoid confrontation with the Establishment Clause.” 265 Thus, the appellate court
found it rational, even reasonable, for the school district to ban the music to avoid
the appearance of government support of religion to a reasonable observer, even
though the court had found Nurre to have had no religious message at all under its
viewpoint analysis.
3. Comments on the Establishment Clause and Equal Protection Analyses
What is most troubling about the treatment both courts afforded Nurre’s
claims is that the courts put Nurre in a double bind. The double bind originated from
Whitehead’s conundrum argument, that Nurre’s claims fail whether she had a religious message or not.
Ms. Nurre now finds herself in a legal conundrum. She has stated
that the senior members of the wind ensemble did not intend to convey
any particular point by playing “Ave Maria” during graduation. Thus, she
cannot genuinely argue that her free speech rights have been violated. On
the other hand, if she now admits that the music was intended to convey
a message, it was reasonable for the District to conclude that such message
was religious in nature, given the title and origins of the piece, “Hail
Mary.”266
Of course, this argument is specious because it misstates what Nurre said. She
said she had no religious message; she did not say she had no message at all. This

259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
07-35867).

Nurre, 580 F.3d at 1095–97.
Id. at 1096.
Id. at 1097.
Id.
Id. at 1098.
Id.
Nurre, 580 F.3d at 1099.
Appellee’s Answering Brief at 14–15, Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2009) (No.
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leaves open the possibility of an artistic message entitled to constitutional protection. Whitehead’s argument that, if Nurre had a religious message, she loses under
the Establishment Clause defense, and if she had no religious message, she loses
her Free Speech claim, because she had no viewpoint to protect, is a bit of logical
chicanery that is defensible as client advocacy. It is not defensible on the part of the
courts to tacitly adopt this reasoning, and apply it even more subtly and effectively.
Whitehead’s argument at least seems to concede that either Nurre had a religious message or not. What the courts did was to find that Nurre both had no
message at all for purposes of deciding the viewpoint prong of the limited forum
analysis, and had a religious message for purposes of deciding whether the school
officials had an Establishment Clause defense for all the other claims and for the
qualified immunity defense.
The district court found Nurre had no message by treating her musical performance as a form of worship as in Glover.267 The appellate court, rejecting this questionable distinction, treated her performance as simply having no viewpoint at all. 268
Therefore, there was no viewpoint discrimination. The district court also found that
Nurre’s performance would have projected a religious message so that the school
district’s prohibition was reasonable under the Establishment Clause defense.269 But
when it came to Nurre’s own Establishment Clause claim, the district court accepted
Nurre’s disclaimer of no religious intent in order to nullify her allegation that the
state had shown hostility to religion.270
The appellate court, after stating its view that Nurre had no message at all in
a footnote, nevertheless saddled her with a religious message perceptible to the
reasonable observer in using the Establishment Clause defense to dismiss Nurre’s
Establishment Clause and Equal Protection claims.271 Without having to refer to any
“conundrum” or “dilemma,” both courts placed Nurre’s case in a double bind by
ignoring her artistic message and assigning to it either no message at all, which took
care of the viewpoint prong on her free speech claim, or a religious message, which
took care of everything else. With this kind of manipulative reasoning, there was no
way Nurre could win on anything. That is the real conundrum of the case.
b. Qualified Immunity and Reasonableness
The district court, at the outset of this section, announced its belief that, pursuant to the Saucier test for qualified immunity, the court had shown the school
district did not violate any of Nurre’s constitutional rights.272 Of course, the court
had not really shown this in regard to the free speech claim because the court had
not addressed the reasonableness prong for government restrictions of speech in a

267. Nurre v. Whitehead, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1232 (W.D. Wash. 2007).
268. Nurre, 580 F.3d at 1095.
269. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1232–40.
270. Id. at 1235.
271. Nurre, 580 F.3d at 1095–99.
272. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1236 (“Although the Court’s conclusion above that plaintiff’s constitutional rights were not violated entitles Dr. Whitehead to qualified immunity as an individual defendant,
for the record, the Court also grants defendant’s motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity for
the separate reason that it was not clearly established that defendant’s actions were unlawful.”).
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limited public forum, which the court said it would treat in this selfsame Section
II.B.2.b, on qualified immunity.273 Be that as it may, the court found under the Saucier test that, besides not having violated any of Nurre’s constitutional rights, Whitehead was also entitled to qualified immunity.274 Judge Lasnik noted the Supreme
Court’s statement in Malley v. Briggs that qualified immunity protects “all but the
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”275 This is the standard
the district court would apply in deciding the reasonableness of the school district’s
Establishment Clause defense for purposes of qualified immunity.276
Judge Lasnik began by quoting from several Supreme Court cases which affirmed student free speech but left open the possibility that avoidance of an Establishment Clause violation may provide a compelling reason to suppress such
speech.277 In Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, the Supreme Court observed, as it did in the earlier Widmar v. Vincent, that the State’s
interest “in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation ‘may be [a] compelling’ one
justifying an abridgment of free speech otherwise protected by the First Amendment.” 278 In Good News Club v. Milford Central School, the Court stated, “[I]t is not
clear whether a State’s interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation would
justify viewpoint discrimination.”279 In all these cases—Widmar, Lamb’s Chapel, and
Good News Club—the Supreme Court did not reach the issue because, under the
facts presented, the Court found “there would have been no realistic danger that
the community would think that the District was endorsing religion or any particular
creed.”280 This, of course, implies that the Establishment Clause defense justifies
273. Id. at 1232–33.
274. Id. at 1236.
275. Id. (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).
276. Id. at 1236–40.
277. Id. at 1236–37.
278. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1237 (quoting Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist.,
508 U.S. 384, 394 (1993)).
279. Id. (quoting Good News Club v. Milford Central Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 113 (2001)).
280. Id. (quoting Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 113). The full quotation from Good News Club reads
as follows:
We rejected Establishment Clause defenses similar to Milford’s in two previous free
speech cases, Lamb’s Chapel and Widmar. In particular, in Lamb’s Chapel, we explained that
“[t]he showing of th[e] film series would not have been during school hours, would not have
been sponsored by the school, and would have been open to the public, not just to church
members.” 508 U.S. at 395, 113 S. Ct. 2141. Accordingly, we found that “there would have
been no realistic danger that the community would think that the District was endorsing religion or any particular creed.” Ibid. Likewise, in Widmar, where the university’s forum was
already available to other groups, this Court concluded that there was no Establishment
Clause problem. 454 U.S. at 272–273, and n. 13, 102 S. Ct. 269.
The Establishment Clause defense fares no better in this case. As in Lamb’s Chapel, the
Club’s meetings were held after school hours, not sponsored by the school, and open to any
student who obtained parental consent, not just to Club members. As in Widmar, Milford
made its forum available to other organizations. The Club’s activities are materially indistinguishable from those in Lamb’s Chapel and Widmar. Thus, Milford’s reliance on the Establishment Clause is unavailing.
Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 113. The passage is a strong indication that the existence of a limited public
forum is a weighty factor against construing what is said in the forum as bearing the imprimatur of the
government and thereby violating the Establishment Clause.
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government limitations on speech only when the prohibited speech could realistically convey an endorsement of religion and create an Establishment Clause violation.
The district court then declared that although the question of “‘whether a
State’s interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation would justify viewpoint discrimination’ is an open one,” for the Supreme Court, 281 “[t]he question . . .
is not an open one in the Ninth Circuit.”282 “The Ninth Circuit has recognized that
Establishment Clause concerns can justify speech restrictions ‘in order to avoid the
appearance of government sponsorship of religion.’”283 For this proposition, the
court cited Cole and Lassonde v. Pleasanton Unified School District, both Ninth Circuit cases that concerned proselytizing student speeches at public high school graduations.284 This Article will address these cases more fully below. 285
The court argued that in the graduation context, the performance of “Ave Maria” would have appeared to be the school district’s speech and not the private
speech of the plaintiff or the Wind Ensemble. 286 The court cited Hazelwood v.
Kuhlmeier for the proposition that a public school may exercise control over student
speech in school-sponsored activities where members of the public might reasonably believe that the student’s speech bears the imprimatur, or approval, of the
school.287 Brandsma and Whitehead had made the point reflected in Weisman that
graduation ceremonies are particularly sensitive school-sponsored activities because students who may not want to be subjected to religious messages nevertheless feel compelled to attend this once-in-a-lifetime event.288 Supporting the notion
that schools are responsible for whatever is said at a school-sponsored event, the
court underscored the control school administrators usually exercise over graduations, quoting the Supreme Court’s Weisman opinion, “[a]t high school graduation,
teachers and principals must and do retain a high degree of control over the precise
contents of the program, the speeches, the timing, the movements, the dress, and
the decorum of the students.”289 Judge Lasnik then quoted the Ninth Circuit in Cole,
“[T]he District’s plenary control over the graduation ceremony, especially the student speech, makes it apparent [that the sectarian] speech would have borne the
imprint of the District”;290 and in Lassonde: “[T]he essence of graduation is to place
the school’s imprimatur on the ceremony—including the student speakers that the
281. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1237 (quoting Hills v. Scottsdale Unified Sch. Dist., 329 F. 3d 1044,
1053 (9th Cir. 2003)).
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id. (citing Cole v. Oroville Union High Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2000).
285. See infra Sections III(D)(ii)(b)(2).
286. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1237–38 (“[G]iven the graduation context, the Wind Ensemble’s
performance of ‘Ave Maria’ would have appeared to be the School District’s speech not the ‘private speech’
of the plaintiff or the Wind Ensemble.”).
287. Id. (citing Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988)).
288. For Brandsma, see Plaintiff Nurre’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 34, at 5, and
accompanying text; for Whitehead, see Deposition Upon Oral Examination of Dr. Carol Whitehead, supra
note 43, at 33–34, and accompanying text.
289. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1238 (alteration in original) (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,
597 (1992)).
290. Id. (quoting Cole v. Oroville Union High Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1092, 1103 (9th Cir. 2000)).
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school selected.”291 Because of this control over student speech at a graduation ceremony, the Lassonde court stated in regard to Cole, “[T]he school district had to
censor the [sectarian] speech in order to avoid the appearance of government sponsorship of religion”; and “allowing the speech would have had an impermissibly coercive effect on dissenters, requiring them to participate in a religious practice even
by their silence.”292 Judge Lasnik concluded:
[T]he Court finds that the Wind Ensemble’s performance of “Ave Maria”
would have borne the imprimatur of the school because the performance
took place at graduation, the School District exercised control over the performance by placing restrictions on its content, and the performance was
by the “Jackson Band” as listed in the 2006 JHS graduate program.293
Judge Lasnik never quite states that the performance of “Ave Maria” would
have been an Establishment Clause violation. He did not formally apply the Lemon
test, endorsement test, or coercion test to the hypothetical performance of “Ave
Maria” at the Jackson High graduation. However, in stating the “finding” that the
performance would have borne the “imprimatur” of the school, Judge Lasnik was
employing language indicating the performance would have satisfied Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test and that he would have found an Establishment Clause violation if the issue were before the Court. Judge Lasnik then went on to argue for
qualified immunity, applying the “plainly incompetent” and “in knowing violation
of the law” standard.
Given the Ninth Circuit’s precedent in Cole and Lassonde, and in the light
of the district’s Establishment Clause concerns, the Court cannot say that
the contours of plaintiff’s rights in the context of a graduation ceremony
were “sufficiently clear” that the defendant would understand that by prohibiting the performance of “Ave Maria” defendant was knowingly violating the law. . . . Therefore, the Court cannot say that defendant was “plainly
incompetent” or “knowingly violate[d] the law” by assuming that her actions restricting “Ave Maria” were proper under the Establishment Clause.
For this reason, the Court concludes that defendant as an individual is entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff's free speech claim. 294
Although the district court conceded that the “conflict” with the Establishment Clause was much greater in Cole and Lassonde,295 nevertheless, in regard to
the performance of “Ave Maria,” the Court found enough of a conflict to quote Justice Blackmun’s concurrence in Weisman, “[T]he Supreme Court has stated that
‘[t]he Establishment Clause proscribes public schools from conveying or attempting
to convey a message that religion or a particular religion is favored or preferred.’”296

291. Id. (quoting Lassonde v. Pleasanton Unified Sch. Dist., 320 F.3d 979, 985 (9th Cir. 2003)).
292. Id. (quoting Lassonde, 320 F.3d at 983 (citing Cole, 228 F.3d at 1101)).
293. Id. (citations omitted).
294. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1238–39 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
295. Id. at 1239.
296. Id. (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 604–05 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis in original)).
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The district court’s apparent dicta, that the performance of “Ave Maria” would
have been an Establishment Clause violation, is remarkable. This was a musical performance, not a prayer, not proselytizing, not a religious message. Not to recognize
that was to exit the realm of reality. The dicta contradicts case law from other circuits which found that school-sponsored student performances of music, even music with religious lyrics, for non-religious purposes do not convey an endorsement
of religion or constitute Establishment Clause violations.297 The court’s dicta also
contradicts Supreme Court dicta approving the study of religion itself in the public
schools for artistic and historical purposes. 298 Finally, the facts of this case are far
removed from Weisman. The performance of “Ave Maria” was not a prayer. School
authorities did not select and arrange this music. It did not convey a religious message. None of the reasons justifying the prohibition in Weisman are present in
Nurre. The court’s approval of the imposition of a ban on all religious music, in fact,
appears unmindful of Weisman’s balanced and nuanced teaching:
A relentless and all-pervasive attempt to exclude religion from every aspect of public life could itself become inconsistent with the Constitution.
We recognize that, at graduation time and throughout the course of the
educational process, there will be instances when religious values, religious practices, and religious persons will have some interaction with the
public schools and their students.299
It is not surprising that the appellate court did not follow the district court in basing
the reasonableness of the prohibition exclusively on the Establishment Clause defense, and pointedly declined to make any finding that the performance of “Ave
Maria” could have resulted in an Establishment Clause violation.300 It should also be
no surprise that the district court’s conclusion depends on numerous defects in reasoning.
In shifting the discussion of reasonableness from the opinion’s discussion on
the limited public forum issue to the section discussing qualified immunity, the district court effectively weakened the reasonableness standard that should have
been applied. By means of this move, the judge avoided discussing whether the
complete exclusion of any religious reference from the wind ensemble’s performance was a reasonable limitation of content for purposes of preserving the purpose of the limited public forum. Instead the court applied the reasonableness
standard for qualified immunity in which the government action would be acceptable as long as it was not “plainly incompetent” or in “knowing[] violat[ion of] the
law.”301 Moreover, this minimal standard of reasonableness was to be applied to
the Establishment Clause defense, the standard for which the district court also
weakened.
In a footnote, the court acknowledged that under Ninth Circuit law, the Establishment Clause defense “does not apply unless the school district proves that the
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.

See supra notes 240247 and accompanying text.
See supra note 248.
Weisman, 505 U.S. at 598–99 (citations omitted).
See infra notes 344-346 and accompanying text.
Nurre v. Whitehead, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1236, 1239 (W.D. Wash. 2007).
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Establishment Clause would have been violated had the activity at issue been allowed to proceed”302 and quoted Hills v. Scottsdale Unified School District, No. 48
for this proposition.303 In that case, a school district prohibited the distribution of
religious pamphlets in what the court found to be a limited public forum. 304 The
school district pled the Establishment Clause defense.305 But because “[t]he District
[did] not . . . demonstrate[] that the Establishment Clause would be violated if it had
permitted distribution of literature that advertised religious programs or events,” 306
the Ninth Circuit ruled that the school district’s prohibition discriminated against
the plaintiff’s viewpoint.307 The district court also quoted Cole v. Oroville Union High
School District, a Ninth Circuit case in which the school district prohibited student
speakers from delivering proselytizing speeches at graduation.308 “[I]t is clear the
District’s refusal to allow Cole to deliver a sectarian invocation as part of the graduation ceremony was necessary to avoid an Establishment Clause violation.” 309
Thus, Ninth Circuit precedent indicated that a school district that justifies the prohibition of speech in a limited public forum on the basis of the Establishment Clause
defense must prove that allowing the speech would have caused an Establishment
Clause violation. Judge Lasnik, however, simply chose not to follow this clear precedent and fashioned his own standard:
If the Establishment Clause “defense” is to provide any meaningful
shelter for a school district, . . . the defense should not depend on a hindsight determination by the court, but rather on the reasonableness of the
school district’s belief at the time that an activity would violate the Establishment Clause.310
It is not clear why the Wind Ensemble’s performance would not be an Establishment Clause violation in hindsight when a court makes a determination, and yet
would appear to be a violation at the time of the activity. Moreover, it seems that
the district court arranged its analysis so that this “reasonableness” was to be based
not on whether there was a realistic possibility of an Establishment Clause violation,
but under the plainly incompetent or in knowing violation of the law standard for
qualified immunity.
Thus, by analyzing reasonableness under the issue of qualified immunity, the
district court reduced in two ways what Whitehead would need to show to justify
the banning of “Ave Maria” within a limited public forum. Whitehead would not
need to show that banning “Ave Maria” from graduation was necessary to avoid an
actual Establishment Clause violation, which was Ninth Circuit law. Instead, she
would only have to show that her belief that the performance might have violated
302. Id. at 1237 n.20.
303. Id. (quoting Hills v. Scottsdale Unified Sch. Dist., 329 F.3d 1044, 1053 (9th Cir. 2003)).
304. Hills, 329 F.3d at 1049.
305. Id. at 1053.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 1056 (“When the District denied Hills access to the school’s limited public forum, it
discriminated against him because of religious viewpoint in violation of the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment.”).
308. Nurre v. Whitehead, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1237 n.20 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (quoting Cole v.
Oroville Union High Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1092, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000)).
309. Id.
310. Id.
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the Establishment Clause was reasonable. Secondly, that belief would be reasonable as long as the court could not find Whitehead to be plainly incompetent or acting in knowing violation of the law. Not only was this standard applied to the qualified immunity defense, but it appears it was used to satisfy the reasonableness
prong of the test for government speech restrictions in a limited public forum. What
should have been a discussion of whether the school district was reasonable in its
blanket exclusion of any religious reference in order to preserve the purpose of the
limited public forum became a discussion of whether Whitehead was plainly incompetent or in knowing violation of the law for excluding “Ave Maria” in order to avoid
a remotely possible violation of the Establishment Clause. Applying such a feeble
standard facilitated the court’s finding that the school administrators acted reasonably regarding Nurre’s Free Speech claim.311
Ironically, Whitehead did not argue, let alone prove, that the performance of
“Ave Maria” would have been a violation of the Establishment Clause, and seemed
quite willing to concede it would not have been. The defense argued that Whitehead was not required to allow the performance of “Ave Maria” whether or not it
would have been such a violation:
In theory, Nurre may be correct that allowing “Ave Maria” would have
been constitutional. But this argument is a non sequitor. Simply because
the Establishment Clause allows some display of religion does not mean it
requires the same. Applied to the present case, even if the District could
constitutionally allow “Ave Maria” to be played at a high school graduation
does not mean it was required to do the same. 312
Because the district court assumed that there was a limited public forum, this argument was spurious. If the school district had established a limited public forum, it
could only prohibit speech on a reasonable and non-viewpoint-discriminatory basis.
It could not prohibit speech for no reason at all or just because it wanted to.
The reader may recall that for purposes of viewpoint analysis, the district
court treated the performance of “Ave Maria” as a religious service or worship. 313
However, in its analysis of Nurre’s Establishment Clause claim, the district court
treated the performance as non-religious because of Nurre’s disclaimer of any religious intent.314 But now, for the purposes of analyzing reasonableness in regard to
the Establishment Clause defense, the district went back to treating the performance as a religious service or message once again.315 Perhaps the nonrepresentational character of instrumental music, which could invite a variety of different
meanings, was responsible for the chameleon-like form which presented itself to
the perception of the district court. However, the court could have avoided this
troubling inconsistency by perceiving the music as an artistic statement, and not
religious.

311.
312.
313.
314.
315.

See Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1233, 1239.
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 30 (citations omitted).
Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1231–32.
Id. at 1233–1235.
Id. at 1233–40.
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In order to find qualified immunity, it was not necessary for the district court
to also suggest the performance of “Ave Maria” would have been government endorsement of religion. The court could have found that Whitehead was entitled to
qualified immunity under the “plainly incompetent” or in “knowing[] violat[ion of]
the law” standard because of the complex and unsettled state of the governing law.
The court could have made that finding and also found that it was unreasonable to
ban the music for the purposes of the limited public forum because the ban did not
meet the higher standard of reasonableness for restrictions of speech in a limited
public forum. There was no need to argue that the performance of “Ave Maria”
would have resulted in a constitutional violation. Much of the district court’s reasoning was also irrelevant. Under Hazelwood, for example, a graduation ceremony
is a school-sponsored activity in which student speech is subject to school regulation.316 But the district court had assumed that the school had created a limited
public forum for the performance of the Wind Ensemble;317 in which case Hazelwood does not apply.318 If, as the district court and the appellate court assumed,
the school had established a limited public forum when the school had allowed the
students to choose the music they would play at graduation, then the speech of the
students was not school-sponsored, and the school district could only regulate the
speech to the extent that its limitations were reasonable and not discriminatory of
viewpoint.319 If there were any question whether members of the audience might
think the musical expression was school-sponsored, Jackson High School could have
made it clear that the students’ musical expression was their own and not the
school’s, as Catherine Ross suggests in her book, Lessons in Censorships: How
Schools and Courts Subvert Students’ First Amendment Rights.320 “The performance
guide could have indicated that the players chose the piece and the criterion they
used, or a member of the group could have made an announcement to the same
effect before the group began to play.”321 If, in the minds of school officials, the
performance of “Ave Maria” realistically presented a potential Establishment

316. See Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 276 (1988).
317. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1231; Nurre, 580 F.3d at 1094. See Reply Brief of Petitioner for Writ
of Certiorari, Nurre v. Whitehead, 559 U.S. 1025 (2010) (No. 09-671), 2010 WL 28540 (“In upholding the
school’s decision to forbid the publication of student articles, this Court made clear in Hazelwood that it was
not addressing principles that apply to a public forum for expression. Nor did Hazelwood involve the kind
of limited public forum for expression that both lower courts determined existed in this case.” (citations
omitted)).
318. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267–70 (finding that the student newspaper was not a public
forum).
319. Nurre, 580 F.3d at 1094 (“In a nonpublic forum opened for a limited purpose, restrictions on
access ‘can be based on subject matter . . . so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the
purpose served by the forum’ and all the surrounding circumstances.”). Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1231
(“But, even if the Wind Ensemble’s performance constitutes a ‘limited public forum,’ defendant’s prohibition on the performance of ‘Ave Maria’ is not a violation of plaintiff’s free speech rights if the restriction is
viewpoint neutral and reasonable in light of the purpose of the forum.” (citations omitted)).
320. See supra note 25.
321. Id. at 266.
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Clause violation, a disclaimer could have made clear that the school was not endorsing religion.322 Of course, such a disclaimer by itself may not have dispelled an
actual Establishment Clause violation.323 However, there simply wasn’t any.
1. Prayer and Proselytizing vs. Musical Performance
Perhaps the most clearly inappropriate precedents Judge Lasnik cited in his
opinion were Cole and Lassonde in support of the Establishment Clause defense.
These two cases are obviously distinguishable from Nurre. In both, students wanted
to deliver graduation speeches containing proselytizing language or sectarian references.324 Cole concerned two students, John Niemeyer and Ferrin Cole, who were
to deliver the valediction and invocation respectively at the Oroville Union High
School graduation.325 The Ninth Circuit described their speeches as follows:
Niemeyer’s proposed speech was a religious sermon which advised the audience that “we are all God’s children through Jesus Christ [sic] death,
when we accept his free love and saving grace in our lives,” and requested
that the audience accept that “God created us” and that man’s plans “will
not fully succeed unless we pattern our lives after Jesus’ example.” Finally,
Niemeyer’s speech called upon the audience to “accept God’s love and
grace” and “yield to God our lives.” Cole’s proposed invocation referred
repeatedly to the heavenly Father and Father God, and concluded “We ask
all these things in the precious holy name of Jesus Christ, Amen.”326
In Lassonde, the Ninth Circuit exemplified the proposed proselytizing speech with
the following passage from that speech:

322. In Rosenberger, the Supreme Court found that the University of Virginia’s program of funding
the publications of student groups constituted a limited public forum, and applying the rules of such a forum, the Court found the University’s exclusion of a religious student group’s publication to be prohibited
viewpoint discrimination. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 844 (1995). A
factor in the Court’s reasoning was the disclaimer, which the University required the student groups to include in their written materials “stating that the [student organization] is independent of the University and
that the University is not responsible for the [student organization].” Id. at 823. The Court argued, “The
distinction between the University’s own favored message and the private speech of students is evident in
the case before us. The University itself has taken steps to ensure the distinction in the agreement each
[student organization] must sign. The University declares that the student groups eligible for [] support are
not the University’s agents, are not subject to its control, and are not its responsibility.” Id. at 834–35.
323. Establishment Clause – Religious Displays on Public Property – Colorado Supreme Court Upholds Display of Ten Commandments on Public Property. – State v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, 898
P.2d 1013 (Colo. 1995) (en banc), 109 HARV. L. REV. 530, 533 (1995) (“Courts at all levels . . . have indicated
that signs disclaiming endorsement of a display’s religious meaning may lessen or even cure Establishment
Clause violations, but no court has yet sought to establish the presence of a disclaimer as more than just
one of many factors to be weighed.”).
324. See Lassonde v. Pleasanton Unified Sch. Dist., 320 F. 3d 979 (9th Cir. 2003); Cole v. Oroville
Union High Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2000).
325. Cole, 228 F.3d at 1095.
326. Id. at 1097.
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I urge you to seek out the Lord, and let Him guide you. Through His power,
you can stand tall in the face of darkness, and survive the trends of “modern society.”
As Psalm 146 says, “Do not put your trust in princes, in mortal men, who
cannot even save themselves. When their spirit departs, they return to the
ground; on that very day their plans come to nothing. Blessed is he whose
help is the God of Jacob, whose hope is in the Lord his God, the Maker of
heaven and earth, the sea, and everything in them—the Lord, who remains
faithful forever. He upholds the cause of the oppressed and gives food to
the hungry. The Lord sets prisoners free, the Lord gives sight to the blind,
the Lord lifts up those who are bowed down, the Lord loves the righteous.
The Lord watches over the alien and sustains the fatherless and the widow,
but he frustrates the ways of the wicked.”
. . . “For the wages of sin is death; but the gift of God is eternal life through
Jesus Christ our Lord.” Have you accepted the gift, or will you pay the ultimate price?327
In Weisman, the Supreme Court prohibited public schools from arranging for outside clergy to lead others in prayer at graduations,328 and in Santa Fe, the High Court
prohibited public schools from arranging, even indirectly, for students to lead prayers at football games.329 In Cole and Lassonde, the Ninth Circuit held that, like government arranged prayer, student prayer and proselytizing at graduation “would
have constituted District coercion of attendance and participation in a religious
practice because proselytizing, no less than prayer, is a religious practice.” 330 The
inclusion of such speech at a public school graduation “would have constituted government endorsement of religious speech,” and “lent [the School] District approval
to the religious message of the speech,” and “carried the District's seal of approval.”331
What all these cases have in common is the finding of state endorsement of
religion and Establishment Clause violations because the State was either imposing,
327. Lassonde, 320 F.3d at 981.
328. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992) (“The sole question presented is whether a religious exercise may be conducted at a graduation ceremony in circumstances where, as we have found,
young graduates who object are induced to conform. No holding by this Court suggests that a school can
persuade or compel a student to participate in a religious exercise. That is being done here, and it is forbidden by the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.”).
329. Santa Fe Independent Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 316 (2000) (“[T]he simple enactment
of this policy, with the purpose and perception of school endorsement of student prayer, was a constitutional violation.”). In Nurre, however, the school did not allow the students to choose the music they would
perform with the purpose of including prayer at the graduation and did not in any way select or influence
the selection of “Ave Maria.” Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2009).
330. Cole, 228 F.3d at 1104. The Lassonde court found that case indistinguishable from Cole. “Our
decision in Cole squarely controls Plaintiff’s case. The facts are almost identical.” Lassonde, 320 F.3d at 983.
“[T]here is no question that a reasonable dissenter could have felt that silence signified approval or participation. Even if the school district could have conducted the proceedings so as to avoid the appearance of
governmental ‘entanglement’ with Plaintiff’s speech, it had no means of preventing the coerced participation of dissenters attending their graduation ceremony other than censoring Plaintiff’s speech.” Id. at 984.
331. Cole, 28 F.3d at 1103.
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causing to be imposed, or allowing to be imposed, a religious practice–either prayer
or sermon-like proselytizing speech–on an audience. In contrast, the performance
of “Ave Maria” at the Jackson High School graduation was neither a prayer nor an
effort to proselytize or sermonize. Whereas Cole and Lassonde involved the censorship of explicit, particularized religious messages, the instrumental music at issue in
Nurre by its very nature could not have conveyed any particularized religious message at all. The essential difference between the speeches and prayers in Cole, Lassonde, Weisman, and Santa Fe on the one hand, and the musical performance in
Nurre on the other, was that the former were religious rituals while the latter was
an artistic event. Contrary to the district court’s suggestion that Cole and Lassonde
presented a “conflict” with the Establishment Clause that was greater in degree
than the “conflict” presented by Nurre,332 the difference between the expression in
the prior cases and the expression in Nurre presented a difference in kind, so that
even though the speeches in Cole and Lassonde might indeed have presented violations of the Establishment Clause, the music in Nurre could not.
2. Limited Public Forums vs. Plenary Control
However appropriate the decisions in Cole and Lassonde may have been,
these particular cases present a problem in their reasoning which later infects and
consumes the district court’s reasoning in Nurre. As noted above, the district court
fashioned its argument on the basis that the performance of “Ave Maria” would
have conveyed an endorsement of religion by the school.333 The argument begins
with Hazelwood’s proposition that a school may exercise control over student
speech at a school-sponsored event in which the speech might reasonably be understood to have the imprimatur or approval of the school.334 The district court then
cited Weisman, Cole, and Lassonde, for the idea that if a school exercises “plenary”
control over a school-sponsored event such as a graduation, it is reasonable for the
audience to construe student speech as having the endorsement of the school. 335
Finally, “because the performance took place at graduation, the School District exercised control over the performance by placing restrictions on its content, and the
performance was by the ‘Jackson Band’ as listed in the 2006 JHS graduate program,”
it was reasonable to understand the performance of a religiously inspired and
named musical work to be an approval of religion.336 Because the school’s approval
of religion would create an Establishment Clause violation, the school officials were
reasonable in prohibiting the performance, if not required to do so.337
But there is a logical defect in this argument. Before developing its “plenary
control” analysis, the Cole opinion states, “Even assuming the Oroville graduation
ceremony was a public or limited public forum, the district's refusal to allow the
students to deliver a sectarian speech or prayer was necessary to avoid violating
the Establishment Clause under the principles applied in Santa Fe Independent
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.

Nurre v. Whitehead, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1239 (W.D. Wash. 2007).
Id. at 1233–40.
See supra note 287 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 289–293 and accompanying text.
Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1238.
Id. at 1233–40.
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School District v. Doe and Lee v. Weisman.”338 For one thing, the statement is questionable because neither the Weisman nor the Santa Fe courts were dealing with a
limited public forum. Be that as it may, the Cole court was saying that even if it
assumed the student speeches were within a limited public forum, they were impermissible because they would have created an Establishment Clause violation.
This indicates that the reasoning in Cole implicitly, or perhaps hypothetically, took
into account the assumption that the students’ speeches were within a limited public forum. But in Nurre, the district court, and later the appellate court, explicitly
assumed that the performance of the Wind Ensemble was a limited public forum.
Under that assumption, it is not logical to say that the school still exercises “plenary”
or complete and absolute control of the school event, at least not in regard to the
expressive area of the limited public forum.339 This is because in establishing the
limited public forum, the school has yielded at least some control of the speech
within this area of the limited public forum, evidenced by the requirement that government limitations on speech be viewpoint neutral and reasonable. To assume the
State has created a limited public forum, but then also say that the State maintains
plenary control, is self-contradictory. Either there is a limited public forum in which
the State is subject to limitations on its control of speech, or there is plenary government control, but not both. If a court assumes that the school has created a
limited public forum within its graduation exercises, it is irrelevant that the school
reviews the speeches or has control over all other aspects of the graduation ceremony, unless the court is considering these facts as evidence that there is no limited
public forum to begin with. Thus, in Nurre, when the district court applies the plenary control argument, the court has, in effect, ignored or abandoned its assumption that there is any limited public forum at all.
At the heart of the plenary control argument is circular reasoning. It goes like
this. The court must decide whether the students’ speeches may be censored or
not. Because the school censors the speech, a reasonable observer would conclude
the school endorses the speech it does allow. Because a reasonable observer would
conclude the school endorses the speech it allows, the school must censor the
speech it does not endorse. Without the intermediate steps, the logic is that the
school must censor student speech because it censors student speech. Instead of
asking whether the school may censor the speech within the assumed limited public
forum, this reasoning posits the fact of censorship as conclusive that censorship is
permissible, even required. As Caleb McCain observed in respect to Cole, “it is a
tautology to require censorship to prevent unconstitutional speech that derives its
unconstitutionality from that very censorship.” 340
In a very odd footnote, the district court states, “Although the Court considers
the parties’ forum analysis assertions, as the Court discusses in Section II.B.2.b below, based on Ninth Circuit authority, a forum analysis is not required to determine
the viability of an Establishment Clause defense where the speech at issue bears
338. Cole v. Oroville Union High Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1092, 1101 (9th Cir. 2000).
339. The Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, defines plenary as “complete in every respect: absolute, unqualified.” Plenary, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (last updated Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/plenary.
340. Caleb McCain, Chalk Talk – Religion in the Valedictory, 37 J. L. & EDUC. 135, 138–39 (2008).
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the imprimatur of the school.”341 The court then provides the passage from Cole
quoted above, stating that even if it is assumed that the school had created a limited
public forum, it was necessary for the school to disallow student speech which
would violate the Establishment Clause.342 The statement is odd because if there
was a limited public forum, as the court assumed, then the speech within that forum would not bear the imprimatur of the school. But if it is the case that the court
thought forum analysis was unnecessary because the speech bore the imprimatur
of the school, the court’s forum analysis had no purpose. All that was necessary for
the court to do was to find that the Establishment Clause defense was viable because allowing the speech would produce government endorsement of religion and
an Establishment Clause violation. Why Judge Lasnik undertook a forum analysis
which he suggests was unnecessary is unclear. In any event, the concurrent assumption of a limited public forum and finding of plenary control does not indicate that
the forum analysis is unnecessary; instead, what this indicates is that the court’s
reasoning is defective if not incoherent.
c. The Appellate Court’s Discussion of Reasonableness
As noted above, the appeals court adopted the same limited public forum test
accepted by the district court, which meant that the speech restriction imposed had
to be “reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and all the surrounding circumstances.”343 However, the appellate court did not base its own finding of
reasonableness upon the Establishment Clause defense.344 Unlike Judge Lasnik,
Judge Tallman very clearly denied that the appellate court was making any finding
or suggestion as to whether the performance of “Ave Maria” would have violated
the Establishment Clause.345 “[W]e . . . wish to make clear that we do not hold that
the performance of music, even ‘Ave Maria,’ would necessarily violate the Establishment Clause.”346
The appellate court opted to address the reasonableness standard, as it
should, in terms of the government’s purpose in creating the limited public forum:
“The ‘reasonableness’ analysis focuses on whether the limitation is consistent with
preserving the property for the purpose to which it is dedicated.”347 The court concluded, “[T]he District’s action in keeping all musical performances at graduation
‘entirely secular’ in nature was reasonable in the light of the circumstances surrounding a high school graduation, and therefore did not violate Nurre’s right to
free speech.”348 The circumstances which made the prohibition reasonable related
to the desire to avoid the controversy that attended the performance of “Up Above
My Head” at the previous year’s graduation.349 “Here, the District was acting to

341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.

Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1229 n.10.
Id. See supra note 338 and accompanying text.
Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1094 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
Id. at 1098.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1094 (citation omitted).
Id. at 1095 (footnote omitted).
Nurre, 580 F.3d at 1091.
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avoid a repeat of the 2005 controversy by prohibiting any reference to religion at
its graduation ceremonies.”350
To legally support the avoidance of “controversy” as a reasonable basis for
prohibiting the performance of Ave Maria at graduation, the appellate opinion cited
several cases in which courts had decided that a school district’s concerns for disturbance and controversy were legitimate reasons for the school to restrict speech
in a limited public forum.351 The court cited DiLoreto v. Downey Unified School District Board of Education, in which the Ninth Circuit found that restricting advertisements on a high school baseball park fence for the purpose of avoiding disturbance
and controversy was legitimate because the audience included impressionable
youths in a school setting.352 The appellate opinion also cited Brody ex rel. Sugzdinis
v. Spang, which noted that a consent-decree provision restricting a student’s proselytizing speech at graduation might be a valid restriction even when the valedictorian speech is considered a limited public forum.353 Finally, the court cited Student
Coalition for Peace v. Lower Merion School District Board of School Directors, which
held that banning the use of school facilities for an anti-nuclear exposition was reasonable to avoid political controversy and maintain the school’s appearance of neutrality.354 The Ninth Circuit majority then found that the Everett School District, like
the school authorities in the cited cases, acted to avoid a controversy, such as that
which occurred following the 2005 graduation, by prohibiting any reference to religion at the 2006 graduation, such as the title, “Ave Maria.” 355
The Ninth Circuit’s shift from the Establishment Clause defense to an avoidance of controversy defense as a justification for the school district’s action is significant. Either the majority thought that the performance of “Ave Maria” at a public school graduation could not have posed any realistic danger of an Establishment
Clause violation, or believed that finding such a realistic danger as a basis for censoring the music in Nurre was questionable and could be overruled by the Supreme
Court. Certainly, the controversy rationale provided a more straightforward argument to satisfy the reasonableness prong of the test for speech restrictions in a
limited public forum than did the arguments of the district court. However, this argument fails just as clearly. Although the Supreme Court denied certiorari so that
the argument did not undergo further scrutiny,356 the controversy rationale drew
substantial criticism from the concurrence of Judge Smith and dissent of Justice
Alito.357

350.
351.
352.

Id. at 1095.
Id. at 1094.
Id. (citing DiLoreto v. Downey Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 196 F.3d 958, 967 (9th Cir.

1999)).
353. Id. (citing Brody ex rel. Sugzdinis v. Spang, 957 F.2d 1108, 1122 (3d Cir. 1992)).
354. Id. (citing Student Coal. for Peace v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist. Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 776 F.2d 431,
437 (3d Cir. 1985)).
355. Nurre, 580 F.3d at 1095.
356. Nurre v. Whitehead, 559 U.S. 1025 (2010).
357. Id.
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Smith, who issued a concurrence to the Ninth Circuit opinion, distinguished
the cases which the majority cited. 358 Rather than delay presenting these distinctions to the section on Smith’s concurrence below, these distinctions are presented
forthwith. DiLoreto concerned the placement of a large banner advertising the Ten
Commandments on school property, and Brody ex rel. Sugzdinis v. Spang was about
a student’s evangelizing speech at graduation, both attempts at explicit proselytization.359 Student Coalition for Peace concerned a large politically partisan rally that
would advocate denuclearization to achieve world peace and had the potential of
generating controversy and disruption at the school.360 However, the performance
of “Ave Maria,” Smith argued, was not proselytizing and could not have caused the
controversy or disruption created by the previous year’s performance of “Up Above
My Head” because the performance was to be completely instrumental and not
contain references to the Lord or heaven, let alone Jesus Christ or any other words
that would advocate controversial ideas.361 No proselytizing religious or political
message could have been conveyed.362
Aside from Judge Smith’s points, the Ninth Circuit neglected to note that in
the Student Coalition for Peace case, the Third Circuit found that the district court
did not consider whether the school district had created a limited public forum and
remanded the case in order to make this determination.363 The district court found
that while the school district had not created a limited public forum for the athletic
field, it did create such a forum for the school gymnasium, and therefore the court
enjoined the school district from prohibiting the student group from using the
school gym, despite the potential for controversy. 364 Because the Nurre courts assumed that the Wind Ensemble’s performance was a limited public forum, Student
Coalition for Peace ultimately supports Nurre’s position that banning a student
group from a limited public forum merely because of an unsubstantiated potential
controversy is a constitutional violation.

358. Nurre, 580 F.3d at 1099 (Smith, J., concurring).
359. Id. at 1101.
360. Id.
361. Id. (“Unlike in Student Coalition for Peace, the wind ensemble’s playing of Ave Maria here
would not have risked creating a disruption or generating appreciable controversy . . . the playing of the Ave
Maria arrangement could not have reasonably been interpreted to convey a religious message, nor was any
such message intended. Rather, as Nurre stated, it was simply ‘a pretty piece.’ She further explained that,
‘it’s the kind of piece that can make your graduation memorable because we actually learned to play it really
well. And we wanted to play something that we enjoyed playing.’ For this reason, unlike as in DiLoreto, the
performance would not have been viewed as proselytizing; as stated, the arrangement contains no words
at all.”).
362. Id.
363. Student Coal. for Peace v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist. Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 766 F.2d 431, 443 (3d Cir.
1985) (“[T]he [Equal Access] Act should be read to apply only if a limited open forum existed after the Act
became law. Since the trial in this case took place before the Act’s effective date, there was no opportunity
to offer evidence of the school’s policy after that date. On remand, the appellants should have the opportunity to prove that the appellees’ policy or practice after August 11, 1984 with respect to noncurricular
student groups created a limited open forum broad enough to include the contemplated use.”).
364. Student Coal. for Peace v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist. Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 633 F. Supp. 1040, 1043
(E.D. Pa. 1986) (“Pennypacker Field is not a limited open forum . . . . The L[ower] M[erion] S[chool] D[istrict]
has created a limited open forum at the Boys’ Gym. . . . I find that it is appropriate here to enjoin the LMSD
from denying the use of the Boys’ Gym to the S[tudent] C[oalition for] P[eace] . . .”).
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As to “controversy,” it is true that Superintendent Whitehead and Associate
Superintendent Brandsma spoke of complaints and “letters” of complaint sent to
the Herald, the largest newspaper in Sonomish County, from those who attended
the 2005 graduation performance of the Kirk Franklin song, “Up Above My Head.”365
But the record of this case documented only one letter of complaint that appeared
in the Herald.366 Surely, if there were a serious controversy over the Jackson High
School Choir’s 2005 performance of “Up Above My Head,” the defense would have
produced more letters and affidavits from offended parties.
The author of the one letter complained about the references to God in lyrics
sung by the Choir and expressed “puzzlement” about the efficacy of the school’s
“civic instruction” regarding “the importance of our national and state constitutions
specifically relating to policy regarding religious activity, while willfully disregarding
the same by sponsorship of nonsecular entertainment during a public graduation
ceremony.”367 Adopting a mocking tone, the letter-writer went on to state, “[i]f in
fact the lesson was to demonstrate the meaning of hypocrisy, an “A” grade should
be awarded.”368 This author appears to consider it self-evident that any mention of
God in a government-sponsored forum, even in a musical performance, is a violation of the Constitution. While expressing disdain for the teachers and administrators who permitted the performance of “Up Above My Head,” the letter certainly
does not present a reasoned argument for this position. There is no mention of
school policies, limited public forum analysis, Supreme Court cases, or any of the
other subtleties that attend this complex issue. But most importantly, the letter is
irrelevant to the issue of “Ave Maria,” for the letter concerned the performance of
a choral piece containing explicit references to God, which the letter writer may
have thought was selected by the school.369
Presumably, the author of the letter was present at the 2005 graduation when
the Wind Ensemble played “On a Hymnsong,” by Phillip Bliss, with all of the religious
trappings that work presented.370 Yet the author did not complain about the
“Hymnsong.” In fact, for several years the Wind Ensemble had played the
“Hymnsong,” which its former director, Mr. Rice, had selected,371 and yet the defense produced no evidence of protest or controversy over it, even though the religious background of this work is at least as evident as that of “Ave Maria.” 372 Nor is
there a hint of any threat of lawsuits by individuals or organizations, like the ACLU
or Americans United for Separation of Church and State, over religious music at the
Jackson High School graduation. It is far from clear that the letter’s author or anyone
else would have objected to the performance of student-selected instrumental music whose religious title could have been omitted from the program altogether. Indeed, the “controversy” objection to “Ave Maria” doesn’t work any better than the
“Establishment Clause defense” objection treated earlier. Given this history, was it
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.

See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text.
Supra note 46 and accompanying text.
Id.
Id.
See Nurre v. Whitehead, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1225 (W.D. Wash. 2007).
Id.
See discussion supra Section III(D)(ii)(a)(1), in particular notes 251–256.
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rational to attach a rather minor controversy concerning the words of a religious
song performed by the School Chorus to the instrumental works performed by the
Wind Ensemble that had never attracted any controversy at all? One extremely
cranky letter about the Chorus does not a controversy make about the Wind Ensemble.
The Ninth Circuit was also concerned with the prospect of a captive audience
subjected to an obviously religious work.373 The appellate court distinguished the
graduation from a musical concert by arguing:
[W]hen there is a captive audience at a graduation ceremony, which spans
a finite amount of time, and during which the demand for equal time is so
great that comparable non-religious musical works might not be presented, it is reasonable for a school official to prohibit the performance of
an obviously religious piece.374
Here the Ninth Circuit overlooked several issues of fact aside from the question of
whether there would be any real controversy at all about the music performed by
the Wind Ensemble. Any one of these issues of fact could have precluded summary
judgment. For instance, it was not a certainty that the audience would have recognized the Latin name, “Ave Maria,” as indicative of a religious piece of music.375 The
court also overlooked the evidence that a good deal of other secular music was
played at the graduation, so that the audience was not subjected to exclusively “religious” music. Aside from the Wind Ensemble’s performance, there were six numbers performed by the Jazz Combo: a recording of “Pomp and Circumstance” played
twice, the national anthem sung by a graduating senior, and the School Chorus’s
performance of “Mother Africa,” not to mention student speeches.376 The court also
seemed to have forgotten its finding that because Nurre had no religious motive in
wanting to perform “Ave Maria,” she therefore had no religious viewpoint protected by the First Amendment.377 It seems contradictory simultaneously to argue
that a work, which had no viewpoint to protect, nevertheless would be controversial because of its viewpoint. Finally, it is also questionable that a public high school
concert audience is any less captive than a graduation ceremony audience, an issue
to be discussed below.378
The failure of the Ninth Circuit to examine evidence of the likely controversy
and the other circumstances that allegedly made it reasonable for the school to
373. See Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1095 (9th Cir. 2009).
374. Id.
375. Neither the school administrators who decided to prohibit the performance, nor Nurre herself, were certain about exactly what the religious significance of the title was. See supra notes 56–58 and
accompanying text.
376. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 10, supra notes 45 and 81–85 and accompanying text.
Incidentally, as the Petition points out at *10 n.4, “There are also lyrics to ‘Pomp and Circumstance’ which
include repeating twice the following phrase, ‘God who made thee mighty, Make thee mightier yet.’” See
Perrine, supra note 25, at 185 (noting that “Pomp and Circumstance” is associated with the coronation of
Edward VII, which marked both his ascension to the role of king and to the Head of the Church of England).
377. Nurre, 580 F.3d at 1095 n.6. (“[T]his is not a case involving viewpoint discrimination . . . .
Nurre concedes that she was not attempting to express any specific religious viewpoint, but that she sought
only to ‘play a pretty piece.’”). See also supra notes 206–207 and accompanying text.
378. See infra notes 427430.
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prohibit the performance of “Ave Maria” are particularly striking in the light of
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, where the Supreme
Court emphasized the need for courts to assess a school’s claim of disruption and
disorder to its educational mission as a basis for limiting or punishing student
speech.379 While the day-to-day environment and circumstances at school are different from those of the graduation ceremony, the issue of curtailing student
speech on the basis of disturbance and controversy is the common element between Tinker and the rationale upon which the Ninth Circuit rested its holding in
Nurre.380 In Tinker, school officials punished students who wore black armbands at
school to express their opposition to the war in Vietnam because the school claimed
the expression of protest would be disruptive to school discipline.381 On this question, the Supreme Court made it clear that unsubstantiated claims of disorder do
not justify limitations on student speech. “[I]n our system, undifferentiated fear or
apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of
expression.”382 The Court continued:
In order for the State in the person of school officials to justify prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show that
its action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the
discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular
viewpoint. Certainly where there is no finding and no showing that engaging in the forbidden conduct would ‘materially and substantially interfere
with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
school,’ the prohibition cannot be sustained. 383
Because the Tinker Court found no “facts which might reasonably have led school
authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school
activities, and no disturbances or disorders on the school premises [had] in fact occurred,” the Court ruled in favor of the students. 384 The Ninth Circuit should have
379. 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
380. In Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272–73 (1988), the Supreme Court differentiated between the free speech rights students have at school-sponsored events as opposed to their
rights of personal expression in school. (“Accordingly, we conclude that the standard articulated in Tinker
for determining when a school may punish student expression need not also be the standard for determining when a school may refuse to lend its name and resources to the dissemination of student expression.
Instead, we hold that educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the
style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.” (footnotes omitted)).
381. On December 16, Mary Beth and Christopher wore black armbands to their
schools. John Tinker wore his armband the next day. They were all sent home and
suspended from school until they would come back without their armbands. They
did not return to school until after the planned period for wearing armbands had
expired—that is, until after New Year’s Day.
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
The district court concluded that the action of the school authorities was reasonable because it was
based upon their fear of a disturbance from the wearing of the armbands. Id. at 508. Because of the lack of
evidence that the armbands were likely to cause such a disturbance, the Supreme Court reversed.
382. Id. at 508.
383. Id. at 509 (citation omitted).
384. Id. at 514.
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given the factual record some consideration rather than uncritically accept the
school administrators’ claims of controversy. 385
E. The Concurrence and the Dissent
i. Judge Milan D. Smith, Dissenting in Part, but Concurring in the Judgment
Judge Smith joined in the judgment of the Ninth Circuit panel because he
agreed that Whitehead was entitled to qualified immunity.386 Judge Smith also
thought along with the majority that the school’s restriction was viewpoint neutral.387 But he forcefully argued that Whitehead’s prohibition was not reasonable
“in the light of the purpose served by the forum,” so that the restriction failed the
limited public forum test.388
I would hold that, in prohibiting Nurre and her classmates from playing
their selected piece of music, the School District misjudged the Establishment Clause’s requirements and, in so doing, violated Nurre’s First Amendment rights. I am concerned that, if the majority’s reasoning on this issue
becomes widely adopted, the practical effect will be for public school administrators to chill—or even kill—musical and artistic presentations by
their students in school-sponsored limited public fora where those presentations contain any trace of religious inspiration, for fear of criticism by a
member of the public, however extreme that person’s views may be. 389
Smith’s major concern was that the majority’s ruling would lead to the inhibition of
student expression and cause the nation’s youth to become “Philistines, who have
little or no understanding of our civic and cultural heritage.” 390
Aside from distinguishing the case law the majority relied upon for its “controversy” rationale, Smith pointed to “the far-reaching influence of religion and religious institutions on music.”391 He cited Doe v. Duncanville for testimony that “6075 percent of serious choral music is based on sacred themes or text,”392 and he
quoted a law review article stating, “[A]pproximately forty-four percent of the music recommended by the Music Educators National Conference for inclusion in the
public school curriculum—for the secular purpose of preserving ‘America’s vast and

385. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 45, at 14 (“In Tinker . . . , this Court made clear
that student speech may not be censored based simply on ‘an urgent wish to avoid the controversy which
might result from the expression.’ Writing for the Court, Justice Fortas declared that the ‘mere desire to
avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint’ is simply not sufficient without more to censor student speech.” (citation omitted)).
386. Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009) (Smith, J., dissenting in part, but
concurring in judgment).
387. Id. at 1100.
388. Id.
389. Id. at 1099 (citation omitted) (footnote omitted).
390. Id.
391. Nurre, 580 F.3d at 1100 (Smith, J., dissenting in part, but concurring in judgment).
392. Id. (citing Doe v. Duncanville, 70 F.3d 403, 407 (5th Cir. 1995)) (“It is undisputed that much
of the music composed in the Western World during the musical eras known as the medieval, baroque, and
classical periods was fostered by one or more of the major European Christian denominations.”).
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varied music heritage’—has religious significance.”393 He also enumerated classical
and modern works and popular music which, though originally inspired by religion,
have become secularized: Handel’s Hallelujah Chorus from The Messiah, Steffan
and Ward Howe’s The Battle Hymn of the Republic, Beethoven’s Ode to Joy, Mozart’s Requiem Mass in D Minor, and even Purvis and Black’s When the Saints Go
Marching In.394 He argued that if the purpose of the graduation ceremony was to
acknowledge the achievements of the graduating seniors by providing an opportunity for them to express themselves through speech and music, purging the ceremony of all vestiges of religion did not advance this purpose, but rather, given the
religious influence on music, had just the opposite effect of curtailing the students’
ability to demonstrate their achievements through their artistic expression. 395 The
prohibition was therefore unreasonable since it did not advance the very purpose
of the limited public forum.
As discussed above, Smith found no legal grounds for banning the performance because of the potential that it would cause controversy, distinguishing the
cases of DiLoreto, Brody ex rel. Sugzdinis, and Student Coalition for Peace.396 Moreover, Judge Smith argued that unlike these cases, “the playing of the “Ave Maria”
arrangement could not have reasonably been interpreted to convey a religious message, nor was any such message intended,” and “the performance would not have
been viewed as proselytizing [because] the arrangement contains no words at
all.”397
Nor, according to Smith, did this case present grounds for the “Establishment
Clause defense,” which would only be available if the school district’s “refusal to
allow the students to [perform “Ave Maria”] is necessary to avoid violating the Establishment Clause,” a proposition for which Judge Smith cited several cases including Cole, Weisman, and Santa Fe, which the district court and the majority had actually used in support of their reasoning.398 Under Lassonde, Smith noted, a school
district may be obligated to censor a religious message for two reasons: (1) “to avoid
the appearance of government sponsorship of religion”; and (2) to avoid “imper-

393. Id. (citing Richard Collin Mangrum, Shall We Sing? Shall We Sing Religious Music in Public
Schools?, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 815, 866 (2005)).
394. Id. Nurre also points out that a great deal of modern popular music with religious references
might also be excluded under the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion.
Students who perform rock-and-roll or pop tunes are likely to encounter problems. The Beatles sang about ‘Mother Mary’ in Let It Be. Stairway to Heaven by Led Zeppelin, The Prayer by
Celine Dion, and Livin’ on a Prayer by Jon Bon Jovi all contain allusions to religion in their titles.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 45, at 29.
395. Nurre, 580 F.3d at 1100–01.
396. Id. at 1101 (citing DiLoreto v. Downey Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 196 F.3d 958, 967 (9th
Cir. 1999); Brody v. Spang, 957 F.2d 1108, 1122 (3d Cir. 1992); Student Coal. for Peace v. Lower Merion Sch.
Dist. Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 776 F.2d 431, 437 (3d Cir. 1085)).
397. Id. at 1101.
398. Id. (quoting Cole v. Oroville Union High Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1092, 1101 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); Santa Fe Independent Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290
(2000); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992)).
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missibly coerc[ing] . . . dissenters, requiring them to participate in a religious practice even by their silence.”399 Judge Smith found neither reason present.400 In
Smith’s opinion, it was unlikely that many people would recognize “Ave Maria” as
an “obviously religious piece” and a “well known Catholic prayer” when Superintendent Whitehead herself “only had a vague sense that the term had some religious
origin.”401 “Simply allowing the playing of a student-selected instrumental piece of
classical music (with a title in a dead language whose meaning would be unrecognizable to most attendees of the graduation) cannot reasonably be construed as
‘government sponsorship of religion.’” 402 Likewise, Smith argued, merely attending
a graduation in which one of several musical pieces is “an obscure classical piece”
cannot constitute “participat[ing] in a religious practice.”403 While there is a compelling government interest “in not committing actual Establishment Clause violations,” the government has no legitimate interest in “‘discriminating against religion
in whatever other context it pleases, so long as it claims some connection, however
attenuated, to establishment concerns.’”404
Judge Smith closed with an expression of sympathy for school officials who
are subject to criticism and lawsuits regardless of what they do.405 But he also expressed the need for the courts to provide guidance in order to alleviate confusion,
discourage litigation, and enhance student expression, something which the Nurre
majority, in explicitly making no finding on whether the performance of “Ave Maria”
would have been an Establishment Clause violation, conspicuously failed to do. 406
ii. Justice Alito’s Dissent to Denial of Certiorari
In his dissent to the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari, Justice Alito began
by declaring, “The Ninth Circuit's decision in this case is not easy to square with our
free speech jurisprudence.”407 Unlike Judge Smith, Alito made it clear he thought
there was an issue regarding viewpoint discrimination in this case. 408 Alito distinguished Nurre from situations where “a public school administration speaks for itself and takes public responsibility for its speech.”409 In such instances the school
“may say what it wishes without violating the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech.”410 However, when the school allows students to make their own

399. Id. (citing Lassonde v. Pleasanton Unified Sch. Dist., 320 F.3d 979, 983 (9th Cir. 2003); Cole,
228 F.3d at 1101, 1104)).
400. Id.
401. Nurre, 580 F.3d at 1102.
402. Id.
403. Id.
404. Id. (quoting Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 730 n.2 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in
original)).
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. Nurre v. Whitehead, 559 U.S. 1025, 1026 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
408. See infra note 420 and accompanying text.
409. Nurre, 559 U.S. at 1028.
410. Id. (citing Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467–68 (2009)). Justice Alito,
of course, was the author of the Summum decision. In that case, a religious organization, Summum, brought
a section 1983 action against the City of Pleasant Grove because the City denied Summum permission to
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choice of music to perform, school administrators “must respect the students’ free
speech rights . . . [and] not behave like puppeteers who create the illusion that students are engaging in personal expression when in fact the school administration is
pulling the strings.”411 Citing the Supreme Court school access cases Rosenberger
and Widmar, Justice Alito asserted that a limited public forum is created when a
public school purports to allow students to express their own views.412 In a limited
public forum, he went on, “the State ‘must not discriminate against speech on the
basis of viewpoint,’”413 and cited the other school access cases, Good News Club and
Lamb’s Chapel as well as Rosenberger.414
Justice Alito particularly paused over the footnote in which the majority of the
Ninth Circuit panel asserted that this was not a case of viewpoint discrimination
because Nurre had “‘concede[d] that she was not attempting to express any specific
religious viewpoint’ but instead ‘sought only to “play a pretty piece.”’”415 Alito
found this reasoning “questionable at best” 416 because: (1) the appellate court’s
holding “[did] not appear to depend in any way on petitioner’s motivation” in selecting the piece.417 “Nothing in the body of the court’s opinion suggests that its
decision would have come out the other way if petitioner had favored the Biebl
piece for religious rather than artistic reasons.”418 And (2) the school district banned
the piece precisely because of its perceived religious message, “that members of
the audience would view the performance . . . as the district’s sponsorship of [religion].”419 Alito stated, “Banning speech because of the view that the speech is likely
to be perceived as expressing seems to me to constitute viewpoint discrimination.”420
erect a stone monument containing the “Seven Aphorisms of Summum” in a park in which a similar monument containing the Ten Commandments already stood. As in his dissent in Nurre, Alito set out the distinction between a forum in which tradition or government designation permits private speech, and a forum in
which the government exercises its own right to speak.
If petitioners [the City of Pleasant Grove] were engaging in their own expressive conduct, then
the Free Speech Clause has no application. The Free Speech Clause restricts government regulation of private speech; it does not regulate government speech. (“[T]he Government’s own
speech . . . is exempt from First Amendment scrutiny”); (“Government is not restrained by the
First Amendment from controlling its own expression”). A government entity has the right to
“speak for itself.” “[I]t is entitled to say what it wishes,” and to select the views that it wants
to express (“It is the very business of government to favor and disfavor points of view.”).
Summum, 555 U.S. at 467–68, 470 (citations omitted). Finding that “Permanent monuments displayed on
public property typically represent government speech,” the Court ruled in favor of the City: “In sum, we
hold that the City’s decision to accept certain privately donated monuments while rejecting respondent’s is
best viewed as a form of government speech. As a result, the City’s decision is not subject to the Free Speech
Clause, and the Court of Appeals erred in holding otherwise.” Id. at 481.
411. Nurre, 559 U.S. at 1028.
412. Id. (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829–30 (1995);
and Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 272–73 (1981)).
413. Id. (quoting Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 96 (2001)).
414. Id.
415. Id. at 1029 (quoting Nurre, 580 F.3d at 1095 n.6).
416. Id.
417. Id.
418. Nurre, 559 U.S. at 1029.
419. Id.
420. Id.
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Justice Alito suggested that he also disagreed with the notion that the censorship of Ave Maria could be justified by a reasonableness rationale based on the possibility that the performance could have generated unwanted controversy.421 Alito
cited other cases supporting his statement that the Supreme Court had “categorically reject[ed] the proposition that speech may be censored simply because some
in the audience may find that speech distasteful,” including the student speech
cases, Board of Education Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26 v. Pico and
Tinker.422 Alito perceived what he called a “tension” between this case law and the
Ninth Circuit’s holding that after creating a limited public forum the public school
could ban a performance of a religious piece of music because it might offend some
members of a “captive audience at a graduation ceremony.” 423 Like Judge Smith,
Alito was concerned with the implications of the decision for the “nearly 10 million
public school students in the Ninth Circuit.”424 He agreed with Judge Smith that the
Ninth Circuit’s reasoning had broader implications in that it could “be applied to
almost all public school artistic performances,” and that some school administrators
“may choose to avoid ‘controversy’ by banishing all musical pieces with ‘religious
connotations.’”425 Justice Alito concluded:
A reasonable reading of the Ninth Circuit's decision is that it authorizes
school administrators to ban any controversial student expression at any
school event attended by parents and others who feel obligated to be present because of the importance of the event for the participating students.
A decision with such potentially broad and troubling implications merits
our review.426
iii. Comments on the Opinions of Judge Smith and Justice Alito
The concurrence of Judge Smith and the dissent of Justice Alito are trenchant
criticisms of the lower court opinions, especially in regard to their concern that a
broad reading of Nurre could lead to the prohibition of religiously inspired works at
all school functions. Much of what Brandsma and Whitehead said in their invocation
of Weisman about school control of graduation ceremonies might also be said of
any school event.427 Although the audience of a graduation is “captive” in the sense
that the graduates and their families and friends would not want to miss the event,
or have it ruined by proselytizing religious expression that they have no use for or
even find offensive, the same may be said for a concert, or a play, or any other
school event that may be of great importance to a particular student who wishes to
perform or participate in the event. The Supreme Court’s transference of the rationale for banning government organized prayer from the graduation ceremony in
421. See id.
422. Id. at 1028–29 (citing Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist., No. 26 v. Pico, 457
U.S. 853, 871–72 (1982); and Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508–09 (1969)).
423. Id. at 1029 (quoting Nurre, 508 F.3d at 1095) (“The tension between this reasoning and the
fundamental free speech principles noted above is unmistakable.”).
424. Nurre, 559 U.S. at 1030.
425. Id. (citing Nurre, 508 at 1095, 1091).
426. Id.
427. See supra notes 6263, 67 and accompanying text.
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Weisman to the high school football game of Santa Fe is evidence of the permeable
line between graduation and other school events. 428 If the title of an instrumental
musical work such as “Ave Maria” may be objectionably controversial at graduation,
it could be controversial and therefore deemed unacceptable at any event a school
sponsors.429 But the final irony is that, contrary to Whitehead and Brandsma, Weisman itself did not perceive graduations to be so special as to require the complete
exclusion of any religious trappings: “[A]t graduation time . . . there will be instances
when religious values, religious practices, and religious persons will have some interaction with the public schools and their students.” 430
In her book, Lessons in Censorship, Ross traces the evolution of the Supreme
Court’s treatment of student speech rights. 431 After West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette,432 and Tinker, the Court proceeded to cut back on student
rights in several cases, of which Hazelwood is the most significant.433 In holding that
schools may censor student speech in sponsored school activities where members
of the audience may attribute the speech to the school, Hazelwood, as noted above,
provided the district court with the starting point in its argument that Jackson High
School could legally censor Nurre’s musical performance.434 But many courts forget
Hazelwood’s second requirement for a school’s censorship of student speech, as
did the courts in Nurre. School officials may restrict student speech as long as the
speech occurs in the context of a school-sponsored activity, and “so long as [the
school officials’] actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”435 If the prohibition in Nurre was as unreasonable and overblown as Smith
and Alito suggest, potentially leading to the prohibition of any music that has any
relation to religion in any school-sponsored event, the action of the school officials
was far more deleterious than beneficial to “legitimate pedagogical concerns.”
The persuasive legal arguments Smith and Alito advance notwithstanding,
their opinions are even more provocative in regard to the educational effects of the
428. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 301–02 (2000) (“In Lee v. Weisman . . . we
held that a prayer delivered by a rabbi at a middle school graduation ceremony violated that Clause. Although this case involves student prayer at a different type of school function, our analysis is properly guided
by the principles that we endorsed in Lee.” (citations omitted)).
429. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 45, at *19, (quoting Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210 (1975) (citations omitted) (“The plain, if at times disquieting, truth is that in our
pluralistic society, constantly proliferating new and ingenious forms of expression, ‘we are inescapably captive audiences for many purposes.’ . . . Much that we encounter offends our esthetic, if not our political and
moral, sensibilities. Nevertheless, the Constitution does not permit government to decide which types of
otherwise protected speech are sufficiently offensive to require protection for the unwilling listener or
viewer.”)).
430. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S 577, 598–99 (1992).
431. ROSS, supra note 25, at 13–62.
432. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). In Barnette, the Supreme Court
held that school officials violated the free speech rights of students who were Jehoveh’s Witnesses by punishing them for refusing to salute the flag, an act contrary to their religious beliefs. Id. at 642. The opinion
includes the robust language, “If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official,
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are any circumstances which
permit an exception, they do not now occur to us.” Id.
433. ROSS, supra note 25, at 44–54.
434. See Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988).
435. Id. at 273.
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Ninth Circuit opinion, for both jurists argue that the unconstitutional narrowing of
students’ free speech could lead to a stifling constriction in all areas of knowledge
and creativity that public schools should, on the contrary, zealously foster and nourish.
IV. THE ORAL ARGUMENT436
The significance of statements made in oral argument should be considered
with caution since such statements are likely expressed with less deliberation and
forethought than arguments made in briefs and court opinions. However, because
they arise spontaneously and instinctively, these statements might provide genuine
insight into the real motives underlying the positions taken by the litigants, litigators, and judges, motives that are not expressed officially in court documents because they won’t quite withstand legal scrutiny and, in short, don’t look so good.
Aside from the Ninth Circuit panel’s occasional indulgence in witticisms about
the phrase “Ave Maria” as a football term (the “Hail Mary Pass”), particularly at
Notre Dame,437 the oral arguments, as one might expect, proceeded to address important issues in the litigation. One issue was whether to apply Pearson, which
would allow the court to forego addressing the constitutional issues altogether.438
Another was whether the audience would have recognized the religious significance
of “Ave Maria,”439 and whether school officials may decide what is and is not religious expression.440 However, the oral arguments also revealed something about
the motives of the school administrators in pursuing such an intolerant policy towards religious expression at graduation. In response to Judge Smith’s question of
whether the school district may have been too careful in prohibiting the performance of a piece of music merely because of its title, the attorney for the school
district, Mr. Patterson, made the following point:
But I can tell you this, judge, is that I cannot tell my client to be not careful
enough in this situation. We have already got budget constraints and every
time I stand up here, we get one more teacher out of that classroom and I
got to tell my client you’ve got to be careful, you can’t bring on a lawsuit
because they’re expensive.441
Thus, fear of a costly lawsuit that might compromise the educational mandate of
the school may overrule all other considerations, including reasonableness. Ironically, the school district provoked a lawsuit by being as careful as it was to avoid an
Establishment Clause violation. Later, Judge Tallman asked Patterson about
whether he would advise his client to prohibit the instrumental performance of a

436. Oral Argument, Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087 (2009) (No. 07-35867), https://www.cspan.org/video/?283553-1/nurre-v-whitehead-oral-argument.
437. Id. at 8:45.
438. Id. at 4:04 (regarding the Pearson issue, which the Supreme Court had issued one day before
the Nurre oral arguments). See supra notes 103–105 and accompanying text.
439. Id. at 9:58.
440. Id. at 23:17.
441. Id. at 21:02.
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work such as the “Ode to Joy” from Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony because of a potential lawsuit regarding the religious expression of some of its lyrics.442 Here is the
full exchange on the subject:
Judge Tallman
[T]he problem that, that I have in trying to figure out where we draw the
line is what would you do for example if Ms. Nurre had come back and said
I would like to play from . . . Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony, “Ode to Joy.”. .
. There’s nothing in the title that suggests that it might be religious. You
would actually have to know something about the history and the lyrics
but this is going to be played as an instrumental piece. What would your
advice be to Superintendent Whitehead if Ms. Nurre had proposed “Ode
to Joy”?
Mr. Patterson
If, in fact, I thought that there was a likelihood that there would be an article in the newspapers and that . . . indeed somebody might bring a claim,
I would advise her that you better take the safe side and you better do
exactly what . . . Deputy Superintendent [Karst Brandsma] did and said, I’m
requesting that music selections of graduation be entirely secular or you
increase your graduation program and allow both secular and non-secular
music to occur443

442. Oral Argument, supra note 436, at 26:20. Though generally considered secular in nature, the
“Ode to Joy” does have some rather religious lyrics. For example:
Brothers, above the starry canopy
There must dwell a loving father.
Do you fall in worship, you millions?
World, do you know your creator?
Seek Him in the heavens;
Above the stars must he dwell.
Aaron Green, Beethoven’s “Ode to Joy”: Lyrics, Translation, and History, THOUGHTCO. (Aug. 26, 2017),
https://www.thoughtco.com/beethovens-ode-to-joy-lyrics-history-724410. The German title is “An die
Freude,” and these lines read as follows in German:
Brüder, über’m Sternenzelt
Muß ein lieber Vater wohnen.
Ihr stürzt nieder, Millionen?
Ahnest du den Schöpfer, Welt?
Such’ ihn über’m Sternenzelt!
Über Sternen muß er wohnen.
Id.
443. Oral Argument, supra note 436 at 26:20; cf. supra notes 81–85 and 376 and accompanying
text, indicating that, aside from “Ave Maria,” there was a good amount of secular music played at the Jackson High School graduation of 2006. The courts paid no attention to this, which begs the issue, how much
must the graduation program be expanded to include secular and non-secular music so that the school is
still on “the safe side”?
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Patterson’s advice that the school “take the safe side” reveals the real standard
school administrators may well be applying in deciding whether to ban student religious speech from a graduation ceremony.444 It is not any judicial test for an Establishment Clause violation. It is not the threat of a lawsuit. It is not even whether
someone has complained about the proposed musical work. The actual test is based
on whether the school’s zealously cautious lawyer perceives any possibility that
something critical might appear in the local newspaper. This test does not rely on
any legal standard, but rather on the real or imagined fear of some unfavorable
opinion some member of the public might have, regardless of how extreme, intolerant, or unreasonable that opinion may be. In this case, the decision to prohibit
“Ave Maria” was not based on any constitutional standard, threat of a lawsuit, or
complaint about “Ave Maria.”445 It was based on a complaint that concerned a very
different musical performance a year before.446 This is not consistent with Weisman’s view of graduations: “We do not hold that every state action implicating religion is invalid if one or a few citizens find it offensive. People may take offense at
all manner of religious as well as nonreligious messages, but offense alone does not
in every case show a violation.”447 With some justification, Nurre’s attorney, Mr.
Vander Wel, spoke of this as the “whiff test:”
Essentially, what the school district is asking for here is some kind of whiff
test. If there’s a whiff of religion whether it’s in a newspaper article or
whether it’s in a lawsuit or whatever. If there’s a whiff of religion then we
need to prohibit it. That’s the conservative approach that Mr. Patterson is
advocating. And that does not comport with the establishment clause of
the U.S. Constitution.448
School administrators might not themselves harbor any hostility toward religion,
but if the “whiff test” is indeed the standard, this test is the quintessence of hostility
toward religion, because it accommodates the most hostile possible view of religion
that may be imagined regardless of how unreasonable or even absurd the view may
be.449 This is what “zero tolerance” is all about.
Certainly, school administrators fear lawsuits because of how costly they are
to the school’s budget. As Patterson suggested, every dollar spent on a lawsuit is
444. Id.
445. Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1095 (9th Cir. 2009).
446. Id. at 1091.
447. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 597 (1992).
448. Oral Argument, supra note 436, at 32:26.
449. Brief of Appellant, supra note 38, at 34 (“The actual purpose of [Whitehead’s] order was to
kowtow to the vocal minority who believe that all traces of religion should be removed from public life,
regardless of whether the purposes and policies served by the Establishment Clause are implicated.”); see
also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 45, at *25–26 (“In applying the endorsement test, the [Sixth
Circuit] warned against the danger that religious expression will be suppressed in response to those who
look upon religion with a ‘jaundiced eye.’ . . . [The Sixth Circuit wrote]: . . . ‘We believe that the plaintiffs’
argument presents a new threat to religious speech in the concept of the “Ignoramus’s Veto.” The Ignoramus’s Veto lies in the hands of those determined to see an endorsement of religion, even though a reasonable person, and any minimally informed person, knows that no endorsement is intended, or conveyed.’”
(quoting Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. City of Grand Rapids, 980 F.2d 1538, 1553
(6th Cir. 1992))).
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a dollar taken away from the essential mission of the public school, the education
of children.450 It appears that in recent years, the intrusion of the courts, statutory
mandates, and the involvement of parents have all led to a greater litigiousness in
schools and greater pressure on school administrators to avoid lawsuits. 451 In any
event, the lack of evidence of any real controversy and the potent concern about
litigation costs articulated in the oral arguments suggest that the rationale of
“controversy” was a bit disingenuous on the part of the Ninth Circuit. The school
administrators and their legal counsel were primarily concerned with the specter
of a costly lawsuit which the lone complaint in the Herald might have imparted to
them. Better to “play the safe side” than take a risk.
Consider the situation of Principal Cheshire when he rejected Moffat’s offer
to list “Ave Maria” as “A Selection by Franz Biebl.” He said, “[I]t would be unethical
to inaccurately or untruthfully list the titles to pieces.” 452 Cheshire didn’t explain his
rationale for why such a listing would be unethical or untruthful. 453 There would
have been nothing untruthful or deceptive about listing “Ave Maria” as “A Selection
by Franz Biebl.” It was indeed a selection by Franz Biebl.454 If the school had thus
listed the music in the graduation program, the most reasonable interpretation for
the omission of the religious title would have been that the school was attempting
to avoid the appearance of an implied endorsement of religion. But under Cheshire’s rationale, it would have been preferable to actually advertise the religious
background of “Ave Maria,” making a government endorsement of religion more
plausible. On the other hand, hiding this background was unacceptable to Cheshire’s way of thinking because that would be untruthful and unethical. Either way,
the students would not be able to perform their choice of music, another doublebind.

450. See supra note 441 and accompanying text.
451. See generally, James Wasser, I’m Calling My Lawyer, AASA: The School Superintendents Association, http://aasa.org/SchoolAdministratorArticle.aspx?id=6506 (providing advice in addressing lawsuits against schools and stating in regard to a particular school district where legal expenses exceeded
$500,000 for 2003-04, “The number of lawsuits, the amount of administrative/staff time preparing for and
appearing in the courtroom and subsequent expenses were unacceptable. These lawsuits were taking public money and valuable time away from our students.”); Ron Schachter, “See You in Court,” District Administration (Apr. 2007), https://www.districtadministration.com/article/see-you-court (stating, "In Florida,
we've spent millions and millions of dollars defending against lawsuits" and “82 percent of teachers and 77
percent of principals say they have made decisions driven by a fear of legal challenges.”); Gary Hopkins, Has
the Threat of Lawsuits Changed Our Schools?, Education World, The Principal Files, http://www.educationworld.com/a_admin/admin/admin371.shtml (quoting a middle school principal as stating, "The current legal atmosphere creates a more cautious approach for me and my district. . . . We are always considering
the legal ramifications of issues with students and staff. The threat of a lawsuit, no matter how frivolous, is
something that colors many decisions we make.").
452. See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text.
453. Patterson commented at oral argument, “But the point was that the principal [sic] here in,
in, indicating that Ave Maria despite the fact that it was going to be an instrumental was going to be listed
on the program. And the suggestion was made, well, why don’t we just take that off? And the point was is
we’re not going to take that off because that wouldn’t be truthful, that would be deceptive and we’re not
going to allow that because we want to be transparent.” Oral Argument, supra note 436, at 25:37.
454. Matthew Oltman, The Iconic One Hit Wonder: The History and Reception of Franz Biebl’s Ave
Maria 1-2 (July 2017) (unpublished DMA dissertation, University of Nebraska-Lincoln) (on file with Student
Research, Creative Activity, and Performance – School of Music, University of Nebraska-Lincoln).
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Why unethical? Could it be that if the school were to allow the performance
of “Ave Maria” without identifying its proper religious name, perhaps the school
could then be accused of surreptitiously subjecting dissenters to religious music
without their knowing it? Perhaps this might be an even worse violation of the Establishment Clause than forcing a captive audience to listen to religious music identified as such, because in that case at least the audience would know of the imposture. What if such dissenters discover they like the music which they otherwise
would despise had they known of its religious association? If this is indeed a harm,
the only solution is banning the music with its religious title. But if that is necessary,
would it not be necessary to ban any other expression of art, history, or knowledge
with a religious connection? Must public school authorities enforce a blanket ban
on a student speaker’s mention of the opposition to slavery on the basis of religion
by Christians such as William Wilberforce, 455 or the big bang theory of the Catholic
priest, Georges Lemaître?456 The vast constriction of knowledge is patent. As Justice
Alito put it, “Why . . . should the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning apply only to musical
performances and not to other forms of student expression, including student
speeches at graduation ceremonies and other comparable school events?” 457
Cheshire could have relayed Moffat’s offer to his superiors such as Brandsma
and Whitehead, to see if it could be acceptable as a compromise. After all, even in
the Lassonde case, the principal did not outright forbid any proselytizing speech,
but negotiated a resolution of the issue. 458 However, the reader may recall Whitehead’s testimony that the previous year was Cheshire’s first as principal of Jackson
High School.459 Not knowing that he was supposed to examine the lyrical contents
of any musical performance as well as the title, Cheshire approved the choral performance of “Up Above My Head” without knowing its lyrics, which were the source
of the controversy that concerned Whitehead.460 The testimony implies some
blame may have been placed on the principal for the complaints. Cheshire may
have been right to conclude that the School District Administration had made a final
decision and the best thing for the students would be to move on so they could

455. See generally BERTRAM WYATT-BROWN, LEWIS TAPPAN AND THE EVANGELICAL WAR AGAINST SLAVERY 6
(1997) (discussing William Wilberforce’s opposition to slavery on the basis of his Christian faith); ERIC
METAXIS, AMAZING GRACE: WILLIAM WILBERFORCE AND THE HEROIC CAMPAIGN TO END SLAVERY (2007) (discussing William Wilberforce’s opposition to slavery on the basis of his Christian faith).
456. See generally THE BIG BANG AND GEORGES LEMAÎTRE: PROCEEDINGS OF A SYMPOSIUM IN HONOUR OF G.
LEMAÎTRE FIFTY YEARS AFTER HIS INITIATION OF BIG-BANG COSMOLOGY, LOUVAIN-IA-NEUVE, BELGIUM, 10–13 OCTOBER
1983 (André Berger ed. 1984) (discussing Georges Lemaître’s development of the big bang theory); JOHN
FARRELL, THE DAY WITHOUT YESTERDAY: LEMAÎTRE, EINSTEIN AND THE BIRTH OF MODERN COSMOLOGY (2005) (discussing
Georges Lemaître’s development of the big bang theory).
457. Nurre v. Whitehead, 559 U.S. 1025, 1030 (2010); cf. Jonassen, supra note 25, at 761–62.
458. Lassonde v. Pleasanton Unified Sch. Dist., 320 F.3d 979, 981 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Before Plaintiff
agreed to excise the proselytizing portions of the graduation speech, the parties engaged in discussions to
determine what Plaintiff would and would not be allowed to say. . . . The parties eventually reached a compromise.”).
459. See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text.
460. See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text.

2018

THE “AVE MARIA” EFFECT

799

prepare to perform another musical work.461 It may have been pointless and impolitic to attempt to save the performance of “Ave Maria” which the higher school
official had definitely decided to reject.
One more incident from the oral argument is worthy of note. Near the end of
the session, Vander Wel declared that Nurre “had a right to choose the song and
the question is why was that right deprived from her?”462 Judge Beezer then asked,
“Wait a minute, is that a, is that a right or is that just part of the educational process?”463 And then there is a pause in which Judge Beezer added under his breath
in an impatient if not exasperated tone, “Come on . . . .”464 “Come on” is an informal
phrase whose meaning depends a lot on the context and manner with which it is
expressed.465 With the right intonation, the phrase is used to express disagreement,
or disbelief, or annoyance: Oh come on, Kyle, you made the same excuse last
week!”466 Did the phrase betray an elemental skepticism on the part of Judge Beezer that Nurre’s case implicated any free speech rights at all?
V. THE AMICI CURIAE BRIEFS
A. The National School Boards Association
There were two Amici Curiae briefs submitted to the Ninth Circuit in the Nurre
case that favored the school district and warrant discussion.467 One was submitted
by the National School Boards Association (NSBA) and several other organizations
representing school boards and school administrators who supported the Everett
School District.468 This brief pointed out the legal confusion surrounding Free
Speech and Establishment Clause issues in public schools and questioned whether
instrumental music subject to the approval of school administrators should enjoy
free speech protection at all.469 The brief also reviewed the ill effects of litigation
expenses on education and educators, arguing for a “play in the joints” rule by

461. Deposition upon Oral Examination of Lesley Moffat, supra note 37, at 41 (quoting Cheshire
as stating, “Graduation’s coming up. We need to move forward with this,” and continuing “And so it was
agreed that it would not make sense to try to hold out and do this so that these kids then at the last minute
might not be able to.”).
462. Oral Argument, supra note 436, at 31:37.
463. Id. at 31:41.
464. Id. at 31:47. The Transcript from Westlaw, supra note 100, at *11, has “go on” rather than
“come on.” The reader, however, may listen to the video recording, supra note 436, to decide what the
judge actually said. In the author’s opinion, it was, “come on,” with the intonation described above.
465. See Cambridge Dictionary, Meaning of “come on” in the English Dictionary, CAMBRIDGE
DICTIONARY, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/come-on (last visited Mar. 30, 2018).
466. Id.
467. See Brief of Amici Curiae National School Boards Association, et. al., in Support of DefendantAppellee, Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F 3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2009) (No. 07-35867), 2008 WL 1723135 [hereinafter
NSBA Brief]; Brief of Americans United for Separation of Church and State as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Defendant-Appellee’s Request for Affirmance, Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2009) (No. 0735687), 2008 WL 1723136 [hereinafter Americans United Brief].
468. NSBA Brief, supra note 467.
469. Id. at 9 (“Also at least debatable is whether the selection of a musical composition for final
approval by school authorities constitutes protected speech at all -- i.e., whether it represents a constitutionally protected viewpoint against which school officials could have discriminated.”).
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which school officials may be afforded qualified immunity or some discretion in allowing or disallowing the performance of a work like “Ave Maria.”470
In effect, the brief was against the recognition of student rights, and the NSBA
got what it wanted. Except for Justice Alito, all the judges who reviewed this case
openly sympathized with the educators for the confusion in this area of law which
the courts themselves have caused.471 Not only did Judge Lasnik speak of school
administrators “being whipsawed” by the contending demands of Free Speech and
the Establishment Clause,472 but Judge Smith observed that school officials “often
find themselves in a Catch-22.”473 In recognition of the unsettled questions of law
involved in this case, the district court gave Whitehead qualified immunity on all
counts,474 and also ruled that the municipality had no liability because of the judge’s
findings of no constitutional violations.475 Because the appellate court found that
there was no violation of Nurre’s constitutional rights, it did not reach the qualified
immunity issue.476 Finally, the Supreme Court denied certiorari, guaranteeing that
this area of law would continue to be unsettled and confused, thereby providing
school administrators with a good argument for qualified immunity and for taking
“the safe side” in the future by banning any suggestion of a religious reference at
graduation.477 The Supreme Court’s ruling in Pearson provided even more cover for
school administrators, because under that ruling, a court may dismiss an alleged
constitutional violation by examining the issue of qualified immunity before or even
without addressing the constitutional issue.478 Except for cases of plain incompetence and knowing violation of the law, Pearson guarantees that a case like Nurre
will almost always be dismissed, without any assessment of the violation of free
speech. Matthew J. Shechtman has illustrated this problem well in his article, Piercing Pearson: Is Qualified Immunity Curbing Students’ Religious Speech Rights?479
Confronted with the difficult question of whether a school has violated a student’s
right to free speech because of religious expression, an issue “scarcely clarified by
Supreme Court jurisprudence,” courts have
[A]n easy out in the form of qualified immunity dismissal. Without ever
addressing whether the student’s rights exist under the First Amendment,
the school board and its policies can theoretically persist indefinitely under
this legal regime . . . This potentially continuous immunity loop works to
the detriment of students’ rights to free speech and religious exercise. It
also allows for the entrenchment of poor school policy and the limitation
of thought diversity at the most critical stages of child development. 480
470. Id. at 18–19.
471. See Nurre v. Whitehead, 559 U.S. 1025 (2010).
472. Nurre v. Whitehead, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1239 (W.D. Wash. 2007).
473. Nurre, 580 F.3d at 1102.
474. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1239–40 (9th Cir. 2009).
475. Id. at 1240–41.
476. Nurre, 580 F.3d at 1099 (“While Nurre could maintain a post-graduation claim for monetary
damages, we hold that the district court properly granted summary judgment to the defendants—Whitehead and the District—because Nurre failed to show any constitutional violation.”).
477. See supra note 443 and accompanying text.
478. See supra notes 98–100 and accompanying text.
479. Shechtman, supra note 25.
480. Id. at 19–20 (footnotes omitted).
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This is the “Ave Maria” effect which Nurre illustrates. The state of the law provides school administrators with the incentive to exclude all religious expression
from high school graduations, whether violative of the Constitution or not, to eliminate any possibility of complaints or lawsuits, and even if this leads to “zero tolerance” for any expression that might be construed as religious, the uncertain state
of the law provides these officials with qualified immunity under which such a blanket exclusion to avoid a lawsuit is acceptable under the Establishment Clause defense as long as it was not implemented by incompetence or in knowing violation
of the law. How could any school administrator who bans religious expression be
found incompetent or in knowing violation of the law if the law is not clarified?
Such a zero-tolerance policy, however, is not reasonable under the standards
of the limited public forum under which it should be tested. Amidst the sympathetic
shelter they granted to school administrators, most of the judges in Nurre demonstrated little concern for the rights and interests of students, who, after all, were
the alleged victims of constitutional violations and the supposed beneficiaries of
public school education, but who have no remedy even if their rights were violated.
B. Americans United for Separation of Church and State
Another Amicus Curiae Brief came from Americans United for Separation of
Church and State.481 Unlike the opinions of the district and appellate courts, this
brief rejected forum analysis altogether by identifying all speech at a public school
graduation as the school’s own speech, or government speech, so that students had
no free speech rights at all:
Jackson High School did not create a forum for private expression by having its Wind Ensemble perform a song at its graduation ceremony . . . The
School . . . exercised complete editorial control over its carefully planned
and scripted graduation ceremony, retaining the authority to review and
approve the song that its Wind Ensemble played. The Wind Ensemble performed only at the School’s invitation and direction . . . The Wind Ensemble
performance constituted quintessential government speech. As such, the
School – not any individual student – retained the authority and discretion
to select the piece to be performed.482
According to this brief, the graduation ceremony was “no forum at all . . . one in
which the government is the speaker and a right of private access does not exist.” 483
Americans United, therefore, agreed that the Ninth Circuit reached the correct result, but argued that it was an error to assume there was any limited public forum.484
“[T]he analytical framework of the government-speech doctrine provides a more
apt characterization of the speech at issue here because . . . the performance was
presented by a Jackson High School class, at the government’s invitation, with the
government’s approval and involvement, and subject at all times to the government’s control.”485
481.
482.
483.
484.
485.

Americans United Brief, supra note 467.
Id. at 2–3.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 8–9.
Id.
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In contrast to the opinions of the Nurre district and appellate courts, the
Americans United brief’s reasoning is at least coherent. By arguing that a graduation
ceremony is no forum at all, Americans United avoids all the factual and logical inconsistencies and arbitrary citations to authorities evident in the Nurre opinions
that result from assuming that a limited public forum existed at the Jackson High
School graduation, and then ignoring that assumption. But there are at least two
major problems with the Americans United brief. The first is that it overlooks the
district court’s finding that there was a genuine question of material fact as to
whether the school exercised sufficient control and censorship over what the Wind
Ensemble played at graduation—that is, there was sufficient dispute to preclude
summary judgment based on the absence of a limited public forum. That finding
made it a matter of Civil Procedure 101 for the court to have the jury decide the
factual issues that would determine the type of forum the court was addressing.486
The second problem concerns Americans United’s argument for the absolute
exclusion of free speech at a public school graduation and its embrace of the notion
that all speech at such events is government speech.487 This position rests on a set
of citations to opinions which purportedly identified the purpose of graduation ceremonies. The brief quotes the following statement from ACLU v. Black Horse Pike
Regional Board of Education: “[h]igh school graduation ceremonies have not been
regarded, either by law or tradition, as public fora where a multiplicity of views on
any given topic, secular or religious, can be expressed and exchanged.”488 This statement originated from a district court opinion in Lundberg v. West Monona County
School District, which stated without any legal citation or historical authority,

486. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
487. Americans United admitted of only one case as an instance in which the “government ha[s]
completely ceded authority over the selection and presentation of graduation-ceremony content” so that
the resulting expression would “qualify as free speech.” Americans United Brief, supra note 466, at 23.
Adler v. Duval County School Board addressed the issue of “whether the Duval County school system’s policy
of permitting a graduating student, elected by her class, to deliver an unrestricted message of her choice at
the beginning and/or closing of graduation ceremonies is facially violative of the Establishment Clause.” 206
F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc), aff’d en banc, 250 F.3d 1330, 1332 (11th Cir. 2001). The Eleventh Circuit
ruled that such a policy does not violate the Establishment Clause even if it were to result in a graduation
prayer or, presumably, a proselytizing message, as long as the school did not review the chosen speech. 250
F.3d at 1342.
[T]he total absence of state involvement in deciding whether there will be a graduation message, who will speak, or what the speaker may say combined with the student speaker’s complete autonomy over the content of the message [means] that the message delivered, be it
secular or sectarian or both, is not state-sponsored.
Id. at 1342 (quoting Adler, 206 F.3d at 1071). Adler is different from Nurre to the extent that the policy in
Adler would permit a religious message at graduation, so that Adler is a true Establishment Clause case.
Nurre does not involve a religious message, so that it is not really an Establishment Clause case, but rather
a case in which Establishment Clause concerns lead to censorship of much more than religious expression,
violating the right of Free Speech. Thus, Americans United for Separation of Church and State advanced an
analysis that accepts Adler, which would allow religious messages at a graduation, or messages that could
presumably be racist, sexist, or homophobic, as long as school authorities had nothing to do with the message, but disapproves Nurre’s case, where the performance of a musical work at graduation would have
had little or nothing to do with religion at all.
488. 84 F.3d 1471, 1478 (3d Cir. 1996).
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“[g]raduation ceremonies have never served as forums for public debate or discussions, or as a forum through which to allow varying groups to voice their views.
Schools hold graduation ceremonies for very limited secular purposes—to congratulate graduates of the high school.”489 The statement then appeared in the Third
Circuit opinions of Brody v. Spang,490 Black Horse, and finally in the Fifth Circuit’s
opinion for Doe v. Santa Fe Independent School District,491 which cited Brody rather
than Lundberg for the proposition, prompting one of the dissenting judges to aptly
observe, “[T]he majority panhandles a remote district court’s musings as Third Circuit law without proper attribution.”492 In fact, the statement is untrue.
In 1940, the University of Pennsylvania accepted a Ph.D. dissertation submitted by William L. Fink, the vice-principal of Reading High School in Reading, Pennsylvania.493 It was entitled, “Evaluation of Commencement Practices in American
Public Secondary Schools.” 494 For his dissertation, Fink surveyed and analyzed the
graduation practices of three hundred and thirty-two public high schools from all
over the United States.495 The study consists mostly of the answers that cooperating
school officials provided in response to Fink’s questionnaire about the practices of
their high school commencement exercises. 496 A particular area of interest was the
extent of student participation in planning and organizing the graduation exercises.497 Fink presented a table categorizing the varying degrees of student participation permitted by the schools in planning the ceremonies.498 The table also indicated the number of schools which placed themselves in each of these categories. 499
Pupil Participation in Planning Program
Number of Schools
I. Class has no voice in planning the program
93
II. Class had some voice in planning the program
128
III. Class had considerable voice in planning the program
80
IV. Program was entirely class planned
20
V. Any other method
5
VI. No information
6
TOTAL
332500
489. 731 F. Supp. 331, 339 (N.D. Iowa 1989).
490. 957 F.2d 1108, 1119–20 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Lundberg, 731 F. Supp. at 339).
491. 168 F.3d 806, 820 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Brody, 957 F.2d at 1117) (“Neither its character nor
its history makes the subject graduation ceremony in general or the invocation and benediction portions in
particular appropriate fora for such public discourse.”).
492. Id. at 832 n.12 (Jolly, J., dissenting).
493. William Leroy Fink, Evaluation of Commencement Practices in American Public Secondary
Schools (1940) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania). Mr. Fink is identified as the viceprincipal of Reading High School in several articles from a local newspaper, for example, Students in Service,
READING
EAGLE,
Nov.
10,
1943,
at
16,
https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1955&dat=19431110&id=N6khAAAAIBAJ&sjid=fJoFAAAAIBAJ&pg=3750,135668&hl=en.
494. Fink, supra note 492, at 30.
495. Id. at 30.
496. See generally id.
497. See generally id.
498. Id. at 89.
499. Id.
500. Fink, supra note 493, at 89.
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As the author observed, “[S]chools in which pupils have at least some voice in
planning the commencement program outnumber more than two to one schools in
which the pupils have no such privilege.” 501 The table also reveals that schools in
which students either had a considerable voice in planning or planned the entire
graduation program themselves made up just over thirty percent of all the schools
that responded.502
From the high schools that responded, Fink distilled a set of seventeen master
objectives, under which he listed general commencement practices that he believed contributed to the achievement of these master objectives; then, under the
general practices, Fink listed specific examples of what the students actually were
allowed to do at their graduation exercises.503 Among the master objectives and
their supporting general practices and specific examples are the following:
Master Objective VI: To offer an opportunity for active student participation.504
General Practice
1. Members of the class have a voice in choosing the commencement
theme.505
Specific Example
In Manhasset, Long Island, “[a] panel discussion prepared for
assembly became the basis of a commencement program . .
. .”506
General Practices
2. [Students] participate actively in planning the program.507
3. The program is presented wholly by the class, except for the presentation of diplomas and awards.508

501. Id.
502. Id. at 89.
503. Id. at 72–113. From the schools that had responded, Fink selected one at random from each
of the then forty-eight states and asked the principals of these schools to list their objectives in planning
their graduation exercises. Id. at 41. Through a process Fink called “telescoping,” he assembled one hundred
and fifty-five objectives which he distilled from the following sources: a jury of education professionals, the
literature on commencement, responses of forty-eight principals of responding schools selected at random
one from each state, and a group of college professors. Fink reduced these objectives into seventeen categories which he called “master objectives.” Id. at 4769. He then added the general practices and specific
examples which supported the master objectives. Id. Fink collected these examples from commencement
programs and announcements, from responses he got to his questionnaire, and from the Pennsylvania high
school commencements he personally attended in 1938 and 1939. Fink, supra note 492, at 71.
504. Id. at 88.
505. Id.
506. Id. at 8889.
507. Id. at 89.
508. Id.
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6. The script is pupil written; it is not edited by adults to the point
where it ceases to be the work of the pupil.509
Master Objective VII: To encourage creative effort in a large range of activities.510
General Practice
1. Under proper guidance, the class is permitted to plan a program which is
truly representative of the philosophy of the class. 511
Specific Example
In Plymouth, Massachusetts, a senior class planned “an interesting commencement program featuring a New England town meeting.”512
General Practice
2. The program reflects the degree of originality which the class possesses. 513
Specific Example
In Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, students presented a program with a dramatic production. One of its episodes was a discussion of “the problems of
American youth.”514
General Practice
3. The script of the program represents a creative work in English composition.515
Specific Example
In Lincoln, Nebraska, the teachers committee selected two compositions
for oral presentation at commencement.516

509.
510.
511.
512.
513.
514.
515.
516.

Fink, supra note 493, at 89.
Id. at 90.
Id.
Id. at 91.
Id.
Id.
Fink, supra note 493, at 91.
Id.
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General Practice
4. Composing, harmonizing, or rendering musical compositions challenges creative effort.517
Specific Example
Among several examples of musical presentations, the students in
Muhlenberg Township, Pennsylvania presented a program entitled
“America’s Musical Heritage” featuring “Indian, Pilgrim, and Negro
music.”518
According to Fink’s study, during the nineteen thirties, graduating seniors at American public high schools commonly presented panel discussions, town hall meetings, dramatic and musical performances, and readings of student works at their
graduation ceremonies as exhibits of their educational achievements. Almost a
third of all high schools permitted students to plan a considerable portion of their
graduation ceremonies themselves.519 This taxonomy of pre-World War II commencement practices in American public high schools is good evidence of the freedom and variety of creative expression, including political expression, that many
secondary schools of the time afforded their students at commencement. Further
historical research reveals that the student speeches traditionally delivered by valedictorians and salutatorians at American public high school commencements find
their origin in student speeches delivered by each one of the graduates at commencement as a demonstration of what every graduating student had learned.520
The argument of Americans United is thus based on a false premise. Contrary
to Americans United,521 graduation ceremonies by both tradition and government
delegation celebrated the achievements of the graduates, not simply by handing
out diplomas, but through exhibitions of what the students had learned and the
talents they had developed through their own self-expression, even permitting
spontaneous debate in what today would probably be termed limited public forums.522 The argument of Americans United, stripped of its historical and judicial
underpinning, is revealed to be the same tautology discussed earlier: that student

517. Id.
518. Id. at 91–92.
519. See supra note 500501 and accompanying text.
520. Jonassen, supra note 25, at 766–75.
521. Americans United Brief, supra note 466.
522. Of course, one must not naively idealize the era. School officials probably retained ultimate
authority to allow or forbid student expression at graduation. This was also the time of segregated schools
and the Jim Crow South, long before Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), put an
end to the legality of segregating public schools by race, and long before the passage of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 outlawed discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in voter registration,
schools, the workplace, and public accommodations. There was far less diversity of ethnicity and race in the
schools. However, for evidence that even in a segregated school in Alabama during the 1920s, a student
believed that the principal could not dictate to him what to say in his valedictorian speech, and was allowed
to give his own speech, see RICHARD WRIGHT, BLACK BOY: A RECORD OF CHILDHOOD AND YOUTH 202–06 (World
Publ’g Co. 1950) (1937).
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speech at graduation is subject to censorship because it is being censored. 523 The
tautology effectively excludes the possibility that the students have any free speech
rights predicated on the establishment of a limited public forum. But if free speech
does not exist whenever the government decides to exercise censorship, the question arises: Is there any forum in which free speech rights are guaranteed? 524 What
is to prevent the state from simply censoring speech in any forum, including the
traditional public forum, if the state’s power to censor is all that is needed to justify
censorship? Whether in a limited public forum or in a traditional public forum free
speech exists, if it exists at all, only because of the guarantees found in the government’s compact with the people, the Constitution, in which the government makes
a covenant to restrain itself in limiting speech, regardless of the government’s
power to censor speech completely.
For all its consistency, the brief submitted by the Americans United for Separation of Church and State exhibits an intellectual tendency towards intolerance
bordering on totalitarianism. It skirts the issue of whether any free speech rights
exist based on the circumstances of the case and lends facile support to government
control for any speech the government objects to no matter how unreasonable. As
this Article has argued several times, this case was not about freedom of religious
expression. It was really about freedom of artistic expression. The fact that Americans United got behind this suppression of artistic expression merely because of the
name of the prohibited musical work indicates how the unreasonable imposition of
Establishment Clause limitations can lead to zero-tolerance prohibition of expression far beyond genuine religious expression, even to cultural icons like the “Ode to
Joy.” It is also an indication of how hostility to religion can lead to the suppression
of free speech rights having little to do with religion.
To see this, one need look no further than the survey of William L. Fink, who
documented musical and dramatic performances, debates, and new England style
town hall meetings at public high school graduations in the 1930s and ’40s.525 This
was a liberal tradition of a bygone era, which, to some extent, is also reflected in
Tinker whose author, Justice Fortas, writing in 1969, was perhaps not so far removed from Fink’s time period to have forgotten the importance of free expression
in public school education:
In our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism. School officials do not possess absolute authority over their students.
. . . In our system, students may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients
of only that which the State chooses to communicate. They may not be
confined to the expression of those sentiments that are officially approved. In the absence of a specific showing of constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their speech, students are entitled to freedom of expression of their views.526

523. See supra Section III(D)(ii)(b)(2).
524. See supra notes 154–158 and accompanying text on the varying tests the courts apply to
government restrictions on speech depending on the type of forum involved.
525. See supra notes 493–518 and accompanying text.
526. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist. 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
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Compare this to the contemporary assessment of a distinguished constitutional
scholar: “Student speakers, such as valedictorians, are only permitted to deliver
speeches that the school authorities accept as furthering the goals and objectives
of the graduation ceremony.” 527 School authorities “can decide that the only students permitted to speak will recite the principal's favorite poem.”528
VI. CONCLUSION
In its Amicus Curiae brief, the National School Boards Association made the
following point:
[L]awsuits like this one frequently lead to ironic results. . . . [L]itigation ostensibly intended to defend freedom of expression in schools often has the
opposite effect. . . . [I]f allowing students to make an initial selection of
music is to be construed as opening a limited open forum and exposing
school officials and the public fisc to greater potential liability . . . Amici
fully expect that the prudent if regrettable response will be to avoid the
question in the future by having school officials alone make every such selection.529
In this way, the National School Board Association elegantly told the judges that in
the event Nurre should vindicate her free speech rights, the victory would only lead
to greater repression of student speech. As it is, even though Nurre lost, one may
rest assured that the school officials of the Everett School District and others will
control student expression at graduation all the more tightly so that there would be
no possibility that any court could conclude that the school had created a limited
public forum. This is a classic no win situation. A “Catch 22” indeed.
When the Supreme Court in Weisman spoke of the “high degree of control”
principals exercise over the program, speeches, timing, movements, dress, and decorum of the students at graduation,530 when the Cole opinion referred to the “plenary control” schools exercise especially over student speech at graduation,531
when courts flatly state that graduation ceremonies have never been “regarded,
either by law or tradition, as public fora where . . . views . . . can be expressed and
exchanged,”532 these courts were not reflecting the traditional nature of graduation
practices which Fink recorded in the nineteen thirties and forties. 533 But these assessments of graduation ceremonies might well reflect what has become standard
operating procedure for high school graduations today, when school administrators
and their lawyers defensively exercise control over student expression at gradua-

527. Alan E. Brownstein, Prayer and Religious Expression at High School Graduations: Constitutional Etiquette in a Pluralistic Society, 5 NEXUS 61, 6162 (2000).
528. Id.
529. NSBA Brief, supra note 467, at 17–19.
530. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 597 (1992).
531. Cole v. Oroville Union High Sch., 228 F.3d 1092, 1103 (9th Cir. 2000).
532. ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1478 (3d Cir. 1996).
533. See Fink, supra note 493.
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tion by scrupulously reviewing and scrubbing student speech clean of any expression that could conceivably lead to litigation.534 As Nurre demonstrates, school officials do this because the complicated and uncertain state of the law puts them in
fear of lawsuits and controversy if they make a mistake in allowing students freedom of expression at graduation. Thus, schools implement a zero-tolerance policy
which can cover much more than what can reasonably be considered religious expression. What is significant about the Nurre decision is that it marks the point in
which the courts have tacitly given their blessing to all this with little recourse in
sight.
Fink’s survey was taken before the Supreme Court accorded students any
rights of free speech in cases such as Barnette in 1943 (holding that the Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment protects students in public schools from being
forced to salute the American flag or recite the Pledge of Allegiance) 535 and Tinker
in 1969 (holding that the free Speech Clause of the First Amendment protects the
right of students in public schools to wear black armbands in protest to the War in
Vietnam).536 It came before the Supreme Court developed the public forum doctrine in the mid 1980s.537 Fink’s dissertation predated the development of the government speech doctrine.538 It also predated the Supreme Court’s decision in Weisman in 1993 (holding that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment prohibits public schools from inviting a cleric to recite a nondenominational prayer at

534. In the cases of Nurre v. Whitehead, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1222 (W.D. Wash. 2007), aff’d 580 F.3d
1087 (9th Cir. 2009), McComb v. Crehan, 320 F. App’x. 507 (9th Cir. 2009), and Corder v. Lewis Palmer Sch.
Dist. No. 98, 566 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 2009), school officials reviewed and censored student speech. Every
year one may find instances of student graduation speakers who attempt to evade restrictions on their
speech, and usually these restrictions don’t involve religious expression. See, e.g., Avi Selk, A Valedictorian
Went Rogue in His Speech. His School Tried to Shut Him down, WASH. POST (June 20, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/education/wp/2017/06/20/a-valedictorian-went-rogue-in-his-final-speech-his-school-tried-to-shut-him-down/?utm_term=.3d935625aaad (video showing student’s microphone cut off when he departed from approved speech to criticize the school administration); James
Michael Nichols, Evan Young, Gay Valedictorian Barred from Giving Speech, Finally Gets His Chance,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 3, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/06/03/gay-valedictorianspeech_n_7502684.html (gay valedictorian not permitted to give speech in which he planned to come out
of the closet); Elisa Gootman, A Valedictorian Loses, Then Regains Her Diploma, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2004),
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/29/nyregion/a-valedictorian-loses-then-regains-her-diploma.html (valedictorian denied her diploma for giving a speech highlighting problems at her school).
535. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633–34 (1943).
536. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512–13 (1969).
537. The U.S. Supreme Court has developed the public forum doctrine in several opinions, the
first two of which were Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983), and Cornelius
v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
538. The U.S. Supreme Court first implied the doctrine in Wooley v. Maynard by acknowledging a
legitimate government interest in communicating to the public an official message. 430 U.S. 705, 716
(1977). In Rust v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court held doctors paid by the government in a government health
program were speaking for the government, so that the government may prohibit them from advising patients on obtaining abortions. 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991). In Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, the Supreme
Court held that a municipality was exercising government speech in accepting a privately funded permanent
monument in a public park while rejecting another from a different private organization. 555 U.S. 460, 469
(2009). Under the government speech doctrine, the Free Speech clause of the First Amendment prohibits
the government from regulating private speech but does not restrict the government when it is speaking
for itself. Id.
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a public school graduation).539 The disturbing reality emerges that if indeed there
has been a sea change in graduation ceremonies from greater freedom of student
expression to absolute and complete control by school authorities, this change has
not been the result of any tradition, but rather the result of the intrusion of the
courts upon the discretion of school administrators and officials. The plenary control the courts speak of is not a custom of American education, but rather a creation
of the courts.
Perhaps Justice Black in his Tinker dissent and Justice Thomas in his Morse
concurrence were correct to argue that the Court should not usurp the discretion
of school officials.540 But for a reason that neither of these jurists perceived: That is,
the involvement of the courts in the issues of Free Speech and the Establishment
Clause in public schools would ultimately diminish the free speech of students by
incentivizing a zero-tolerance policy that prohibits all student expression at graduation for reasons that ultimately have little to do with student rights, but a great
deal to do with avoiding any liability as school officials clutch ever more tightly to
their budgets and their careers.
Also contrary to the traditional notions of student speech at graduation is the
vision of public school government speech that Americans United enthusiastically
advocated. This vision is, however, the logical outcome of case law, which insists
that everything that happens at a public school graduation, including the speech
and musical expression of the students, is really the school’s speech. Students who
have earned the right to ostensibly deliver their own speeches at graduation, but
then find this right conditioned on acceptance of school censorship,541 become, as

539. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1993).
540. In Tinker, Justice Hugo Black issued a dissent in which he disagreed that judges should second-guess the decisions of school officials concerning what student speech to allow:
This case, therefore, wholly without constitutional reasons in my judgment, subjects all the
public schools in the country to the whims and caprices of their . . . students . . . . I wish,
therefore, wholly to disclaim . . . that the Federal Constitution compels the teachers, parents,
and elected school officials to surrender control of the American public school system to public school students. I dissent.
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 525–26 (Black, J., dissenting). Similarly, in Morse
v. Frederick, Justice Clarence Thomas argued that the Supreme Court should overrule its holding in Tinker.
I join the Court’s opinion because it eroded Tinker’s hold in the realm of student speech, even
though it does so by adding to the patchwork of exceptions to the Tinker standard. I think the
better approach is to dispense with Tinker altogether, and given the opportunity, I would do
so.
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 422 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring).
541. Under the principal of “unconstitutional conditions,” the government “may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected freedom of speech even if he has no
entitlement to that benefit.” Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996) (quoting Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)); see also Amicus Brief for National Legal Foundation in Support of
Plaintiff-Appellant Supporting Reversal, at 3, Corder v. Lewis Palmer Sch. Dist. No. 38, 566 F.3d 1219 (10th
Cir. 2008) (No. 08-1293) 2008 WL 5609517. Justice Kennedy’s concern in Weisman, that religious conformity
should not be the price of attending one’s own graduation is a formulation that reflects the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine. However, the doctrine may apply with even more force to the situation in which a
student who has earned the privilege of delivering a speech or performing at a graduation must waive free
speech rights by submitting to the censorship of school authorities.
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Justice Alito put it, mere puppets of school officials.542 The appropriate disclaimer
for any student expression at a public school graduation should then be: “The views
expressed have been censored by the school administration and do not necessarily
represent the views of the student.”543 This is a far more genuine issue of transparency than hiding the title of “Ave Maria” ever could be.
The Supreme Court should rethink its jurisprudence regarding public high
school graduations. The courts should take into consideration the deleterious effects of the fear of litigation the case law now inspires. This means the courts ought
to provide more guidance regarding violations of Free Speech and the Establishment Clause. On the other hand, the courts might also step back to allow school
administrators a bit of the “play-in-the-joints” discretion at graduation recommended by the National School Boards Association,544 so that litigation only occurs
where school officials allow or perpetrate clear and obvious violations of students’
rights at graduation. Certainly, many school administrators will, to some extent,
abuse their discretion in limiting student expression, or in permitting religious expression. However, as in the period Fink studied, other administrators will make
good decisions balancing student Free Speech with the Establishment Clause so that
a freer, more creative culture will return to at least some public high school graduations where administrators no longer labor under the abject fear of being sued, or
feel it necessary to become minor tyrants in suppressing student speech. In this
way, the public school graduation may once more become a celebration of student
learning and creativity and not a government exercise in zero-tolerance, nor an exhibition of the “Ave Maria” effect.545

542. Nurre v. Whitehead, 559 U.S. 1025, 1028 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)
(“School administrators may not behave like puppeteers who create the illusion that students are engaging
in personal expression when in fact the school administration is pulling the strings.”).
543. See Jonassen, supra note 25.
544. NSBA Brief, supra note 467, at 18.
545. See Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1099 (9th Cir. 2009) (Smith, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“The taking of such unnecessary measures by school administrators will only foster the
increasingly sterile and hypersensitive way in which students may express themselves in such fora, and hasten the retrogression of our young into a nation of Philistines, who have little or no understanding of our
civic and cultural heritage.”).

